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GOD'S ETERNAL LAW

AFTER St. Thomas lays down his definition of law in general, he proceeds to discuss the various kinds of law in particular. Chief among these, as their source and origin, is the eternal law of God. First he shows that the eternal law exists and then he investigates its nature. His proof that there has existed a law in the mind of God from all eternity is rather different from what we might expect. If it exists, it is evident that we cannot have intuitive knowledge of its existence, for no one can see what is in the mind of God but God Himself and the blessed in heaven, who enjoy the face to face vision of the divine nature.[1] In this life, we can only reason to its existence from the things that we see around us, just as we reason to God's existence from the visible things around us. In fact, the final proof that St. Thomas gives for the existence of God, *ex gubernatione rerum*,[2] is, as we shall see later, also a proof for the existence of the eternal law.

[1] I-II, q. 93, a. 2.

[2] *Ibid.*, I, q. 2, a. 2.

This is not the approach to the eternal law that we might have expected. We might have thought, for instance, that he would argue from the existence of human law to the divine law or that he would have argued from the existence of the natural law to the existence in the mind of God of a transcendent law which is the origin and explanation of all other laws. We might have expected him to adopt that line of argument because he teaches that natural law is a participation in the eternal law and positive laws, civil and ecclesiastical, are valid as laws only insofar as they are derived from the eternal law.

When we examine the position a little more closely, we can see why he did not adopt that line of argument. It would have been tantamount to assuming what he wished to prove. That would certainly be so if he had argued from the natural law. For, the natural law is not really different as law from the eternal law. It is the eternal law as received in us. He approaches the problem from another angle altogether. He starts from something that is self-evident [3] and which is itself an effect of the eternal law, namely, God's government of the world.

That the universe is governed by God, we gather from the wonderful order and harmony that reign, not only amongst things, but also amongst the multitudinous and vastly complex activity of things. The lower orders of being serve the higher, and all in their proper place and in their various ways conspire to promote the good of the whole universe. To direct and guide the works of creation towards this goal demands, as St. Thomas points out elsewhere,[4] a supervising intelligence and governing hand, which is the mind and hand of God. That is particularly so, when we consider that a large portion of the total universe is without reason and of itself cannot see the goal towards which it unconsciously moves. The alternative is to say that the unity and harmony of the universe are altogether due to chance, and such an explanation is ruled out by its own intrinsic impossibility.

[3] Self-evident on the supposition that God exists.

[4] *Op. cit.*, I, q. 103, a. 1.

God's government of the universe, however, is only the execution in time of what his providence ordained from all eternity. His argument, then, is this: if there existed from all eternity in the mind of God a detailed scheme for bringing each individual creature to the goal for which it was created, that presupposes a still more comprehensive plan in the mind of God for bringing the whole of creation to its appointed goal, which is the good of the universe. That all-embracing plan in the mind of God is the eternal law. In other words, the existence of an eternal providence in God demands the existence of an eternal law.

The steps of his argument are therefore as follows: the order and harmony in the world around us demand God's governing hand; the divine government of the world, which takes place in time, demands as its counterpart eternal providence; eternal providence in its turn demands the eternal law. That seems to be St. Thomas' argument.[5] It is this last link in the chain that is likely to present most difficulty to one who addresses himself to this question for the first time. Why, it might be asked, should eternal providence in God demand the existence of an eternal law? If only we could get a clear understanding of the answer to this question we should have gone a long way towards grasping the meaning of the eternal law itself. St. Thomas gives us the answer in the *De Veritate*.[6] There he compares the eternal law to a principle. It is the function of providence, he says, to draw conclusions from this principle, much as prudence in the individual draws conclusions from the first principles of morals for the guidance of his personal actions.

This is a point of capital importance, which deserves to be investigated further. The first thing that we must be convinced of is that providence is not the same as the eternal law.[7] The fact that providence and the eternal law are both defined in practically the same terms might lead the unwary to conclude that they are the same thing. Even a theologian of the intel-

[5] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 91, a. 1.
[6] *De Veritate*, q. 5, a. 1, ad 6.
[7] *Ibid.*

lectual calibre of Cajetan taught that they were the same.[8] It is probably in reference to him that we find the following sentence in De Godoy, speaking of *De Veritate*, q. 5, a. 1: " From these statements is drawn the conclusion that divine providence is not the same as God's eternal law. On this point I find learned Thomists misled, contrary to St. Thomas." [9]

The fundamental difference between the two lies in the fact that, whereas each is an act of prudence, the eternal law is an act of regnative prudence in God and providence is an act of monastic prudence. In God, of course, all things are one. However, we must speak of them as we speak of these things in ourselves, " by reason of the weakness of our intellect," as St. Thomas remarks.[10] In us, regnative prudence and monastic prudence are not the same. Indeed, they are specifically distinct, for the formal object of each is specifically distinct. The formal object of regnative prudence is the common good of society. The formal object of monastic prudence is the private good of the individual. In due proportion the same is true of God.

When we say that the eternal law is an act of regnative prudence in God, we imply that it is not binding on God Himself. The law is given to creatures and in various degrees it binds them to work for their own good and the common good of the universe. It lays down general rules of action which all creatures must obey. Once the law has been given, God owes it to Himself, as it were, to make creatures and to guide them in accordance with it.

Providence, on the other hand, is a function of monastic prudence. The principal act of monastic prudence, as of regnative prudence, is *praeceptum*. But the *praeceptum* of regnative prudence is given to others. The *praeceptum* of monastic prudence is given to oneself. The eternal law is an *imperium* of regnative or regal prudence in God and is given to creatures.

[8] *Commentarium* in I-II, q. 91, a. 1.

[9] De Godoy, *Disputationes Theologicae in Primam Partem Divi Thomae* (Venetiis: 1696), Tomus 1, q. 23, Tract. 8, Disp. 605, n. 70.

[10] *De Ver., loc. cit.*, corp.

Providence also is an *imperium*. It is an *imperium* of monastic prudence and deals, not with creatures immediately, but with God's own activity. By providence God commands Himself to carry out what He Himself has laid down in the eternal law.

This *imperium* of providence, however, is very different from the *imperium* which is the eternal law. The *imperium* of the eternal law imposes necessity on creatures, either physical or moral. It imposes physical necessity on irrational creatures and moral necessity on rational ones to do what it commands. The *imperium* of providence does not impose necessity of any kind. When God commands Himself to rule creatures according to the directions of His own law, He does not bind Himself physically or morally in doing so. He commands Himself freely. All we can say is that He owes it to Himself to follow the rules that He has laid down in his wisdom for the government of the world.

To say that providence imposes a moral obligation on creatures, as is sometimes said,[11] shows a fundamental misunderstanding, we think, of the nature of providence. The error is likely to arise, if we do not distinguish clearly between regnative and monastic prudence. St. Thomas certainly says that providence is *praeceptiva ordinationis aliquorum in finem*.[12] To conclude that it therefore imposes a moral obligation is quite false. Providence is preceptive, but the precept it gives is the precept that every man gives to himself when he is acting in a prudent fashion. The precept of providence bears directly on God's own activity and not on creatures.

This, we submit, is the teaching of St. Thomas. It is what he means when he says that the eternal law is as a principle from which providence is deduced as a conclusion.[13] He compares the relationship that exists between the two to the relationship that exists in ourselves between a first principle of the

[11] Cf. W. Farrell, O.P., *The Natural Moral Law according to St. Thomas and Suarez* (Ditchling: St. Dominic's Press, 1930), p. 29.

[12] *Summa Theol.*, I, qq. 23, 24.

[13] *De Ver., loc. cit.*

practical reason and a conclusion of prudence. Such a first principle for instance, might be "good is to be done and evil avoided," or any of the commandments of the Decalogue. Take the precept of the natural law which says that it is wrong to steal. That prohibition holds good for all men and it must be applied by each individual to his own actions as they are in the singular and concrete. This application is really made by the moral virtue of prudence, of which providence is a very important part.[14]

So much is providence a part of monastic prudence that the very name of prudence is said to be derived from it. St. Isidore thus explains it: *prudens dicitur quasi porro videns.*[15] When we say that providence in our own case, as part of monastic prudence, applies the general law to a particular action, we mean that providence in the light of the law orders a particular action to the ultimate end of life. Providence, like prudence, does not deal primarily with the end to be attained. It deals with the means to the end. This is true whether we consider prudence as a natural virtue choosing the best means of achieving a natural goal, or as a supernatural virtue choosing the best means of reaching a supernatural goal. The law merely tells us that certain actions in general will lead us to our ultimate end, namely, good actions. Furthermore, it imposes on us the obligation of doing them and avoiding those that are bad, namely, those that will not bring us to our goal. It is the function of prudence and of providence to determine whether a particular action with all its concomitant circumstances is a good action and therefore calculated to lead to the true end of life, or a bad action and therefore leading away from the true ultimate end of life.

This decision of prudence and providence is the conclusion of a syllogism, of which the major premise is a precept of the natural law. For instance: theft is forbidden by the natural law; this action which I am now contemplating is an act of

[14] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 49, a. 6, ad 1.
[15] Cited *ibid.*, obj. 1.

theft; therefore, this particular action is forbidden. The prudent or provident man will not be satisfied with merely drawing this conclusion, which is also the conclusion of conscience. He will command himself to avoid it if the action is bad, or he will command himself to do it if the action is good. If the action is not only good but prescribed by the law, the command of prudence applies the moral obligation of the law to the particular act.

In the example we have taken, the law is imposed on us by God and we by prudence apply it to our individual actions, so that in our case there is an exercise of monastic prudence only and not of regnative prudence. If, however, we take the example of a ruler who makes a law for his subjects, we can see both regnative and monastic prudence in action. By regnative prudence he imposes the law on his subjects with a view to promoting the common good. He can bring monastic prudence into play also if he commands himself to see that the law is carried out by the subjects.[16] The subjects, however, can carry out the injunctions of their ruler without his continual supervision and assistance. Their own prudence and providence are sufficient for that. But when God is the lawgiver, it is quite different. Not only does God make the law and impose it on creatures; this is an act of regnative prudence in Him. At every stage, He must also assist His creatures to carry out the law. In the case of irrational creatures God makes the application of the law to each particular action. In the case of rational creatures, who are free, He pre-moves them and co-operates with them in making the application of the law to themselves. Hence, where God is concerned, an act of monastic prudence is always required to direct creatures according to the law.

With these reservations, however, the relation of providence in God to the eternal law is much the same as the relation in ourselves between prudence and the general principles of the moral law. The eternal law deals immediately with the ultimate

[16] The ruler also brings monastic prudence into play when he commands himself to observe his own law.

end God had in mind when He created the universe, namely, the common good of the universe. Divine providence deals with the means of attaining that end. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that divine providence regulates God's own activity with a view to carrying out the rules laid down in the eternal law.

The eternal law, therefore, has the common good of the universe as its immediate object. Divine providence has for its immediate object the observance of the eternal law. It deals with the means for carrying the directions of the eternal law into effect. It deals with those means in general, and this is called general providence; it deals with them in particular down to the smallest detail, and this is particular providence. Whether we consider providence in its particular or in its general aspect, we find that it is always guided by the precepts of the eternal law. As a conclusion presupposes a principle or premise from which it is drawn, so with like necessity does divine providence demand the existence of the eternal law.

Hence we can see the cogency of St. Thomas' argument from the divine government of the world. For the divine government of the world is merely the manifestation in time of God's eternal providence and God's eternal providence demands the eternal law as a conclusion demands a principle from which it can be drawn. From this it follows that the eternal law must be at least co-extensive with divine providence. Whatever is governed by God's providence must also of necessity be subject to His eternal law, though not necessarily in the same way.

The proposition that the eternal law in God stands in the same relation to providence as regnative prudence to monastic prudence is so central to this article that it deserves further consideration. It cannot be regarded as a needless digression if I substantiate it by a closer analysis and by an appeal to the authority of theologians of weight. A more minute examination will reveal, perhaps, why a theologian of the calibre of Cajetan seems to have gone astray on the matter. In his commentary on the first article of question twenty-two of the First Part, he identifies providence with the eternal law. Basing his argu-

ment on the difference between monastic prudence and regnative prudence, Cajetan explains:

> The former is the plan (*ratio*) of the order of one's own acts to the goal of one's own life, while the latter is the plan (*ratio*) of the order of subjects to their goal. . . . From this distinction it follows that divine providence is not a part of monastic prudence, since this is impossible in God because He has nothing in Him capable of being ordered to an end. But it is a part of prudence as regnative, or rather monarchical. And consequently it must follow that it orders the things subject to it to their ends.[17]

In my opinion, Cajetan is here speaking of providence that is identified with the eternal law. There is, however, another kind of providence, the providence, for instance, that governs the sparrow's fall. It is my contention that providence in this sense is not the same as the eternal law. It presupposes the eternal law and follows from it as a conclusion from a principle or a premise. When I say that providence is related to the eternal law as monastic prudence is to regnative prudence in rational creatures, it is providence in this second sense that I have in mind. Unless we distinguish clearly these two senses in which providence can be understood, we shall become entangled in endless confusion and we may unwittingly contradict ourselves.

That there is a sense in which providence can be understood as the same as eternal law I will consider in a moment. That there is a sense in which it is distinguished from the eternal law is clear from a number of considerations. In *De Veritate*, St. Thomas leaves us in no doubt that they are distinct: "Providence in God does not properly designate the eternal law but something consequent to the eternal law. . . . And likewise in God too the eternal law is not providence but is as a principle of providence." [18]

No one, I think, would maintain that predestination is the same as God's eternal law ordering all men to a supernatural

[17] Cajetan, *Comm.* in I, q. 22, a. 1.
[18] *De Ver.*, q. 5, a. 1, ad 6.

destiny. God's law obliges all without exception to strive for the beatific vision. It imposes on all an obligation to work for that goal. On the other hand, predestination does not order all men to the beatific vision. It orders some who are specially chosen by God. In the Thomistic view the essence of predestination is to be found in a divine *imperium*. This *imperium* is not given to the predestined but to God Himself. That does not mean that God orders His own divine actions to eternal life. Such a thing would be impossible. He imperates Himself to execute, in due time, what He has decreed for the elect. The *imperium* that He gives Himself, according to our human way of conceiving divine things, is the *imperium* that follows on choice, the choice in this case being the elect and the means that will lead them infallibly to eternal life. As with us so with God the *imperium* that follows on choice regulates what is the *usus activus* of the divine will. It does not impose a moral obligation on God. Rather it is a *direction* which His will is pleased to follow freely. I have said that in predestination God does not *imperate* the elect. He does not impose on them a moral obligation for the simple reason that no one knows for certain whether he is predestined or not. As far as the elect are concerned the *imperium* of predestination results not in a moral obligation but in *vocatio, justificatio et glorificatio.* I think it is clear that predestination is not an act of regnative prudence in God but of monastic prudence. What is true of predestination is also true of providence in the natural order and of general providence in the supernatural order.

As I have already shown, Cajetan makes providence an act of regnative prudence, thus apparently identifying it with the eternal law. But in his commentary on the fourth article of St. Thomas on predestination he seems to contradict this. In the body of the article St. Thomas says that since predestination is a part of providence, like providence it must be "the plan (*ratio*) existing in the intellect directing (*praeceptiva*) the ordering of some things to an end." [19] In reference to the

[19] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 23, a. 4.

word *praeceptiva* Cajetan notes: "And understand this of a true interior precept. I say this on account of the exterior precept which in q. 19 was declared to be a sign of the divine will.[20] In this passage Cajetan expressly distinguishes the precept of predestination from the precept of law which is merely a sign of the divine will. For one thing, the precept of law is an external precept. Not only is it external but it must be made public or promulgated if it is to be binding. On the other hand, according to Cajetan the precept of predestination is *interior*, presumably in the mind of God. If it is interior it cannot be given to the elect. Much less can it impose on them a moral obligation. In truth, Cajetan is right when he says that the *praeceptum* of predestination is interior, for it is known only to God. It is God imperating himself from eternity to execute in time what He has planned for His elect.

Besides providence is the sense just explained, which is an act of monastic prudence in God, there is another kind of providence which is an act of regnative prudence and which is more or less the same as the eternal law. St. Thomas does not say so in so many words but we must infer it from his teaching on the relationship between providence and prudence in general in the *Summa*.[21] There he tells us that providence is an integral part of prudence. There are seven other integral parts but providence is far and away the most important of them all. So important is it that it can in a sense be practically identified with the virtue of prudence itself. Since the eternal law is an act of regnative prudence in God, it follows that from our way of looking at things one of its integral parts must be providence, providence which is not an act of monastic but regnative prudence. Moreover, it must be its most important part: so important indeed that it can be identified practically with the eternal law.

I say *practically* because the identification is not complete. Cajetan's commentary on the relation between providence and

[20] Cajetan, *Comm.* in I, q. 23, a. 4.
[21] II-II, q. 49, a. 6.

prudence may help to clarify a little more the distinction between them.[22] He tells us, following St. Thomas, that providence can only be called a part of prudence, if by prudence we mean all its integral and potential parts. In that sense providence is the principal and most important of its parts. But if by prudence we understand merely *recta ratio praeceptiva* prescinding from its integral and potential parts, then he says providence is for all practical purposes the same as prudence. Yet it is not quite synonymous with it. Each has *formally* different acts. The act to which providence is formally ordained is " to order rightly." That to which prudence is formally ordained is " to command rightly." Of the two, however, " to order (*ordinare*) rightly " is superior to " to command (*praecipere*) rightly," for, as St. Thomas points out in his answer to the third objection, " right order to an end . . . contains rectitude of counsel, judgment and command." [23]

If we apply this subtle distinction between providence and prudence, it will give us the distinction that exists between providence and the eternal law. Applied to regnative prudence in God as it bears on the common good of the universe, " to command rightly those things which are for the common good of the whole universe " would be eternal law *formally* understood. The function of providence as an integral part of it would be " to order rightly to their end those things which are for the common good of the whole universe."

Well might one ask what this distinction means in ordinary language. To explain, we must imagine God acting as any human legislator would as he contemplates enacting a law for the common good of his subjects. Reason may suggest a number of possibilities. He weighs them in his mind and finally chooses one as better calculated to achieve his purpose. Having made his choice, he then promulgates his *imperium* or command to his subjects and it is their duty to obey. As far as God is concerned, He freely determines the common good of

[22] *Comm.* in II-II, q. 49, a. 6.
[23] *Summa Theol.*, *loc. cit.*, ad 3.

the universe in this sense that the measure in which the universe is to manifest His goodness is a matter of His own free choice. In fact, we know that He has been pleased to manifest His goodness at three levels, as it were: the level of nature, the level of grace, and the level of the hypostatic union. His next concern is to devise a law that will best promote the common good He has decided on. As a human lawgiver brings into play all the parts of regnative prudence in framing laws, so we picture to ourselves God doing the same. In particular, He brings into play providence. The function of providence as an integral part of regnative prudence is to order all things with a view to the common good of the universe. Speaking of the natural order alone, I would say that the order or arrangement of essences in the universe, which manifest the divine attributes, is *formaliter* the work of providence. Individual essences taken by themselves are explained by the divine ideas. But their correlation with one another and with the common good of the universe is the doing of providence as an act of regnative prudence.

That seems to be the opinion of St. Thomas in the *De Veritate* when he says, " the order that exists in nature is not from itself but from another; and therefore nature needs providence, by which such an order is established in it." [24] However, as prudence is *recta ratio praeceptiva*, so regnative prudence in God terminates, as it were, in a divine *imperium* or command which He gives to all created things. This divine command, promulgated from eternity, is the eternal law. When speaking of the eternal law, St. Thomas always relates it to *action*. Thus, he defines it as " the type (*ratio*) of divine wisdom, as directing all actions and movements." [25] The eternal law directs (in the sense of obliging) the activity of every creature so as to promote the common good of the universe. From this it will appear that although there is a *formal* distinction in Cajetan's sense between the eternal law and providence as an integral part of it, the two are sufficiently alike to be defined in practically the

[24] q. 5, a. 2, ad 10.

[25] *Summa Theol.*, q. 93, a. 1, corp.

same words. The *formal distinction* would seem to lie in this, that while providence, as an act of regnative prudence, orders *essences* as such to the common good of the universe, the eternal law order *actions* as such to the same end.

Providence as an act of regnative prudence must not be overlooked. But it is not providence in that sense I refer to when I say that the eternal law is to providence as regnative prudence is to monastic prudence. When God has promulgated the eternal law He then has to do something that no human legislator has to do, at least to the same extent. True, a human lawgiver has to see to it that the law is observed but he does that in a general way by enforcing the penalties of the law in the case of those who violate it. God, on the other hand, has to move every single created thing to observe the eternal law. To move them He has to imperate Himself. That *imperium* is an act of monastic prudence in God and it is that *imperium*, given to Himself from eternity, that is providence as distinct from the eternal law.

Having asserted that providence in this sense is not the same as the eternal law,[26] St. Thomas proceeds to illustrate the difference between them by a comparison with ourselves. The eternal law in God, he says, is somewhat similar to the first principles of the moral law in us. The first principles of the moral law are universal but they have to be applied by us to individual actions. That application is made by monastic prudence or, if you wish, by providence, which is an integral part of monastic prudence. Similarly, from eternity God by a process which we conceive to be counsel and judgment imperated Himself to apply the general principles laid down in the eternal law to every single creature that will exist and to every action that will proceed from His creatures. That *imperium* given to Himself from eternity is divine providence as an act of monastic prudence in God. The *imperium* is eternal but its execution takes place in time. Its application in time is the actual divine government of the universe.

[26] *De Ver.*, q. 5, a. 1, ad 6.

That this is the genuine teaching of the Angelic Doctor is shown from such weighty authorities on St. Thomas as Godoy, Gonet, and Zigliara. Godoy, after explaining the text of St. Thomas in the *De Veritate* on the difference between the eternal law and providence proceeds in the following words:

From his statements this is clearly established: for law as law properly has reference to subjects. This holds true especially of the eternal law inasmuch as it has reference to rational creatures with the power of obligating them. For this reason it does not consist in a monastic *imperium* with reference to divine actions, for, as St. Thomas teaches (II-II, q. 93, a. 1, ad 1), the eternal law is not imposed on God but on creatures, and consists in a regal *imperium* with reference to subjects; but providence has reference immediately to the free act of God which is called *usus*, and mediately, to execution. Therefore, speaking most formally, providence and the eternal law of God are not the same.

Nor does it matter if you make this objection: the teaching of St. Thomas is that "the eternal law is the type (*ratio*) of things in God as existing in the governor of the universe" (I-II, q. 91, a. 1, corp.); in this way he defined providence also in the preceding question (I, q. 22, a. 1); therefore the eternal law and providence are the same. For the reply is drawn from what has been said, that the eternal law is the type (*ratio*) of the government of things after the manner of one giving rules in a general way about the movements of things towards their proper ends, and providence is the type (*ratio*) after the manner of one applying the above-mentioned rules to particular actions. The former, then, is a *ratio* immediately regarding the creatures subject to Him, upon which He imprints their proper inclinations, and obligates in some way; but the latter is directed not immediately to creatures, but to God's actions. So it follows that, although the words of both definitions are nearly the same, the sense of each is different.

You might object that in us law is a principle of prudence, because it obligates us, and therefore prudence in accordance with law dictates that this is to be done here and now; but the eternal law does not obligate God, as we have just said; therefore, the eternal law cannot be the principle of divine providence and of the prudence by which God dictates to Himself in accordance with it that this is to be done here and now. I reply, by denying the consequence, though the antecedent is conceded. For although the eternal law cannot be the principle after the manner of something obligating,

it can nonetheless be the principle after the manner of something directing, so that God in accordance with the eternal law commands Himself *usus* and the execution of things in their order to the end.[27]

Gonet has the following to say on the same point:

The providence of God is not the same as the eternal law. In this some of our Thomists, who hold the opposite, are led astray, for St. Thomas expressly teaches (*De Ver.*, q. 5, a. 1, ad 6) that providence in God properly designates not the eternal law but something consequent to it. This he proves from the fact that the eternal law is considered in God as similar to the principles in us of things to be done from which we proceed to take counsel, choose, and command. Therefore as the naturally known principles of things to be done are not providence or prudence in us, but its principle, so the eternal law in God is not prudence or providence formally but its principle. So St. Thomas concludes that the effect of providence is to be attributed to the eternal law as to its principle. It should be noted here that St. Thomas is speaking of the eternal law as it is the plan (*ratio*) of the governing of things whether rational or irrational. In this sense his teaching is most true, and the distinction he has stated is to be understood in this way, that as law in us lays down rules in a general way (e. g., God is to be loved, parents must be honored, etc.), rules by which prudence here and now concludes that an action is to be done, so the eternal law in God lays down general rules (e. g., a stone is inclined downward, fire upward) but providence disposes according to these rules concerning the movements of these things in particular. And therefore providence has the eternal law for its principle.

This is a confirming argument: the eternal law, as law in the proper sense, is not imposed on God but on creatures; nor does it consist in a monastic *imperium* with reference to God's actions, but in a regal *imperium* with reference to His subjects, as theologians teach with the Holy Doctor (I-II, q. 93). But providence consists in a monastic *imperium*, and refers immediately to the free act of God which is called *usus*, and mediately to execution, as will be evident from what is to be said in his tract on predestination. Therefore providence and the eternal law are not the same, in the most formal sense.[28]

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[27] De Godoy, *loc. cit.*, nn. 72, 73, 74.

[28] Gonet, *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae* (Lugduni, 1681, Editio Sexta), Tomus 1, Tractatus 4, Disputatio 8, nn. 95 et 96. The Salmanticenses do not treat expressly of the relationship between the eternal law and providence but they are quite

Zigliara summarizes the point in a few words: "Though law pertains to providence, and providence to law, nevertheless, they are distinguished from one another, and law is as a principle for providence, *which abstracts from the power of obligating that law possesses.*" [29]

As human laws are not given to particular individuals but to whole communities, so the eternal law is not given directly to individual persons or things. It is given to the community of the universe of which God is the supreme ruler. And it is given with a view to promoting the common good of the universe. On all created things, animate and inanimate, rational and irrational, the eternal law imposes a necessity, the necessity of acting in accordance with their specific natures. In irrational creatures that necessity is a physical necessity which is automatically observed. In creatures with free will, it is a moral necessity.

The eternal law imposes moral necessity on those actions of a free creature that are free. On actions that are not free, it imposes physical necessity as on the rest of irrational nature. Thus we say that it is a property of heavy bodies to tend downwards when unsupported. This tendency is closely linked up with their nature, which receives that tendency or inclination from the eternal law. A man's body has the same tendency and from the same source. If unsupported, it also tends to fall. But besides the tendencies which a man has in common with irrational things, he has others which are proper to him as a rational creature. He has the general tendency to do good and avoid evil. He has the general tendency to seek his perfection as a rational creature. This tendency he has also received from

explicit in their teaching on predestination. They maintain that predestination is an *imperium* of monastic prudence which God gives Himself. Since they hold that the only difference between predestination and providence is a difference *ex parte objecti*, what they say of predestination as an act must also be said of providence as an act. Providence, like predestination, is an act of monastic prudence which God gives Himself. Cf. Salmanticenses, *Cursus Theologicus* (Parisiis, 1876, Ed. nova correcta), Tomus 2, De Praedestinatione, Disp. 2, Dubium 2, n. 100.

[29] T. M. Zigliara, O. P., *Summa Philosophica* (ed. 10; Parisiis: Delhomme et Briguet, 1895), III, "Philosophia Moralis," Lib. II, cap. III, a. 2, IV, N. 1.

the eternal law. It is not peculiar to the individual. It is the patrimony of the race. It gives the individual, through the nature which he shares with his fellow men, a strong inclination to work for his own good and through his own good for the common good of the universe of which he is a part. It gives the inclination and it imposes a moral obligation to follow it.

But man is physically free to act against his natural inclination. He can violate the law. When he does so and persists in it till the end, God has another way through His eternal law of making even his rebellion subserve the common good of the universe. The transgression of law means punishment and it is by the unending punishment of unrepentant sinners that the eternal law reduces rebellious wills to order.

That a heavy body should tend to fall when unsupported is a tendency which it has received in common with all bodies from the eternal law, a tendency which it has been given with a view to the common good of the universe. That a particular body should actually fall at a particular time in a particular set of circumstances and owing to a particular cause is not to be attributed to the eternal law but to divine providence. It is providence guiding the particular action of a particular body in a particular set of circumstances in accordance with the general provisions of the eternal law. It is a characteristic of all law, even human law, that it deals with the general or universal. This characteristic, human law has derived from the eternal law which orders specific natures to the common good of the universe.

In a special sense, however, it can be said that the eternal law also extends to particular actions. For, particular actions are governed by divine providence and, since providence follows from the eternal law as a conclusion from a principle, what is attributed to providence may also be attributed to the eternal law. Hence, St. Thomas says, " And therefore the art of providence is fittingly attributed to the eternal law, just as every result of a demonstration is attributed to its indemonstrable principles." [30] If we keep in mind that the eternal law is always

[30] *De Ver.*, q. 5, a. 1, ad 6.

an act of regnative prudence, that it deals with specific natures rather than with individuals, that it is ordered immediately to the common good of the universe and not to the good of any particular individual—if we keep those three points in mind, they will throw considerable light on the nature of the eternal law. To such an investigation we shall now proceed.

In keeping with his definition of law in general, St. Thomas takes it for granted that the eternal law is essentially a work of the divine reason rather than of the divine will. For instance, he speaks of it in the words of St. Augustine as the " sovereign type (*summa ratio*)" in God [31] and as " the type (*ratio*) of divine wisdom, as directing all actions and movements." [32] Elsewhere he tells us that it is the peculiarity of wisdom to seek order in things and to put order into things. It orders them in relation to one another and more especially in relation to a common end. A careful analysis of this simple-looking idea of order will bring us to the very core of what St. Thomas understood by the eternal law. It will show us that for him the divine will does not enter into the eternal law as an essential constituent of it, as will does not for him enter the essential constitution of any law, human or divine.

For St. Thomas, the *essence* of a law is derived from reason. The will of the lawgiver explain its *existence*. In our analysis of the eternal law we must keep that in mind. We shall be better able to do so, if we consider the eternal law first, as it were, in the making, in the region of the possible, that is, where the will has no place. Then we shall discuss it as an existing fact, which owes its existence to the divine will.

In this very abstruse question, we can only proceed as we would if we were dealing with a law given by man. To understand anything it is well to begin with the end or purpose for which it was made, for it is the end or formal object that determines the specific nature of a thing. That is true of law also. It is true of human law and it is true of God's law.[33] Where

[31] *Summa Theol.*, q. 93, a. 1, sed contra.

[32] *Ibid.*, corp.

[33] It is true of the eternal law, not in the sense that the common good is pre-

a human lawgiver is concerned, the common good which he strives to promote is outside himself. He is not free to alter it according to his good pleasure. The eternal law is also meant to promote a common good, namely, the common good of all creation. Until we understand what is meant by the common good of the universe we shall never understand what the eternal law is. On the other hand, a clear grasp of the common good of the universe will give us an insight into the nature of the law that promotes it.

The common good of the universe is twofold, namely, a common good that is intrinsic to the universe and a common good that is extrinsic. The extrinsic common good is God Himself. The intrinsic good, that is, the good which is found in the totality of created things, is a created thing. It is the goodness of God as reflected in the totality of creatures. The universe is good to the degree in which it manifests the goodness of its Creator.

The extrinsic common good of the universe is fixed and unchangeable. It does not depend on the divine will, for it is identified with God Himself. Hence it is fixed and unchangeable, not only as an end or object of desire, but also in the sense that God must desire it. By a physical necessity of His nature God must will and love His own infinite goodness.

That does not necessarily mean, however, that He must will to manifest His goodness outside Himself in a world of creatures. If He chooses to do so, He does not act from compulsion of any kind but from choice, which is supremely free. In fact, we know that He has chosen to manifest His goodness and glory in this external fashion by calling the universe into being. The choice was freely made, but once made, God was then constrained by a necessity of His own nature to make creatures for one purpose and one purpose only, namely, to show forth His goodness and to manifest glory.

Since, however, God is infinite, His goodness and divine

supposed or exists before the eternal law, but in the sense that it is easier for us to grasp the nature of the common good and from it to arrive at a knowledge of the eternal law.

attributes can never adequately be represented by creatures. They can be represented only in a shadowy and imperfect manner, owing to the limitation of created things. Since creatures cannot adequately manifest the divine attributes, God has freely chosen the measure in which they shall do so. The measure of His goodness which He has actually chosen to manifest through creation, is now the intrinsic common good of the universe. It is also the factor that determines how many and what kind of creatures will find a place in the universe.

Unlike a human lawgiver, therefore, God freely determines the existence and the extent of the internal common good of the universe. He therefore freely determines the measure or extent of the common good which He wishes to promote by law. In that sense, according to our human way of looking at things, the divine will precedes the eternal law as actually existing. In that sense, too, the *existence* of the eternal law is the result of the divine will. If God had not chosen to create and to manifest His goodness in creatures, the eternal law would never have become an actually existing law.[34] We can get a general idea of the measure in which He has been pleased to manifest His goodness from a consideration of the existing order of things. First of all, He has chosen to manifest His goodness through the order of nature, which runs from the invisible electron up to the highest angel. More than that: He has chosen to manifest His divine nature in the order of super-nature, which ranges from the least movement of grace up to the glories of the beatific vision. For the moment, we shall confine our attention to the manifestation of His glory which He has effected through the order of nature.

Although the existence of the eternal law depends on the divine will, its *essence* does not. That is a point that we shall have to consider now in more detail. We shall best understand it by keeping in mind the more easily analysed procedure that obtains in the making of human law. When the human law-

[34] In this whole matter of the eternal law it is always to be understood that we are speaking *modo humano*. We are analysing it as we would a human law and we are making suppositions merely to acquire a clearer understanding of it.

giver is clear on the common good which he wishes to promote, his next step is to consider the best means of promoting it. That is the proper function of counsel and judgment. By counsel, he deliberates on the most suitable measures to be taken with a view to the common good in question. By judgment, he decides that one out of many is the most suitable. Having made this decision, he chooses it as the one to be imposed on the community. In due course he commands his subjects to observe it. It is only when it has been commanded by him in a public way that it becomes law in the strict sense of the word.

In this process, it is important to distinguish between that which accounts for the existence of the law and that which accounts for its essence. The two are formally united in the command. It is reason that accounts for the essence of law, for law is essentially an objective norm of action. It is sometimes said that the essence of law is identical with the judgment of reason that precedes election. The essence of law certainly includes this judgment, but it adds something important besides. It adds the two essential elements of *imperium*, namely, *ordinatio et intimatio*. It is because the will after election moves the reason to elicit the act of *imperium* that it is said to be responsible for the existence of the law. In giving it existence, however, it does not enter into the realm of essence. The law is essentially an objective norm and it is not the will of the lawgiver that is this objective norm. In other words, the means that he chooses to promote the common good do not promote it because he chooses them. He chooses them because of their own intrinsic nature they are already calculated to promote it.

The same is even more true of the eternal law, except that God has not to investigate and take counsel with Himself as to the best means of promoting the common good of the universe. We take counsel with ourselves or from others when we are in doubt what to do. God is never in doubt what to do. However, as St. Thomas admits,[35] it helps us to understand

[35] Cf. *De Ver.*, q. 5, a. 1, corp.

divine things when we picture God acting like ourselves. When He had decided on the measure in which He wished to manifest His goodness externally, we imagine Him deliberating, as it were, on the best means of achieving His goal. His deliberation bore on the range and combination of essences that would best show forth His goodness in the measure He had decreed. From an infinite number of possible essences or natures, He had to choose that best suited His purpose. The fact that God chose them did not make them the best suited. He chose them because He judged them best suited and He judged them best suited because of their own nature they were best suited. Since the nature of things depends on the divine intellect and not on the divine will, it is evident that the particular combination of essences that will best serve the divine purpose is due not to the divine will but to the divine intellect. When, in our manner of speaking, God judged that a particular combination of essences would promote His glory externally in the measure which He had decreed, He chose that particular combination and then commanded from eternity, before anything was created, that creatures should observe that arrangement. In that command from eternity the eternal law essentially consists, according to the words of the Psalm, "He gave a law, which shall not pass away." [36]

As we shall see, that divine precept binds all creatures, rational and irrational alike, although it binds them in different ways. It is the guiding principle, not only of their actions, necessary and free, but also of their hierarchical arrangement in relation to one another.[37] In creating the universe, in arranging creatures in the hierarchy in which we see them, God followed the directions He Himself had already laid down in the eternal law. If there were no command given by God from eternity which creatures were to obey when they came into existence, then we should have to conclude, according to our principles

[36] Ps. 148: 6; *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 93, a. 5.

[37] It would be more correct to say that the hierarchical arrangement of creatures in the universe is due to divine providence as an integral part of the eternal law, as already explained.

of law, that the eternal law did not exist from eternity. We will discuss the consequences of such a supposition in greater detail when we come to deal with the objection that the eternal law is not a law in the strict sense because promulgation from eternity is impossible.

The combination of creatures which God has actually chosen to manifest His attributes externally, is called by St. Thomas *ordo universi*.[38] The word *ordo* signifies grades of being. It therefore implies a variety of specific natures rather than a number of individuals in a particular nature. In those species which have not intelligence, the individual exists only for the sake of the species. When God planned the universe to manifest His divine attributes, it was this hierarchy of species that He directly intended. Different grades of being are required to manifest even imperfectly the immensity of the divine goodness, just as men use a variety of words and combine them in a diversity of ways to give expression to one idea in their minds. To give any kind of expression worthy of the divine nature, an immense variety of species is required. If all creatures were on a dead level, even if it were the level of the highest angel, they would not reflect the divine goodness as perfectly as a variety of species does.[39]

The existence of a variety of species reflects God's goodness and immensity at the level of existence. But in God's nature there is much more than mere existence, if we may speak in such a fashion of God, in whom everything is existence. There are supreme activity, supreme intelligence, supreme will, power and sovereign freedom as far as the world of creatures is concerned. He has conferred on the various grades of being certain faculties and powers precisely in order that they should manifest His goodness in the operational field as well as in the field of mere existence. The whole created universe is meant to mirror forth the immensity and goodness of God, not only in the static order of being, but in the dynamic order of action.

[38] Cf. III *Contra Gentiles*, c. 97.

[39] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 47, a. 2: "For the universe would not be perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in things." Cf. also II *Cont. Gent.*, cc. 44, 45.

That ordering of beings according to their specific natures on a hierarchical scale of perfection and the consequent ordering of the activity that flows from those natures is the work of the eternal law and of the divine intellect. This hierarchy is immutable in the sense that it is a hierarchy of essences, whose possibility does not depend on the divine will but on the divine intellect and the divine nature.

In the same way, the activity proper to those essences is immutable. In inanimate things and in creatures that are not free, their actions like their natures are governed by physical necessity. The activity of creatures that are free is immutable in a moral sense. While enjoying physical freedom, they are bound morally to act in a way in keeping with their rational nature. When we say that they are morally bound, we mean that they must do freely what other creatures do of physical necessity. They must act according to their rational nature if they are to achieve the perfection to which they are ordained by the eternal law. It is by achieving this perfection that they manifest the goodness of God and thus contribute to the common good of the universe.

Rational creatures can know the eternal law as it is impressed upon their nature. In the natural order, that impression of the eternal law is called the law of nature. The natural law is one, but it contains many precepts. Its many precepts are all elaborations of the one precept, namely, that good is to be done and evil avoided. This one precept is only a manifestation in time of the precept in the divine mind which is eternal and which orders the rational creature to its own good. The good of a rational creature on the natural plane is to imitate the goodness of God as known by reason. The more godlike it becomes in the order of nature, the more it shows forth the goodness of God and thus plays its part in promoting the common good of the universe, which is the ultimate purpose of its creation.

However, being free, a rational creature has the physical power to abuse its freedom and to act contrary to the natural

and eternal law. And yet all law has a safeguard against such abuse of freedom. The eternal law has a similar safeguard which is to be found in the threat of punishment. The threat of punishment does not take away the use of free will, but it acts as a deterrent against the abuse of it. If a creature insists on abusing the gift that God has given, by the punishment attached to the eternal law God ensures that even violations of his law will ultimately co-operate in promoting the common good of the universe. For, if the damned in Hell do not manifest the goodness of God as the blessed do, they at least manifest it in the form of justice. They thus contribute in their own way and against their will to the total goodness and perfection of the universe.

God's original plan for rational creatures was that they should contribute to the perfection of the universe by achieving their own perfection and happiness. In the natural order, the perfection of a rational creature is not an arbitrary thing. It does not even depend on the will of God. It necessarily consists in the natural knowledge and love of God and in the exercise of the moral virtues. A rational creature could not be perfected in the natural order in any other way. Between his rational nature and that end there is an intrinsic and necessary connection. Only a certain kind of action is proportioned to the attainment of that end. A free action that is calculated to lead a rational creature to its final perfection is called a morally good action and an action that will lead away from that goal is called by definition a morally bad action.

It is clear, therefore, that as far as the natural moral law is concerned, the goodness or badness of certain actions does not depend upon the divine will but upon the divine intellect. God, of course, wills that the precepts of the natural law should be observed. But actions commanded by the natural law or forbidden by it, are not good or bad because He wills that they should be done or avoided. Their goodness or badness is intrinsic to themselves and precedes, if we may so speak, the divine will. Their goodness or badness depends ultimately on the eternal law, which has ordered rational nature from eternity

to a fixed goal. In the pre-existential order, namely, in the order of essences and possibility, this ordering of rational nature to a fixed goal had already taken place. In the domain of essence, before God actually willed to give the precept which is the eternal law, there was a intrinsic and necessary relationship between a rational creature, certain good actions, the attainment of a certain goal and the perfection of the universe. Of its very nature, therefore, a rational creature stands ordered, in the realm of essences, to its own perfection and to manifest the goodness of God in that way, if God should actually decide to show forth His goodness in an external fashion. When God did make the choice and issued the command which gave rational creatures not only a place in His creation but which ordered them to act according to their rational nature, His will merely sanctioned and gave existence to a necessity which was rooted in the essence of man and which derived ultimately from the divine intelligence.

There can be no doubt that for St. Thomas the eternal law is a law in the proper sense of the word. Since his time, however, difficulties have been raised against the eternal law as law. One difficulty is based on the teaching of St. Thomas himself, that law in the proper sense is essentially a rule of human action, and human action is action that is free. On the other hand, when dealing with the eternal law, St. Thomas does not confine it to the regulation of actions that are free. He teaches that all things, outside the divine nature, rational and irrational, necessary and contingent, are subject to the eternal law of God. His argument is that as nothing created can escape the providence of God, so nothing can escape the all-embracing sweep of His law.

St. Thomas considers and answers that difficulty.[40] He makes it quite clear that irrational creatures are not subject to the eternal law in the same way as rational creatures. Irrational creatures are subject to it in a wide or improper sense. They are subject to it inasmuch as they are bound by a physical

[40] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 93, aa. 5, 6.

necessity of their nature to act according to its directions. This necessity of their nature is derived from the eternal law. It is the precept of the eternal law imbedded in their nature, giving a strong inclination to actions proper to their nature. It imposes on them a physical necessity. They are, therefore, subject to the eternal law, but they have no rational knowledge of their subjection. Rational creatures, on the other hand, receive the precept of the eternal law in a rational way, namely, through knowledge. The precept, which is the eternal law, is impressed upon rational creatures as upon irrational, but in the case of rational creatures it does not impose physical necessity. It gives a strong inclination to act in a rational way, but it does not interfere with freedom. Creatures that have reason can recognise this precept, which is implicit in their nature. They can formulate it for themselves and apply it to themselves as a norm of free activity.

To determine, therefore, whether the eternal law is law in the proper sense we must distinguish sharply between the eternal law as it proceeds from the mind of God, the Legislator, and the same law as it is participated by creatures. As it exists in the mind of God, the eternal law is one. One law directs all things to the common good of the universe. But this one law can be received by creatures in different ways. Rational creatures receive it *proprie* because they can know it and formulate its precepts for themselves. Irrational creatures, on the other hand, are capable of receiving it only *improprie*. When we ask if the eternal law is law in the proper sense, we must not consider it as it is found in creatures but as it proceeds from the mind of God, the Legislator. It is only in law as it proceeds from the mind of the legislator that the *essence* of law can be found. If law in that sense fulfils the four conditions laid down by St. Thomas,[41] then it is law in the strict sense (*essentialiter*) whether it is received by others *proprie or improprie*. It is my contention that the eternal law as it proceeds from the mind of God fulfils those four conditions. Hence, it is law in the

[41] Cf. *ibid.*, q. 90, aa. 1-4.

proper sense (*essentialiter*) even though it can be received by irrational creatures only *improprie*.

The eternal law, therefore, considered precisely as it is found in irrational creatures, is not law in the proper sense, but that does not mean, as some would have us believe, that as far as irrational creatures are concerned, the eternal law is nothing more than divine providence. Nor are we to understand the Angelic Doctor in that sense when he says, "Consequently irrational creatures are subject to the eternal law through being moved by divine providence; but not, as rational creatures are, through understanding the divine commandment."[42] St. Thomas does not here identify the eternal law and providence. He merely says that irrational creatures are subject to the eternal law in so far as they are moved by divine providence to their own proper activity and their own end. In other words, God moves them through his providence according to the rule laid down for them in the eternal law.

That he does not here identify the eternal law and providence is also clear from his general teaching on the difference between them. Eternal law is as a premise from which providence is a conclusion. As a conclusion invariably presupposes a premise, so does providence invariably presuppose the eternal law. Hence, the fact that irrational creatures are governed by divine providence is a strong argument in favour of their being subject to the eternal law. For another reason, it is impossible to call the eternal law in relation to irrational creatures a kind of providence. For, even in the improper sense, as it is applied to irrational creatures, it is an act of regnative or regal prudence in God, whereas providence is always an act of monastic prudence. Not only does the eternal law extend to the regulation of actions that are not free; it also explains the grades of being in the universe.[43] For the common good of the universe, as we have seen, requires many grades of being and the common good of the universe is the chief concern of the eternal law.

[42] *Ibid.*, q. 93, a. 5.

[43] Providence as an integral part of the eternal law seems to be responsible for the grades of being.

The second difficulty that is urged against the eternal law being law in the proper sense is more sweeping, for it applies, not only in relation to creatures that are not free, but even to creatures that are. It is the difficulty about promulgation. Promulgation is essential to law, so the objection runs. But the eternal law, even as laying down objective norms for the guidance of free actions, is lacking this essential of law. Promulgation presupposes a community to which the law is promulgated, but from eternity there was no community to which the eternal law could be promulgated.

This difficulty, like the preceding one, was considered by St. Thomas and answered. He holds quite definitely that the eternal law was promulgated from eternity. It is significant that he does not take an easy way out of the problem by saying that promulgation is not essential to law and that therefore promulgation from eternity is not essential for the eternal law. That St. Thomas did not give this easy solution is a strong indication that he regarded promulgation as an essential constituent of law. His answer to the difficulty is that the eternal law was promulgated from eternity in the divine Word and in the Book of Life.[44]

If this answer satisfied St. Thomas, but does not seem satisfying to us, it may be that our notion of promulgation differs from his. St. Thomas distinguishes between promulgation *actively* considered as an *imperium* in the mind of God and *passively* considered as the reception of the law by those who are subject to it. Passive promulgation is not and could not be eternal, for creatures did not exist from eternity to receive the law. Active promulgation on the part of the divine lawgiver is eternal. It is identified with the divine *imperium* by which God laid down from all eternity the plan to be followed by his creatures with a view to promoting the common good of the universe. It is promulgation in this active sense that St. Thomas considered to be essential to law.

That subjects should come to know of the promulgated law

[44] *Ibid.*, q. 91, a. 1, ad 2.

is rather an effect of promulgation than essential to it. Neither is it absolutely essential for the promulgation of law that the community for which the law is intended should actually exist. It seems to be sufficient that it exist potentially when the law is promulgated, and will exist actually in the future. That seems to be true even of human law. The Code of Canon Law, for instance, was promulgated in 1918. It was promulgated then, not only for those who were then alive, but for generations as yet unborn. The Code of Canon Law is as truly promulgated today for those who will live one hundred years hence, as it will be when those people are born and come to learn of the law. There does not seem to be any difficulty in applying the same principle to the eternal law. There is no reason why the eternal law should not have been actively promulgated by God from eternity even though the creatures that were to be bound by it did not actually exist from eternity. From eternity, God by his law established an objective order to be followed by creatures when they were created in time.

Active promulgation in this sense is an immanent act existing in the mind of God from eternity. Words and writing are not essential to promulgation. They are only a *conditio sine qua non* that creatures should come to know of the divine command. Hence, the first moment creatures began to exist, that moment God's eternal precept was expressed in a sign, for it was stamped on their nature as a sign to be read by creatures with intelligence to read. Before creatures were made, the divine *imperium*, which is the eternal law, terminated, not in words or signs, but in an objective proposition of the divine reason ordering all future creatures to the common good of the universe.

If we hold, as some do, that before creatures were made, God's law was not promulgated in this active sense, we should be driven to hold that there was never any active promulgation of the law by God at any time. In other words, we should be driven to conclude that there is no eternal law and therefore, no natural law and no law of any kind since all human law is derived ultimately from the eternal law. We do not say that

this conclusion has actually been drawn by those who deny eternal promulgation, but we feel that the conclusion is implicit in the denial.

When creatures actually exist the law is promulgated *passively*. Is it promulgated actively on the part of the divine Lawgiver for the first time when creatures begin to exist? If we answer " no " to the question, we imply that there was either no active promulgation on the part of God or that there was active promulgation from eternity. If we answer " yes," then we shall have to admit that with every creature that comes into existence, God actively promulgates a law, which before it was only His intention to promulgate. Such a conclusion seems to be absurd, for every act of God is an eternal act. Either, then, there is no active promulgation at all by God and consequently no law, or there is an active promulgation which is eternal. It seems to us that those who deny eternal promulgation do so because they confuse active with passive promulgation. Passive promulgation cannot be eternal, but then passive promulgation is not essential for law, as we saw in the case of the Code of Canon Law.

It may help to clarify our notion of the eternal law if we compare it with the divine ideas and with the divine art by which God brought all things into being. The eternal law is not quite the same thing as the divine ideas for there are many ideas in the mind of God, but there is only one eternal law. To understand the precise difference between them, we must be clear on the nature of the divine ideas.

The divine ideas may be considered from two points of view. They may be considered in the realm of pure possibility or they may be considered in the domain of existing fact, actually existing or future. In the realm of mere possibility, an idea is called *ratio*. Idea as *ratio* is the object of speculative thought and it is co-extensive with everything that is possible. God understands the infinite ways in which his divine nature can be imitated by creatures. The object of this knowledge (*objectum quod*) is the divine idea as *ratio*. Understood in this sense,

there are as many ideas in the mind of God as there are possible creatures. The *objectum quo* remains one and the same, namely, the divine essence. The *objectum quod* is multiplied as the term of the divine knowledge. The term of the divine knowledge is the infinite ways in which the divine essence can be participated by creatures. The divine ideas understood as *exemplares* mean that God has actually chosen to create beings after the pattern of the idea as *ratio* existing in his mind. The ideas considered as *exemplares* are not infinite in number. They are confined to those things which God has created or will create in the future.

If we ask why, from an infinite number of possible creatures and from an infinite number of combinations of those creatures, He should have chosen a definite number and a definite combination of them, we shall find that it was done with a view to an end which He had already chosen. That end was the external manifestation of His goodness according to a certain measure. From an infinite range of possible creatures, He chose a definite number and a definite combination of them, because He saw that this number and this combination were best suited to promote the degree of glory which He had decided to manifest externally. A particular combination of creatures does not manifest His glory externally because He has chosen them. Rather He chooses them because of their very nature they are calculated to serve His purpose.

Here we have part of the essence of the eternal law, namely, the divine judgment preceding choice that a certain combination of creatures is best suited to manifest His goodness after the manner in which He has chosen. The completed essence of the eternal law is found in the *imperium* inasmuch as it is an act of the divine reason, commanding created things to observe the order imposed on them so as to promote the common good of the universe. God wills to give the command but the fact that He wills to give it accounts only for its existence. The divine reason accounts for its essence. God's eternal command imposing an objective order on things to be created, is not the

divine decree to create. The intention to create precedes the eternal law. The decree to create the particular kind of universe the eternal law has legislated for, pertains to God's executive power. His executive power is governed by divine prudence. But it is monastic prudence and not regnative prudence that governs it. It is governed by God's providence rather than by his eternal law.

Although the eternal law is to be distinguished from the divine ideas, there is a sense in which we can speak of it as itself an idea. It is not, however, an idea of essences or of individual things. It is rather an idea of order: what St. Thomas calls " the idea of the order of the universe." [45] Not only has God an idea of all possible essences (*idea-ratio*) and an idea of each particular thing which he intends to create (*idea-exemplar*), he has also an idea of the totality of the universe, which is composed of these separate things.

The idea of the order of the universe may be considered as *idea-ratio*. In this case, it would include all the possible universes that God could create. It may also be considered as *idea-exemplar* and in this sense it signifies the actual universe God has chosen and to which from eternity He intended to give existence. As the divine ideas represent the essences of things taken singly and by themselves without relation to anything else, so the idea of the order of the universe as exemplar, represents the total combination of essences in relation to a given purpose. In the case, the given purpose is the measure in which God willed to manifest His goodness externally. The whole conception of order, which is so fundamental in law, implies that things are related to one another and that all are related to a given end. As the divine ideas represent essences independently of the divine will, so the idea of the order of the universe represents a combination of essences independently of the divine will, which is better suited than any other to manifest God's goodness in the measure in which He has decided

[45] *Ibid.*, I, q. 15, a. 2. When I say that the eternal law may be called *idea ordinis universi* I am using the term " law " as it is practically identified with providence which is the most important of the integral parts of regnative prudence.

to manifest it. If He had decided to manifest it in a greater or lesser degree, a different combination of essences would have been called for. If, for instance, He had wished to manifest His goodness in the least possible degree, He would have had to create at least one species. *Materia prima* would not have done, because of itself it cannot exist. It must be given a form. Once it is united to form, a specific nature is the result. Since existence follows substantial forms, the lowest species of a created thing would have manifested God's goodness to some extent by the mere fact of existing. If God had wished to manifest his goodness still further He would have had to create another substantial form. But another substantial form necessarily means a new species and a new grade of being. Hence, the more He wished to manifest His goodness and divine attributes, so many more were the grades of being He had to call into existence. Since, however, as St. Thomas tells us,[46] God has been pleased to communicate His goodness to creatures in a manner as perfect as creatures are capable of receiving, an almost infinite variety of species will be called for to give even an inadequate picture of the goodness and majesty of the Creator.

The eternal law, or rather providence as an integral part of the eternal law (understood in a wide sense), explains the grades of being in the universe. But being is further ordered to action. Each grade of being manifests His goodness still more wonderfully by acting according to its nature. The highest manifestation of his goodness in the natural order is to be seen in the free activity of rational and intellectual creatures, who follow the directions He has laid down in His law. By following the directions laid down in His law, they grow in His knowledge and love and in the practice of the moral virtues. In that way, they grow in likeness to God. They achieve their own perfection and happiness and in doing so, they make manifest in the highest degree the perfection and goodness of their Creator. Hence, St. Thomas says that the perfection of the universe is to be found chiefly in rational creation. It is in relation to

[46] *De Ver.*, q. 5, a. 8.

rational creation that the eternal law is law in the proper sense of the word. Hence, we can see how the common good of the universe is the object of the eternal law taken in its widest sense.

To bring things into being, something more was required on the part of God than the mere decision to create. His providence, which is an act of monastic prudence, gave a command to His executive powers to call things into being that did not exist before. In the actual production of creatures the divine art came into play.[47] As an artist is guided by the idea which he has in his mind, so in the production of individual things God was guided by the ideas of them in the divine mind. Not only did He give them being according to the ideal prototype in His mind, but He disposed them in a certain order in relation to one another and with a view to an end.[48] Since, however, the ordering of things in relation to an end is the special function of providence, the original disposition of creatures in the universe is also attributed to providence. In this passage, St. Thomas would seem to assign to providence and to *disposition* what we have assigned to the eternal law. There is no contradiction in this, when we remember that in the domain of regnative prudence there is a providence which is an integral part of the eternal law. The eternal law, with a view to the common good of the universe, lays down in a general way what *disposition* and *providence* carry into effect in the sphere of monastic prudence. Moreover, whatever can be attributed to providence as a conclusion, may also be attributed to the eternal law as the premise from which the conclusion was drawn.

JOSEPH COLLINS, O. P.

St. Mary's, Tallaght,
Co. Dublin, Eire

[47] Cf. *De Ver.*, q. 5, a. 1.

[48] In the executive order, this *disposition* of things followed the plan laid down by the eternal law.

CATHOLIC BIBLICAL SCHOLARSHIP AND COLLEGE THEOLOGY

THIS article brings together two ideas: Catholic Biblical Scholarship especially in the Old Testament—and—College Theology courses. Such a juxtaposition may imply a tension between Scripture and Theology; it may point to a stretch of no-man's land where suspicious antagonism separates the professors of these two subjects. Or, on the contrary, such a juxtaposition may imply evidence of a desire on the part of religion teachers to have the best of Scripture scholarship. We assume the latter. There should be no antipathy between these two branches of learning. Both handle the word of God, and a Scripture professor is required to be a theologian with an academic degree. Yet, more than once has a Theology professor remarked in a fraternal though serious way: "Modern Scripture scholars seem always on the alert to emphasize those interpretations which differ from the common opinion of Theology manuals!"

Perhaps, there is a friendly rivalry between Theology and Scripture, but is this to be deplored? The present advance in the biblical field can be traced to the theologians' discontent, and even disgust, with Scriptural studies at the turn of the century. It is within the living memory of many priests when scriptural manuals and classes were dry, theoretical and on the defensive. There was much talk *about* the Bible and little reading *in* and *from* the Bible. Rightly did theologians demand that we begin to open the Bible and put ourselves in contact with the living word of God. The Spirit of God was whispering once again: "Tolle, lege!" Pope Pius XII complained about Scripture courses and commentaries which "to our regret" are devoted "only to expounding exclusively those matters which belong to the historical, archeological, philological and

other auxiliary sciences." [1] The scripture scholars owe gratitude to the professors of theology, for their dissatisfaction has been greatly responsible for the reform of biblical studies.

Today, scriptural scholars are returning that favor and contributing to a deeper and more vital understanding of doctrinal truths. Unwittingly and inculpably, theology had been affected by biblical studies which for so long a time had been critical and apologetical.[2] God's word had been separated from real, practical life-situations (what the Germans call *Sitz im Leben*), and to that extent theology along with scripture studies tended to drift off into the same unreal world. An advance in Sacred Doctrine is now being made by a certain *good* tension between scripture and theology.

This article will first investigate the *historical background* of the present, enthusiastic revival of scripture studies. This historical précis will prepare us to understand what are the *principal elements* in this revival with pertinence to sacred doctrine. We will then show how these elements influence the *college religion courses*. Last, some suggestions will be offered to the teacher of sacred doctrine on keeping *au courant* with modern scripture scholarship. Most of our attention will be directed to the Old Testament, since this is the area where scripture studies have made the greatest advances and where theology manuals are often out of touch with modern Catholic exegesis.

I. Historical Background to the Catholic Revival of Scripture Studies [3]

The involved and intricate manner in which religion is intertwined with the world's secular events is not at all regrettable. At times worldly trends and secular thought-patterns have had

[1] *Divino Afflante Spiritu*, n. 24.

[2] Cf. E. F. Siegman, "The Literary Forms of the Old Testament and High School Religion Textbooks," *The Catholic Educational Review* 54 (1956) 73-84.

[3] C. Pesch, *De Inspiratione Sacrae Scripturae* (Freiburg: 1925). The first part of the book (pp. 11-378) is a historical study and very helpful. The second part is doctrinal, expressing many opinions no longer held.

a corroding effect upon the religious life of the Church. Among the good consequences of this intermingling of the sacred with the secular we can cite this fact: God remains a *living* reality whose presence in the world cannot be ignored. He is continually making an impact upon human lives. Christ declared: "My Father works *even until now*, and I work." (Jn. 5, 17)

Let us now consider what influence secular learning has brought to bear upon Bible study.

1. *1650-1800 A. D.*

The Council of Trent had set in motion such an interest in Scripture that Pope Leo XIII could later write: "It almost seemed that the great age of the Fathers had returned." [4] This was the golden age of scholars like Sixtus of Sienna, O. P. (d. 1569), Cornelius a Lapide, S. J. (d. 1637), James Bonfrere, S. J. (d. 1642), Cornelius Jansenius (d. 1576), John Maldonatus, S. J. (d. 1583), and William Estius (d. 1622).[5] Yet, by 1650 interest began to lag and in the next one hundred and fifty years (1650-1800 A. D.) there shone no great lights to dispel the gloom and warm the mind with enthusiasm.

We would rather wrap up in charitable silence and bury in the dust of a forgotten library the account of clerical education during this period of 1650-1800. Too often were men ordained priests who had lived very little time in a seminary and whose knowledge did not surpass the material in the *Roman Catechism*. In many religious orders the members were split between the "graduati" who formed a caste of well-educated, privilege nobles and the "rank and file" whose education consisted mostly in a minimum preparation for confessional work.[6] Because of an ignorant or listless clergy, the Catholic Church lost

[4] *Providentissimus Deus* of Leo XIII. An English translation is found in *Rome and the Study of Scripture* (ed. 6; St. Meinrad, Indiana: 1958) 9.

[5] Maldonatus and Estius are still ranked among *loci classici* in the exegesis of the Gospels and the Epistles of St. Paul.

[6] Cf. Fabiano Giorgini, "L'Educazione dei Chierci nella Congregazione della Passione," *Gioventù Passionista* 2 (Teramo, Italy: S. Gabriele dell' Addolorata, 1958) 51-144, esp. pp. 51-56 where valuable footnotes and references are given.

her leadership in the important sphere of education during the very years when tremendous advances were being scored in the sciences and in the arts. Unfortunately, the Church was maneuvered into a weak and defensive position by the standard-bearers of the new learning. Often these men were irreligious and even militant anti-clericals.

The full force of the Copernican revolution exploded into the "Quaestio Biblica," the seeming irreconcilability of the Bible with science. The studies of Giordano Bruno (d. 1600), Kepler (d. 1630), Galileo (d. 1642), and Newton (d. 1727) cut a path which led many natural scientists away from the Church. There seemed to be no solution for the "myth of biblical inerrancy."

At the same time another revolution was energetically shaking the citadel of learning. The Renaissance stirred up an absorbing interest in the ancient classics. Men carefully studied the literary forms, the authorship and the variant texts of the Roman and Greek masterpieces. With an equal zest and boldness they turned to the Bible and other religious documents, and the age of Biblical Criticism dawned. Catholics who do not recognize the value of the inquiring mind are embarrassed to learn that two co-religionists are venerated as the fathers of biblical criticism. The Oratorian Richard Simon[7] wrote in 1682 that many hands were at work in the composition of the various chapters and books of the Bible. He stressed the belief that future redactors were just as inspired as the original writer. Writing in 1753, Jean Astruc[8] laid the foundations for the "documentary theory" which divided the Pentateuch into

[7] R. Simon, *Histoire Critique du Vieux Testament* (Paris: 1678); Eng. trans. *A Critical History of the Old Testament* (London: 1682); *Histoire Critique du Texte du Nouveau Testament* (Rotterdam: 1689); *Histoire Critique des Principaux Commentateurs du Nouveau Testament* (Rotterdam: 1689); *Nouvelle Observations sur le Texte et les Versions du Nouveau Testament* (Paris: 1695).

[8] J. Astruc, *Conjectures sur les Memoires Originaux dont il paroit que Moyse s'est servi pour composer le Livre de la Genèse* (Bruxelles: 1753). Cf. E. O'Doherty, "The Conjectures of Jean Astruc, 1753," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 15 (July 1953) 265-274, where it is shown that the book was actually printed not at Brussels but at Paris, and that the author's name was not given.

various documents. He called one of them " A " wherein God is usually named *Elohim* and the other " B " wherein God is addressed as *Yahweh*. These two men were devout Catholics and wrote with moderation, but their dissection of the Bible into separate documents set in motion the most absorbing biblical movement of the 19th century.

Rationalism now stepped in to free the literary critic of any reverential restraint. For instance, Thomas Hobbes (d. 1679) was writing:

> If a man pretend to me that God has spoken to him supernaturally, and immediately, and I make doubt of it, I cannot easily perceive what argument he can produce, to oblige me to believe it.[9]

Then came the day of Deism, and the printing press rolled out the works of Locke (d. 1704), Shaftesbury (d. 1683), Collins (d. 1759), Woolston (d. 1733), and Reimarus (d. 1768). Their system of Deism had removed the supernatural and left man to his fallible, erring self! Like Spinoza (d. 1677), these men were demanding that the human reason be freed of all restraint and make an impartial study of scripture.

2. *1800-1930 A. D.*

The boy is father of the man. The revolutionary ideas of the 17th and 18th centuries in the fields of science and literature grew to maturity in the 19th. Scriptural study moved toward manhood with equal strides. The two most noteworthy traits of the 19th century scripture studies are: " the quest for the historical Jesus "; and the Graf-Wellhausen School of Criticism.

" The quest for the historical Jesus " is a phrase coined by non-Catholics to distinguish the " Christ " whom they claimed had been conjured up by faith from the " Jesus " who actually lived. The various lives of Jesus, written by Paulus, Strauss, Renan, Baur, Weiss and von Harnack professed to disentangle the real Jesus from the layers of legend and folklore which they thought weighed down the gospel account.[10] Strauss had re-

[9] *The Leviathan* (1651), reprinted by the Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1909, p. 287.

[10] The de-mythologizing of Bultmann is a modern variation upon this 19th

duced Our Lord to a spiritual phantom who could walk upon the water because he knew of a submerged reef! Renan's *Vie de Jésus* explained a miracle as the concoction of three ingredients: " 1) the credulity of everybody; 2) a little obligingness on the part of a few; 3) the silent agreement of the chief author." [11] Scholars did not take Strauss or Renan too seriously. However, Renan's *Vie de Jésus* reached 52 editions by 1928 and his abridged *Vie Populaire* underwent 22 editions. George Elliot testifies to her own pitiful loss of faith as a result of translating Strauss' *Das Leben Jesu.*[12]

A Catholic reaction resulted in biographies which emphasized chronological facts, historical details and geographical data. These books betray a troublesome concern to insist (and perhaps, overinsist) upon the supernatural. Unfortunately, these great Catholic biographies tended to overlook the individual viewpoints of the various evangelists and to disregard their particular theological themes and their doctrinal content. Apologetical arguments saw the Old Testament fulfilled in the New Testament by means of dates, numbers, places and people, rather than by means of great doctrinal truths, such as poverty, humility, expiatory suffering, transcendence and corporate solidarity.

The 19th Century was marked not only by the " Quest for the Historical Jesus " but also by the Graf-Wellhausen School of Criticism. Krister Stendahl has characterized this school as " litrary criticism of a book-minded, *scissors and paste* type." [13] The scholar sits contentedly at his desk with any number of books at arms-length but with no help whatsoever from archeology or ancient Semitic documents. His studies drop an atom bomb upon the Bible, scattering its verses and words into a

century vogue. Cf. J. M. Robinson, *A New Quest of the Historical Jesus* (Naperville, Ill.: 1959).

[11] p. xxvii, in the 13th French ed.; quoted here from M. J. Lagrange, *Christ and Renan*, tr. by Masie Ward (London: 1928) p. 119.

[12] Cf. P. A. Sheehan, *Under the Cedars and the Stars*, p. 136.

[13] " Problems in Biblical Hermeneutics," *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 77 (1958), 34.

jumble of fragments and documents. He accepts without hesitation the Marxist-Hegelism theory of evolution. The Old and New Testaments he divides into periods of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, as the universe whirls forward in its blind drive for natural perfection. G. R. North has summed up the reaction of most scholars of this age in these words: "The Graf-Wellhausen theory had triumphed, and it seemed that little or nothing remained to be done." [14]

Catholic scholarship was seriously weakened by a combination of unhappy circumstances. The backwash of anti-intellectualism, left behind by the two preceding centuries, had not yet been cleared away by the reforms of Leo XIII. The Modernist heresy was gaining ground and infiltrating seminaries and universities. No clear ideas on the nature of inspiration and revelation were at hand to guide the research scholar.[15] Consequently, the closing years of the 19th century were a time of fog and whirlwind, or of hysterical fright and rash conclusions. Two of the foremost Catholic scholars at this time were Marie-Joseph Lagrange, O. P., who had founded the École Biblique in Jerusalem and François de Hummelauer, S. J., who was stirring up a scriptural revival in German speaking lands. What Lagrange and Hummelauer presented as hypotheses, their followers rashly turned into established conclusions.

Quick, decisive action was necessary. Pope Leo XIII estab-

[14] "Pentateuchal Criticism," in *The Old Testament and Modern Study*, ed. by H. H. Rowley (Oxford: 1951), 48. The rise and development of literary criticism is presented by J. Coppens, *The Old Testament and the Critic*, tr. by E. A. Ryan and E. W. Trebbe (Patterson: 1942).

[15] I. Jahn (1816) reduced inspiration to a negative assistance, preserving the sacred writer from error; B. de Haneberg (1876) to a subsequent approval by the Church; Rohling (1872), Lenormant (1882) and Di Bartoló (1888) contended that inspiration extended only to matters of faith and morals; Prat and Hummelauer elaborated their theory of "implicit citation," whereby sections of the Bible could be conveniently withdrawn from the sphere of inspiration; Cardinal Newman's struggles for a solution are well presented by Jaak Seynaeve, *Cardinal Newman's Doctrine of Holy Scripture* (Oxford: 1953). That the controversy on the nature of inspiration is still open is evident from Karl Rahner, *Über die Schriftinspiration* (Freiburg: 1958).

lished the Biblical Commission in 1902;[16] five years later its disciplinary power was further strengthened by Pius X.[17] In the same year (1907) Pius X issued his encyclical *Pascendi* against Modernism. Various decrees proceeded from the Biblical Commission: in 1905 on the historical books of the Bible; in 1906 on the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch; in 1907 on the Fourth Gospel; in 1908 on the book of Isaias; in 1909 on the first three chapters on Genesis.[18] Hummelauer was forbidden to make any public statements on the Bible. Lagrange interrupted his scripture studies and withdrew to France. "Less than a year later he was again at Jerusalem with orders to carry on his exegetical studies."[19]

An impartial study of biblical research at the turn of the 20th century shows the need of such drastic disciplinary action by ecclesiastical authority. Such action prevented any widespread apostasy from orthodoxy contaminating the faith of the Catholic Church from within, as did happen among many non-Catholic sects. The decrees, however, were made and enforced by human beings, and at times there may have been excessive rigor. The inevitable result was a "defensive atmosphere [of the beleaguered fortress in which] creative scholarship was extremely unlikely."[20] For twenty to thirty years no

[16] Cf. *Rome and the Study of Scripture*, pp. 30-35 for the Apostolic Letter, *Vigilantiae*, establishing the Biblical Commission.

[17] *Praestantia Sacrae Scripturae*, in *Rome and Study*, 40-42. Pius X wrote: "All are bound in conscience to submit to the decisions of the Biblical Commission, which have been given in the past and which shall be given in the future, in the same way as to the Decrees which pertain to doctrine, issued by the Sacred Congregations and approved by the Sovereign Pontiff." A recent clarification on the binding force of the decrees of the Biblical Commission can be found in the *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 18 (Jan. 1956), 23-29.

[18] Decisions of the Pontifical Commission are given in *Rome and Study*, pp. 115 ff. See fn. 17 about a recent clarification.

[19] Cf. *Père Lagrange and the Scriptures*, tr. by R. T. Murphy (Milwaukee: 1946) p. 186. The decree of the Consistorial Congregation, demanding that there be removed from clerical institutions "scripta plura P. Lagrange," can be found in "I Generi Letterari e l'Enciclica," by P. Eufrasio di Cristo Re, *Questioni Bibliche, Parte I* (Pontificium Institutum Biblicum: 1949), 10-11. This decree is no longer binding.

[20] J. L. McKenzie, "Problems of Hermeneutics in Roman Catholic Exegesis," *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 77 (Sept. 1958), 197.

Catholic scholar dared to touch such books as Genesis, Josue, Judges or Isaias.[21] Consequently, scripture courses in our seminaries and colleges usually degenerated into unyielding conservatism and prolonged arguments against the higher critics.[22] Little attempt was made to sift truth from error in the writings of non-Catholics. An even more lamentable result was a general neglect of the Bible as a source of doctrine and spiritual inspiration.

3. *The Last Thirty Years*

We come now to our own times and look into the *present* state of scriptural studies. We ask ourselves: what has happened during the last thirty years. What has happened since Pius XII's encyclical letter, *Divino Afflante Spiritu* (Sept. 30, 1943), when a vigorous spirit stirred Catholic biblical studies. Our late Holy Father voiced the " hope that our times also can contribute something towards the deeper and more accurate interpretation of Sacred Scripture." He pointed out that " new means and aids to exegesis are also provided." [23] In this *Magna Carta* of biblical scholarship he wrote: " All should abhor that intemperate zeal which imagines that whatever is new should for that very reason be opposed or suspected." [24]

Today Catholic exegetes are debtors to the archeologist's pick ax which has been hard at work in the Near East especially since 1900. With the decipherment of the Rosetta Stone (between 1799 and 1832) and the efforts of Sir Flinders Petri (1885 and later), Egypt began to release her mysterious messages about the past. It was Petri, as Albright has remarked, who " revolutionized the science of Archaeology." [25] Petri dis-

[21] This becomes evident by studying the bibliographies in modern Catholic commentaries like *A Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture*, ed. by B. Orchard (London: 1953). Notice the few works that can be cited by John M. T. Barton, " Recent Catholic Exegesis in English-Speaking Lands," *Mémorial Lagrange* (Paris: 1940), 239-244.

[22] An example is the once very common text book: A. Cornely and A. Merk, *Introductionis in S. Scripturae Libros Compendium* (ed. 10; Paris: 1929).

[23] *Divino Afflante Spiritu*, n. 31.

[24] *Ibid.*, n. 33.

[25] W. F. Albright, *Recent Discoveries in Bible Lands* (publ. by The Biblical

covered the value of pottery as a chronological criterion, and in 1901 published his method of dating. Religious compositions like the *Book of the Dead* and the hymns of Akhenaton to the Sun (which resemble Ps. 103) are now known to us. Historical inscriptions have also been discovered, detailing the conquests of Merneptah (ca. 1220) in the days of Moses and of Sheshak I (ca. 935-914 B. C.) during the reign of Roboam.

The decipherment of the famous Behistum trilingual in 1851 opened up the land of the Tigris and the Euphrates. Sir Leonard Woolley excavated the city of Ur, the birthplace of Abraham. André Parrot discovered the famous Mari tablets in 1935 and 1936, from which we can reconstruct the patriarchal period of Abraham and explain many biblical customs. We now possess in our own language the Law codes of Hammurabi (ca. 1700 B.C.), the Sumerian Code (ca. 2050 B.C.), the Eshnuna Code written in Akkadian (ca. 1800 B.C.), the Assyrian Code (ca. 1100 B.C.), and the Hittite (1400-1200 B.C.). The *Enuma Eliš* creation story and the *Gilgamesh Epic* of ancient Mesopotamia have thrown tremendous light upon the early chapters of Genesis. The publication of the "Wiseman Chronicles" (1956) is unraveling the sequence of events during the era Nabuchodonosor and the fall of Jerusalem.[26]

Much of Canaanite life became known to us from the *Raš Shamrah* tablets, discovered at ancient Ugarit in 1929 and deciphered between 1930-1931 by Bauer and Dhorme. In Palestine systematized excavation was undertaken at sites like Jericho, Megiddo, Mizpah, Hai, Shechem, Lachish, Tell el-Far'ah, and Hazor.[27] G. Ernest Wright could write about

Colloquium. Pittsburgh) p. 7. This paper-back is an excellent summary of the effects of archaeology upon the Bible.

[26] Cf. E. Vogt, "Die Neubabylonische Chronik über die Schlacht bei Karkemisch und die Einnahme von Jerusalem," *Supplements to Vetus Testamentum* vol. 4 (Leiden: 1957) 67 ff.; D. J. Wiseman, *Chronicles of Chaldaean Kings (626-556 B.C.) in the British Museum* (London: 1956); comments of E. Vogt *Biblica* 47 (1956), 389-397.

[27] Besides the paper-back of Albright just mentioned, we also call attention to the following books, valuable for estimating the effects of archaeology upon Scripture study: W. F. Albright, *From the Stone Age to Christianity* (Baltimore: 1940),

Palestine: "I know of no other country in which over five thousand years of pre-Roman history is as well known and as well established chronologically." [28] There is no space here to detail the overwhelming effects of the Dead Sea Scrolls, especially on the understanding of the age in which Our Lord and the apostles were born and lived.[29]

One of the men most responsible for integrating these new discoveries into Catholic biblical studies was Père Lagrange, O.P. He had established the now world famous L'École Biblique at Jerusalem in 1890. This was the time when the ancient Near East was about to yield its treasures.[30] In January 1892 the first issues of the *Revue Biblique* appeared, undoubtedly the finest Catholic Scripture periodical in the world. Père Lagrange gathered around him men like Père Vincent, Abel, Dhorme, Vosté and de Vaux, whom he transformed into first class scholars. His voluminous writing in the *Revue Biblique* and in many books, his teaching and lecturing, his sanctity and prayers, have transformed biblical studies.[31] Another step forward was taken in 1909 when Pope Pius X established the Pontifical Biblical Institute in Rome, the only school able to grant Scripture degrees, and entrusted it to the

recently reprinted in paper-back by Doubleday Anchor Book; J. Finegan, *Light From the Ancient Past* (Princeton U. Press: 1959); L. H. Grollenberg, *Atlas of the Bible* (London: 1956); E. G. Kraeling, *Bible Atlas* (New York: 1956); G. E. Wright, *Biblical Archaeology* (Philadelphia: 1956); O. Schilling, "The Bible and Archaeology," *Theology Digest*, 6 (1958), 33-37.

[28] "Archaeology and Old Testament Studies," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 77 (March 1958) 41.

[29] Very select bibliography for the Dead Sea Scrolls would be: T. H. Gaster, *The Dead Sea Scriptures* (Doubleday Anchor paperback: 1956); G. Vermès, *Discovery in the Judean Desert* (New York: 1956); Millar Burrows, *The Dead Sea Scrolls* (New York: 1955); *id.*, *More Light on the Dead Sea Scrolls* (1958); *The Scrolls and the New Testament*, ed. by K. Stendahl (New York: 1957); F. M. Cross, Jr., *The Ancient Library of Qumran and Modern Biblical Studies* (New York: 1958); R. E. Murphy, *The Dead Sea Scrolls and the Bible* (Westminster, Md.: 1956).

[30] The story of these pioneering days is beautifully told by R. T. Murphy, *Père Lagrange and the Scriptures* (Milwaukee: 1946), 181 ff.

[31] This is forcibly clear in *Mémorial Lagrange*, commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the l'École Biblique.

Jesuit Fathers.[32] On the faculty of this university have served such outstanding Jesuit scholars as Fathers Vaccari, Fernandez, Bea, Pohl, Holzmeister, Zorell and Mallon.

It is well to keep in mind that our present enthusiastic scripture revival was not forced upon us by ecclesiastical authority, but rather arose from the initiative of men like Lagrange and Bea. For instance, the *Divino Afflante Spiritu* was written by Pius XII to put a stop to a false pietistic movement which would have suppressed all technical research in favor of allegorizing; and to offer " Our encouragement [that biblical scholars may be able] to continue with ever renewed vigor, with all zeal and care, the work so happily begun." [33] The immediate occasion of the encyclical was the books and circular of a certain Abbe D. Ruotolo, published between 1930 and 1941, which were *nominatim* condemned by the Holy Office.[34]

Another important document in the advance of Catholic biblical studies is the Letter of Père Vosté to Cardinal Suhard, Jan. 16, 1948.[35] It was praised in the *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* with this encomium:

> It would be hard to state more explicitly the attitude of the best modern Old Testament scholarship towards the problems of the early chapters of Genesis.[36]

We will now summarize the effects of biblical studies during the past thirty years. First of all, the arm-chair, ivory-tower, literary conclusions of the Graf-Wellhausen School have been overthrown. Albright's masterful book *From the Stone Age to Christianity* (1940) has established very forcibly that monotheism was not the achievement of the 8th century prophets but was already in existence in the Mosaic era.[37] A neo-con-

[32] *Dictionnaire de la Bible Supplement* (= *DBS*) 4 (Paris: 1949), 559-561, has a short article by A. Bea, S. J.

[33] n. 59.

[34] An account can be found in *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité*, fasc. XXV (Paris: 1958) 270. Cf. *Rome and the Study of Scripture*, 136-145.

[35] Eng. tr. in *Rome and the Study of Scripture*, 148-151.

[36] 81 (Jan. 1949) p. 10.

[37] Cf. H. H. Rowley, *The Unity of the Bible* (London: 1953), 22-23; also fn. 4-5 on p. 22 and fn. 1 on p. 23.

servatism has set in among many non-Catholic scholars.[38] The antiquity and historicity of the patriarchial stories and of the Mosaic traditions are now accepted by very many scholars.

As Pope Pius XII frequently points out in his encyclical, we now know much more about " the peculiar character and circumstances of the sacred writer, the age in which he lived, the sources written or oral to which he had recourse and the forms of expression he employed." [39] Archaeology has enabled us to reconstruct the milieu, civilization and life-situation (*Sitz im Leben*) in which the biblical accounts arose. The Old Testament is thus seen as a living tradition which grew out of Israel.[40] The Bible therefore belongs to Israel and can be interpreted only in the context of Israel's religion.

Scripture is being studied in its ancient literary forms and liturgical uses. The Bible again becomes a religious book rather than a science manual.

A clearer idea of inspiration and revelation removes the danger of modernism and mythical interpretation. We understand now that a later redactor can be just as much inspired as the original author. We can admit that a biblical author depended to a certain extent upon myths, without implying that the Bible is a myth. Actually, our whole concept of " myth " has been revolutionized. " Myth " can no longer be defined as a " purely fictious narrative " [41] but rather as a story which attempts to explain the hidden forces behind various human experiences. Biblical " myths " differ from the myths of the other Semitic people in that the Israelite identified " the hidden power " as the one, personal, loving God.[42]

Biblical studies of the past thirty years have underlined these

[38] This is quite evident in the volume *The Old Testament and Modern Study*. Rowley remarks in his introduction (p. xvii): In general, it may be said that there has been a tendency towards more conservative views on many questions.

[39] *Divino Afflante Spiritu*, n. 33.

[40] Cf. C. Stuhlmueller, " Influence of Oral Tradition," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 20 (1958), 310, fn. 42.

[41] *Oxford Universal English Dictionary*, 6 (Oxford U. Press: 1937), 1306.

[42] Cf. J. Henninger, H. Cazelles, R. Mailé, " Mythe," *DBS* 6 (Paris: 1958), 225-268; J. L. McKenzie, *The Two-Edged Sword* (Milwaukee: 1956), 50 ff.; 80 ff.

two ideas: the Bible was as much a part of the ancient Near East as the encyclicals of Pius XII belong to our twentieth century; there is a basic difference between Israel and the other countries of the Near East which only a supernatural intervention can adequately explain.

II. Principal Elements in the Catholic Scriptural Revival

Many conclusions reached during the last three decades by Catholic scriptural scholars strike the theologian as a secularization or a "humanizing" of the Bible, and so there arises a tension or suspicion! However, the exegete finds solace in the words of Pius XII, who reiterated that the inspired writer of the Bible is "the *living and reasonable* instrument of the Holy Spirit . . . [He] so uses his faculties and powers, that from the book composed by him all may easily infer 'the *special* character of *each one* and, as it were, his *personal* traits.'"[43] As a result of biblical investigations, the sacred author is a human being walking upon the clay of this earth, no longer a dreamer drifting among clouds nor an automaton speaking in a trance. Neither is he an orphan, forced to exist as a stranger in a 20th century civilization; he has been joyfully rehabilitated to his own homeland and times, with his own culture, problems and thought patterns. The God of the Old and New Testaments is no longer an unknown Supreme Being off in somewhere. He is rather a living, *personal* God—acting, knowing, loving and intervening as Lord, Father and Spouse. His divine name Yahweh signifies: *I am He who is always there*, present in your midst at each moment of time, personally involved in each detail of your history and geography!

This new knowledge of biblical times leads to the first conclusion of Catholic scriptural studies to be stressed here: The Biblical Notion of History.[44] It is now admitted that his-

[43] *Divino Afflante Spiritu*, n. 33, italics ours.

[44] Response of the Biblical Commission, written by its then secretary James M. Vosté, to Cardinal Suhard, Jan. 16, 1948. Eng. tr. in *Rome and the Study of Scripture*, 148-151.

tory, as it is written today, was non-existent in the ancient Near East; the Semite felt no interest in a fixed, static account of the past. The Hebrew people shared in this common Semitic way of thinking and acting which centered around the present, the concrete and the practical. The biblical narrator was constantly asking himself: what does this event or this tradition really mean *to me and to my fellow countrymen right here and now?* [45]

For this reason it would be preferable to return to the Jewish division of the Old Testament into: The Torah or Law; The Prophets; and The Writings.[46] The Torah contains the first five books of the Bible and was *the* Law or foundation of Israel's religious life. Like all law, the Torah grew and was modified with the passing of time,[47] yet, unlike western law codes, the Torah also contained the lives of Israel's heroes, who were considered a "law of right living." In the Torah there is found the story of creation. This story was never a scientific explanation. It was a religious vindication of Yahweh. It stripped down to empty nothingness the degrading nature-gods worshipped by other peoples; in language of exquisite poetry it sang the Hebrew *Credo*: that at the beginning God in his goodness made all things beautiful. With this truth there sounded a warning: for the man who revolts against God all things will revert to primal chaos.

The second part of the Jewish scriptures is the prophetical books. Our "historical books of Josue, Judges, Samuel and Kings" constitute for the Israelite a prophetical judgment, passed upon the nation's early history according to the norms of the Torah and the obligations of the Mosaic convenant. Our first three Major Prophets and the Twelve Minor Prophets keep the *spirit* of the Torah burning in the people's hearts

[45] This whole problem of the actualization of the ancient traditions has been handled by me in two articles: "The Influence of Oral Traditions" (cf. fn. 40 above) and "The Interdependence of the Old Testament Liturgy and the Bible," *1958 Proceedings of the North American Liturgy Week* (Elsberry, Mo.: 1959), 139-155.

[46] This division has been adopted in *Introduction à la Bible* (Paris: 1957).

[47] Cf. L. H. Grollenberg, *Atlas of the Bible*, 52-53.

during later historical periods. The third division of the Jewish Bible is called simply "The Writings." This general term refers to any book which was accepted late in the sacred canon, sometimes only after a struggle. This fact should throw light upon the composition of books like Daniel, Lamentations, Ruth and Paralipomenon, which are listed among "The Writings."

For the Israelites, history had a much different purpose than our idea of knowledge recorded for knowledge's sake, supplemented with documented footnotes from the *fontes*. Rightly does André Robert in the *Dictionnaire de la Bible Supplement* speak of "*historique genre*" rather than of "history"; he inquires into the Hebrew manner of history writing, not into Israelite history.[48] John Bright's monograph *Early Israel in Recent History Writing* [49] criticizes works like those of Ricciotti and Heinisch, and rightly points out that the trend is away from their kind of history writing. Père de Vaux's splendid article on "Israel" in the same *Dictionnaire* [50] or his commentaries in the *Bible de Jérusalem* move along this newer approach. For instance, de Vaux accepts the Genesis account of an ancient racial bond, uniting the ancestors of the 12 tribes of Israel. However, he also admits "that these groups have had different histories [which fact is] implied in the Bible itself." [51] The blessing of Jacob in Ch. 49 reflects not the patriarchal period of Jacob but the age of the Judges or of David.[52] We cannot write biographies of Abraham, Jacob or Josue by following the word by word account of the Bible. It is most necessary first to determine the literary genre of each section or pericope and the age of its composition. We must investigate what the inspired author or authors intended, when they lived, how their compositions were transmitted.

[48] Vol. IV, col. 7-23. Renée Bloch continues this same method of investigation in her magnificent study, "Midrash," V, 1263-1281.

[49] J. Bright, *Early Israel in Recent History Writing*. Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 19 (London: 1956). Bright's *A History of Israel* (Philadelphia: 1959) is the finest Old Testament history in English.

[50] Vol. IV, col. 729-777.

[51] Vol. IV, col. 734, italics mine.

[52] *La Sainte Bible de Jérusalem* (Paris: 1956), 58, fn. d (one volume edition).

Rather than history for history's sake, biblical history was projected as a means: to worship the living God who had wrought such wonders and continues to do so in each new generation; to maintain hereditary rights, for God's promises were committed to a particular people; to impart religious instruction; to entertain. Very evident is the necessity to determine the literary genre or form of literature of a particular passage before we begin to exegete it. In what are called the "historical books" we will meet: *satire,* like the origin of the Ammonities and the Moabites through incest (Gn. 19, 30-38); *relaxing entertainment* in the incident of Balaam's talking ass (Nm. 22, 22-35); *liturgical benediction* combined with history in the repetition of God's blessing upon Abraham (Gn. 12, 1-3); *liturgical procession* united with history in the story of the fall of Jericho (Jos. 4, 13-27). Each literary form has its own laws to govern the presentation of truth.[53]

The first conclusion of Catholic scriptural scholarship has been a re-defining or a re-assessment of biblical history. True historical facts are most certainly in the Bible, but not in our style of western history writing. The Bible is being given back to its inspired authors, and God is seen at work among His people, instead of far off in a world of abstraction. The *second conclusion* now to be emphasized is the fact of *oral or liturgical tradition.*

We are so accustomed to think of what the Bible has contributed to the liturgy that we seldom think of how much the liturgy has done for the Bible. In this connection, we may ask: why were certain traditions, sermons and poems preserved, while all the rest were lost? The answer to this question is not the prophet's firm realization that his words were spoken under God's inspiration. He may or may not have known of this supernatural influence upon him. Actually, it does not seem

[53] Cf. "Form Criticism," *Theology Digest.* 6 (1958), 9-10, an abstract of two articles: W. R. Catterall, "Form Criticism," *Clergy Review.* 41 (1956), 157-162; A. Legault, "An Application of the Form-Critique Method," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly,* 16 (1954), 131-145. A. Robert, "Littéraires (Genres)." *DBS* 5 (Paris: 1957), 405 ff. Articles by Cerfaux, Dupont, Benoit and Stanley often follow this method.

likely that any of our biblical books were arranged by their original authors.

It is my opinion that the LITURGY of the temple and of the Palestinian sanctuaries was the principal agent in the preservation of the sacred message. The prophetic words may have been written down, but the ordinary way of transmitting them was by word of mouth. Very few Israelites could read and write. Furthermore, oral presentation made the message come alive. The listeners felt *themselves involved* in the great deeds of the past. Historical traditions became a mystery in which the worshipper was taking part. God who had accomplished the great wonders of the past was again acting and working among his people *by means of the liturgical recitals*. The temple services, therefore, profoundly influenced the composition of the Bible and kept the sacred message always a live issue. This *living* tradition was what the practical mentality of the Hebrew people demanded.

An excellent example of liturgical, oral tradition is the book of Deuteronomy. We must read this book as though we are standing in a sanctuary courtyard, listening to an instruction from one of the Levites. We are reliving the days of Moses, because the Levite is delivering his sermon as though Moses himself were speaking. We will sense an immediate contact with the great Lawgiver of Israel, even though he is now long dead, as we hear the repetition of such phases as: YOU, TODAY, NOT WITH OUR FATHERS BUT WITH US, THE LORD OUR GOD.

> Hear, O Israel, the statutes and decrees which I proclaim IN YOUR HEARING THIS DAY. . . . The Lord, OUR God, made a covenant WITH US at Horeb; NOT WITH OUR FATHERS did he make this covenant BUT WITH US, ALL OF US WHO ARE ALIVE HERE THIS DAY (Dt. 5, 1-3; cf. 10, 12-15).

History and law are being brought up to date, so as to continue as a vital power in a new period of time. The temple liturgy was preserving the Mosaic heritage not as a dead letter but as a living power whereby the spirit of Moses pulsed in the hearts of his distant followers.

Many other examples can be cited, in order to show how the Bible was composed and transmitted as a *living, sacred* tradition: the two, triumphant songs of thanksgiving which conclude the book of Emmanuel (Is. 12); the congregational chants which interrupt the soliloquies of lonely Jeremias (Jer. 20, 7. 13); the doxologies of Amos (Am. 4, 13; 5, 8 f.; 9, 5 f.); the lamentations of Jeremias and Joel. Instead of being a book composed once and for all and then left static and unchanged, the Old Testament is the product of a long series of different, inspired authors. This gradual modification of ancient traditions was never reckless and haphazard. If anything, it inclined to be slow and conservative. Nor was it done in defiance of legitimate authority. God was directing the process, inspired redactors were his instruments, and temple priests and levites were authorizing and supervising the changes.

In this second part of our article, we have been stressing two of the most salient features or conclusions of recent Catholic scriptural scholarship: *the BIBLICAL notion of history*, by which the historical, redemptive acts of God are preserved in such a way as to be relived by each new generation; and *oral and liturgical recitals*, by which historical and prophetical traditions were preserved and transmitted by temple services in which the entire congregation participated. Rather than be scandalized at any daring changes in the sacred message, we should admire the Hebrew's love of the Bible. He was determined that his scriptures be no dead letters upon faded vellum but rather *LIVING traditions* pulsing within his heart.

III. Practical Effects upon College Theology Courses

In this part of our article we seek to determine some of the *practical* or *pedagogical* effects of Catholic Scripture studies upon the actual teaching of Sacred Doctrine. We will direct our attention: to the proper use of Scripture texts; and to the attitude of mind which Scripture imparts to the college student.

1. *Proper Use of Scripture Texts*

In college religion courses Scripture must be read and studied in the spirit of its authors; and neither God, the principal Author, nor his human instrument, ever intended the sacred message to be a list of statistical facts or a conglomeration of unrelated sentences. There is a unity to the Old Testament, as there is to the New. This concord of thought is no monotonous, monolithic structure of sameness. Its human authors are as widely separated as an Amos and as Osee, an Isaias and a Micheas, a pro-monarchic and antimonarchic tradition; and each of these manifest the greatest diversity of character, outlook and literary ability. Yet, there remains a constant harmony of thought, which the great biblical theologians of our modern day are careful to recognize. Walther Eichrodt unifies his massive, three volume *Theologie des Alten Testaments* [54] under the theme of the covenant. H. H. Rowley is very close to Eichrodt in his excellent book, *The Unity of the Bible*. Rowley writes: " in the religious ideas which were mediated to Israel through Moses lay the seeds of almost all the creative ideas which are to be found in the Old Testament, to be carried forward into the New." [55] With Phythian Adams the center around which everything clusters is the tabernacling presence of Yahweh,[56] while Rudolf Otto emphasizes *The Idea of the Holy*.[57]

This unity of thought never inflicted a paralytic stroke upon biblical writers so as to reduce all mental activity to static inertia. Rather, it is " a unity of process and development." [58] The books of the Bible are related to one another like the years

[54] W. Eichrodt, *Theologie des Alten Testaments* (Göttingen). Personally, I consider this three volume work, written by a non-Catholic, the finest of all OT Biblical Theologies now available.

[55] H. H. Rowley, *The Unity of the Bible*, 21. This non-Catholic work is excellent and orthodox throughout.

[56] P. Adams, *The People and the Presence* (London: 1942).

[57] R. Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, tr. by J. W. Harvey (ed. 2; Oxford U. Press: 1950). Neither P. Adams nor R. Otto are recommended for general reading by Catholic students.

[58] H. H. Rowley, *op. cit.*, 46.

of a man's life. Hebrew religion passes through periods of birth, infancy, boyhood, adulthood, until there comes, not the moment of death, but " the fulness of time [when] God sent his son " (Gal. 4, 4). Isaias, Jeremias, Ezechiel and Zacharias compare the messianic promises to a plant, growing from a hidden root and gradually extending sturdy branches upon which the birds of the air (that is, the nations of the world) can rest in security.[59] Each moment of Old Testament history was more than an isolated moment of time. It was an integral part of the past and of the future. It belonged to that onward, progressive movement of time, which St. Matthew saw stretching from Abraham to " Joseph, the husband of Mary, . . . [from whom] was born Jesus who is called Christ " (Mt. 1, 16). This " unity of development " is another way of expressing what was described earlier as the biblical notion of history, whereby the historical acts of God continue to live in each generation by means of oral or liturgical recital.

No merely natural evolutionary development can be detected here. Almighty God was the workman tending the vineyard (Is. 5, 1-7); He was the potter working with the clay of human stuff (Is. 29, 16; Jer. 18, 1-13). The Bible is the record of God's loving and personal intervention in the lives of his children, in order to achieve " a kingdom of priests, a holy nation " (Ex. 19, 6). There was something of God's invincible power and conquering love in the great events by which Israel became —in the words of God—" my special possession, dearer to me than all other people " (Ex. 19, 5). As explained earlier in this paper, these redemptive acts of God could not be confined to the past, but were thought to happen repeatedly in each generation; therefore, the sacred words which narrated the stirring events of the past contained in themselves the power to make that past once again a present reality. For these words, like the marvelous deeds of old, come from God and contain within their syllables the mystery of God's living presence. Did not Isaias cry out to the discouraged exiles:

[59] Is. 11, 1; Jer. 23, 5; Ez. 17, 22-24; Zach. 3, 8; 6, 12.

> As the rain and snow come down from the heavens,
> And never return
> without watering the earth
> and making it bring forth and sprout, . . .
> So is my word which goes out of my mouth—
> It does not return to me fruitless,
> without doing the work which I desired,
> and accomplishing the purpose for which I sent it.
> (Is. 55, 10 f.)

The sacred, inspired message directed Israel ahead with a steady, onward step. It put a forward looking vision in the eyes of each true Israelite. The power of God's presence was always seen into the heart of each one as he listened to the recital of the sacred message. For instance, when the psalmist is praising God for His past kindness, he suddenly turns to the assembled congregation and implores:

> Oh, that *today* you would hear this voice:
> 'Harden not your hearts . . .' (Ps. 94, 7 f.)

How can this progressive unity and constant actualization of the biblical word be manifested in our religion courses. First of all, we must break away from that all too common practice of proving a doctrinal thesis by a long series of disjunct Scripture texts. The apologetical method of listing names, dates, persons and places must be abandoned. Rather, let the teacher choose key texts which represent a development of doctrine, scrutinize through the Old and extending into the New Testament. As far as he is able, let him trace the slow, organic, living growth from one era to another, so that biblical texts are seen as an integral part of Israelite life.

Here is an example of what is meant. In presenting the theme of a suffering Messias, there should be no stringing together of a series of texts which the students are expected to memorize without further explanation. Far better would it be for the teacher to locate a few texts in their historical setting; then point out how the theme "salvation through suffering" is a truth found at the very start of biblical religion. Here is the unity of the Bible; yet it is also a truth which became more

clearly and fully known with the passage of time (biblical unity is a progressive, organic development).

1st) Gn. 3, 15 witnesses to the Mosaic era (ca. 1200 B. C.). The Protoevangelion states that victory will eventually come to the good and upright, but only through persevering struggle, sustained by means of God's help.

2nd) In the period of the Judges and in the early days of the royalty (ca. 1170-800 B. C.) sorrow was always considered punishment for sin. When David innocently suffered the unmerited persecution of Saul, he felt that there must have been sin (1 Kgs. 26, 19). This was a mystery too deep for him to unravel, for what sin had David committed? Yet, biblical faith maintained at the same time that God could not be guilty of jealous caprice; He was no Canaanite deity.

3rd) In the later royal period (800-587 B. C.) came a partial answer to this mystery. There existed the growing realization that God *must* send suffering, in order to receive back a chastened, purified remnant. The purpose of suffering is beginning to dawn upon their minds (cf. Is. 7-8; 19. 22; Soph. 2, 3).

4th) When the terrible catastrophe of the Babylonian exile swept the nation into a boiling cauldron of suffering (587-537 B. C.), the saving, purifying power of suffering was *actually experienced*. By this time they believed in a *personal* Messias, and so they were prepared for the great revelation that the Saviour or Servant of the Lord must himself suffer, for suffering is the law of salvation (Is. 52, 13-53, 12).

5th) Lastly, in the postexilic days (after 587 B. C.), men and women freely embraced poverty and austerity, so that they will be ready for the "Day of the Lord." The Qumran group along the Dead Sea are to be classed among these poor and lowly.

Therefore, when Christ stood up in the synagogue of Nazareth, read from the scroll of Isaias, and then cried out: "TODAY this Scripture has been fulfilled in your hearing!" he was seeing not so much a fulfillment of words as of a living, prayerful, humble tradition that salvation comes through suffering (Lk. 4, 21). Jesus was not being forced to conform his life to words in a book, but rather he was answering the earnest prayers of

many centuries, prayers which the Scriptures did inspire, sustain and reflect.

Since there is a living, vital unity between the Old and New Testaments, then we must explain New Testament phrases like justice, grace, redemption, Son of God and Son of Man, by tracing them back into Old Testament thought patterns and concepts. This unity is a dynamic unity with the result that the New Testament has outgrown the limited content of Old Testament thoughts. Yet, unity also demands that we do not read into the Bible concepts and definitions of Greek philosophy or Medieval Scholasticism.[60] To consider "justice" as a legal *quid pro quo*, "redemption" as an act of *buying back*, or "Son of God" as an expression of divine nature is reading the Bible as though it were composed by a Greek. Once we have determined the biblical teaching on a particular doctrine, *then* Scripture is ready to make its contribution to systematized theology.[61]

We now turn our attention to the second major contribution of Catholic Biblical Scholarship to college theology courses. Here we point out the wholesome and holy attitude of mind which Scripture imparts to the students. The only requirement, again, is to read the Bible *humbly* and *intelligently*. HUMBLY implies a prayerful willingness to learn from God; INTELLIGENTLY demands some acquaintance with biblical history, geography and literary forms.

First, the Bible enables the science student to recognize a *creature of God* in the sun and clouds, in the moon and stars, in the trees and flowers, in the birds and animals. Through

[60] F. V. Filson, *The New Testament Against its Environment* (London: 1950); G. Dix, *Jew and Greek* (Westminster, Eng.: 1955)—both these works are non-Catholic, the second can be generally recommended to theology teachers. D. M. Stanley, "Kingdom to Church," *Theological Studies*, 16 (1955), 3-29.

[61] The necessity of interpreting Scripture according to the analogy of faith and the teaching of the Church is not being compromised. As Pius XII carefully pointed out in the *Divino Afflante Spiritu* (n. 47), there are very few texts whose meaning has been defined by the Church. We may never so interpret a text as to contradict a doctrinal truth, but neither are we obliged to find the same truth in the text.

Bible reading the student learns to call the universe " my home where I live with my Heavenly Father." How can anyone read Ch. 1 of Genesis and ever forget the echoing refrain: " And God saw that it was good "? Ps. 28 turns the world into a temple where cosmic forces are shouting " Glory! " to God. Can anyone match the exalted song of JOB, where morning stars sing in chorus and clouds are swaddling bands of the sea, where God is father to the dew and ice and raises his voice among the clouds and sends lightning on its way. Bible reading transforms nature into a " THOU " to be known and loved, rather than an " IT " to be studied and dissected.[62] This seeing of God in His creatures is not Pantheism, but that spirited exaltation which exclaims:

> If I go to the heavens, you are there;
> if I sink to the nether world, you are present there.
> If I take the wings of dawn,
> if I settle at the farthest limits of the sea,
> Even there your hand shall guide me,
> and your right hand hold me fast. (Ps. 138, 8-10)

Second, Bible reading gives the history student the conviction that history like nature is invested with the quality of " THOU," not " IT," since God is at work in every event, from the dinner table of the family to the mahogany conference table of mighty nations. God's plan of salvation is accomplished, not off in the clouds but right here upon this earth, in the midst of shouting children and marching armies, in the evil surroundings of crude immorality and in the quiet days of peace. Habacuc is today's history student, face to face with the terrifying scourge of Communistic Russia.

> How long, O Lord, must I cry for help,
> and thou not hear? (Hab. 1, 2)

God's final answer to Habacuc is the declaration: " The just

[62] This Semitic concept of nature is splendidly developed by H. and A. Franfort, " Myth and Reality," *Before Philosophy* (Penguin Books; Harmondsworth, Middlesex: 1949), the original edition was entitled: *The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man* (U. of Chicago Press: 1946).

man lives by faith!" (2, 4). Through the sequence of biblical events, the history student acquires the faith to realize "that for those who love God, [God makes] all things work together unto good" (Rom. 8, 28). The very presence of those elements which thirty years ago made the Bible seem very worldly and earthly are now a proof of its divinity. Only the presence of God can account for such mighty wonders in the midst of such unlikely circumstances.

At times, we are scandalized at the sins of lust and cowardice in the lives of biblical saints! We naturally wonder how can the Bible be classed as spiritual reading? With extraordinary candor, unequalled by the official, historical records of any nation ancient or modern, Scripture recounts the sins of its holiest and most important personages, "lest any flesh should pride itself before him" (1 Cor. 1, 29). Here is a serious warning to all who consider themselves already predestined, and who, therefore, proudly condemn the weakness of their neighbor. Also present in these registers of sin is the consoling truth: God rejects only the unrepentant sinner. Another element of instruction is this caution: never put the blame of one's own sins upon the sins of other people. In the pages of the Bible are an Isaias and a Jeremias who were sanctified not despite but because of the wicked world in which they lived. The Bible, therefore, charges all of history with the sanctifying power of God.

Third and last, Bible reading helps to develop a truly Christian humanism in the college student. Scripture overlooks nothing but rather calls upon *all* creation to help man on his journey to God. True, some biblical writers look with suspicion upon the refinements of city life. The Yahwist tradition in Gen. 4 ascribes to the wicked line of Cain the origin of musical instruments like the harp and the flute and the beginning of "vessels of bronze and iron." Osee and Jeremias long for the simplicity of nomadic desert existence. Yet, these men were reacting not against advancing civilization but against the soft, degenerate form of civilization, then corrupting the Canaanites.

Off-setting this point of view is the priestly tradition which incorporated art, music and architecture into the worship of God. The songs of Second Isaias (Is. 40-55) like the prophecies of his master (Is. 1-35) ring with the controlled resonance of a master craftsman. Another typical example is Ben Sira, the author of *Sirach*. In his school for young men, he offered a complete liberal education, embracing religion, the professions, the fine arts, homelife. He wanted his charges to have a *full* life—with poetry, music and wide experience, surrounded always with the warmth of God's love and justice. Religion must come first, yet religion never repudiated other sources of knowledge but instead depended upon them. Ben Sira ends a magnificent description of the natural wonders of the world with:

> More than this we need not add;
> let the last word be: He is all in all!
> Let us praise him the more, since we cannot fathom him,
> for greater is he than all his works. . . .
> It is the Lord who has made all things. (Sir. 43, 28-35)

Conclusion

How is all this the result of modern scriptural scholarship? Were not these verses always in the Bible? Yes, they were, but how many biblical scholars drew our attention to their existence? The Catholic biblical revival is enabling us to read the Bible *religiously and intelligently*. We no longer turn the Bible into a science manual, and then spend all our time apologizing why it disagrees with science. Neither do we look to find history in our western style of history-writing, but rather a religious interpretation of real historical facts. The Bible shows how God's mighty wonders were relived in each new generation through liturgical recital. The Bible is once more a *religious* book, alive with the presence of God who calls himself YAHWEH—I AM HE WHO IS *ALWAYS THERE*.

Reading the Bible *intelligently* we find that there is no contradiction between Scripture on the one hand and science and history on the other. An intelligent understanding of Semitic

thought patterns and literary forms brings us back to the meaning intended by the inspired author. The more that we are intelligently acquainted with the geography and politics of ancient Palestine, the more Biblical writers and characters become living persons.[63] These saintly men and women are shown to be very real people, living at a very real point of time, yet totally surrendered to God's holy will. This presence of God accounts for the dynamic unity of the Bible, for throughout the *Sturm und Drang* of its human events God is *there*, achieving His mysterious plan of salvation. If Catholic biblical studies make the biblical word so human as to scandalize, then may we not admit that men are always scandalized to see the Divine Word become flesh to dwell amongst us. Each inspired writer can say:

> I write of what was from the beginning, what we have heard, what we have seen with our eyes, what we have looked up and our hands have handled: of the Word of Life. And the Life was made known and we have seen, and now testify and to you, the Life Eternal which was with the Father, and has appeared to us. . . . And these things we write to you that you may rejoice, and our joy may be full. (1 John 1: 1-4)

Appendix—*Helps to Keep Abreast with Scripture Studies*

Today, even those Scripture scholars who are producing ponderous books and articles themselves, groan under the massive amount of modern publications. In an article on Biblical Theology, Ceslaus Spicq longed for that former day when scholars confined their research to a limited number of major periodicals.[64] Scripture research has entered the nuclear age of atomic fision, with "bibliographies of bibliographies." There now exist such surveys of periodicals as: *Internationale Zeitschriftenschau für die Bibelwessenschaft und Grenzbegiete* (begun in 1951), *New Testament Abstracts* (1956), *La Bibliographie Biblique* (Jesuits of Montreal;

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[63] To read the Bible intelligently does not demand that a person be a scripture specialist. Any adult can easily read certain of the Sapiential books like *Sir* and *Prv*. Religious teachers, however, have an obligation to be acquainted with the more important elements of modern scripture scholarship. Otherwise, a book like *Gn*. will be badly misinterpreted.

[64] C. Spicq, "Nouvelles Réflexions sur la théologie Biblique," *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, 42 (Oct. 1958), 209-219. This article contains an excellent select bibliography on Biblical Theology. A summary can be found in *Theology Digest*, 7 (Winter 1959), 29-34.

1958), *Religious and Theological Abstracts* (Youngstown, 1958), and the exhaustive *Index Bibliographicus* of *Biblica*. There is no easy path through the forest!

Keeping in mind their needs and their available time, I have compiled for the teachers of Sacred Doctrine the following list of Catholic Scripture periodicals and publications. The list is divided into various categories, of descending importance.

The first group contains publications in French or English which I consider the most important for the teacher of Sacred Doctrine, in order to keep *au courant* with Catholic Scriptural studies.

Catholic Biblical Quarterly (Catholic University of America; Washington 17, D. C.). The articles are usually written by and for specialists. The book review section is rather extensive and provides excellent coverage of what is being published. The reviews usually compare the book under discussion with other works on the same subject. One caution about the *CBQ*: it feels no obligation to point out doctrinal errors in a book; judgment is made solely on the value of scriptural exegesis.

New Testament Abstracts (Weston College; Weston 93, Mass.) is also intended primarily for the scripture specialist; it no longer distinguishes Catholic from non-Catholic magazines. It summarizes an article without accepting any responsibility for the opinions expressed. It is unsurpassed for giving the religious teacher a "sense" of what is being written and discussed.

Theological Studies (Woodstock, Maryland) has a fine coverage in its "Surveys"; its book review section is good; the articles are rather technical. It is careful to point out any variations in orthodoxy.

Theology Digest (St. Mary's College; St. Mary, Kansas) is including more and more Scripture articles.

Lumiere et Vie (Revue de formation doctrinale Chretienne; 2, Place Gailleton; Lyon 2me, France), published by French Dominicans, is the finest magazine which I can recommend for theology teachers. Appearing five times yearly, each copy is a symposium on a particular subject and approaches its topic particularly from the scriptural and theological points of view. The April 1953 issue, for instance, included Fr. Benoit's magnificent article: "La Divinité de Jésus dans la Évangiles Synoptiques."

Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture (publ. by Nelson, England), edited by Orchard, is of unequal value. Many of the Old Testament commentaries were already out of date when they were written. However, it does have very fine parts, such as the entries by R. A. Dyson, R. A. F. MacKenzie, J. L. McKenzie, S. Bullough, L. F. Kearns, with the added advantage of complete coverage, in English! Fr. Benoit remarked in his review of this book: "The defensive attitude, which limits to a minimum any concessions to the progress of critical scholarship, does more damage than good."[65]

Besides these periodicals certain other publications should be mentioned in this first category. The next titles are books which provide excellent reference material and belong in the theological library of every college.

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[65] *Revue Biblique*, 64 (Oct. 1957), 601.

Dictionnaire de la Bible, Supplément (publ. by Librairie Letouzey et Ané; 87, Boulevard Raspail; Paris-VI, France) ranks at the top. Its articles are long enough to be books and are written by experts. For example, the authors who collaborated in the *Bible de Jérusalem* often have long studies on the same subject in this *Dictionnaire*.

L'Études Bibliques (J. Gabalda; Rue Bonaparte, 90; Paris), under the direction of the L'École Biblique of Jerusalem, is producing extended studies on the various books of the Bible which have already become *loci classici*.

Bible de Jérusalem (published by Cerf; 29, Boulevard Latour-Maubourg; Paris) is the finest example of modern Catholic scriptural scholarship. I might remark here that the one volume edition (1956) does not substitute for the individual fascicles of each biblical book, which have been published separately. The unique value of the one volume edition is its topical index, chronological table, and cross-references.

La Sacra Bibbia (Publ. by Marietti; Rome), under the direction of Garofalo, who now has the help of Rinaldi in the Old Testament books, is an Italian commentary on the various books of the Bible, much more extensive than the Jerusalem Bible and usually depending upon the best modern scholarship.

La Sainte Bible (publ. by Letouzey et Ané) under the direction of Pirot-Clamer is very good, but some volumes in this series are dated.[66] It does not manifest the same personal grasp as the two commentaries just mentioned.

Among Biblical Theology books worthy of mention in this first category we single out:

Bibliothèque de Théologie, Ser. III Théologie Biblique, sous la direction de L. Cerfaux, A. Gelin, et H. Cazelles. Van Imschoot's *Théologie de L'Ancien Testament* appears in this series.[67]

Théologie des Neuen Testaments is an excellent work by M. Meinertz in two volumes.

Two-Edged Sword by John L. McKenzie is tops. Albert Gelin, Lucien Cerfaux, Jacques Dupont have published fine works in this field.

We come now to the *SECOND CATEGORY*. For the teacher of sacred doctrine the following publications would not be as essential as those in the preceding section.

La Vie Spirituelle (publ. by Cerf; ed. by A. Plé, A.-M. Henry, A.-M. Cocagnac, O. P.) has many fine articles, developing the scriptural or ascetical value of Sacred Scripture.

La Maison Dieu (publ. by de Cerf; Revue de Pastorale Liturgique) carries scriptural articles from a liturgical point of view.

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[66] I. e. Vol. 5 "Les Psaumes" is basically the same as the article of E. Pannier in *Dictionnaire de la Bible*[5] (Paris: 1912); Vol. 9 "Les Évangiles de S. Matthieu et S. Marc" was published in 1946 but bears an imprimatur of 1934; Vol. 10 "Les Saints Évangiles S. Luc—S. Jean" was published in 1950, but carries an imprimatur of 1933 for S. Luc and 1934 for S. Jean.

[67] K. Sullivan is translating this work into English.

Bible et Vie Chretienne (publ. by Castermann; Tournai, Belgium). Here the pastoral value of Scripture is explored.

Revue Biblique (publ. by Gabalda; ed. by the Dominican Fathers of L'École Biblique in Jerusalem) carries articles which are highly technical; the *Bulletin* and book reviews give a careful, critical evaluation of recent literature.

Biblica (publ. by the Pontifical Institute, Rome) is similar to the *Revue Biblique*.

Scripture (publ. by Nelson, England) is the publication of the Catholic Biblical Ass. of Great Britain. The articles are not too long and contain good material.

Worship (Collegeville, Minn.) is beginning to include excellent Scriptural articles which will give it a place side by side with *La Vie Spirituelle* and *Bible et Vie Chrétienne*.

In the *THIRD CATEGORY* we list those periodicals which give greater depth and richness to the theology professor. These magazines frequently contain fine bulletins and book review sections.

Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses has its scripture section under the capable management of Cerfaux and Coppens. It acquaints the reader with the contributions of the "Louvain" scripture school.

Recherches de Science Religieuse (15, Rue Monsieur; Paris) is one of the best research periodicals. It is edited by French Jesuits.

Revue Thomiste carries several excellent scriptural articles each year.

Nouvelle Revue Théologique runs articles by such scholars as J. P. Audet, J. Dupont, A. Guillet, G. Guitton.

Verbum Domini (publ. by the Pontifical Biblical Institute Rome), has only Latin articles and is less technical than *Biblica*.

Biblical Archeologist (publ. by American Schools of Oriental Research; Drawer 93-A, Yale Station; New Haven, Conn.) is a non-Catholic publication, of great help in presenting the most recent archeological discoveries which relate to the Bible. Its contents are always impartial to sectarian differences.

In a *FOURTH AND LAST CATEGORY* are three periodicals which sometimes have good scriptural articles, yet not with too great frequency: Gregorianum, Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale, Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques.

Carroll Stuhlmueller, C.P.

Passionist Fathers Seminary
Louisville, Kentucky

THE REPARATION OF OUR FALLEN NATURE

OUR fallen nature, deprived of the God-given gifts of original justice by the sin of the first man, was repaired by Christ's passion, death and resurrection. That is our faith in the Redemption. Yet, not all the gifts of the original state are restored together with grace in baptism. In the baptized, human nature remains a fallen nature, subject to both moral and physical misery. This also Catholic doctrine teaches, and, moreover, experience confirms. Our faith adds: not until the day of the resurrection, but then without fail, will the lost gifts be restored. Such is our faith and it fits wonderfully the facts of our present human condition.

But faith seeks understanding. And we ask: why this delay in the reparation of our fallen nature? If Christ's Redemption is complete and superabundant, as it is beyond any shadow of doubt, why must we wait for the restoration of the preternatural gifts bestowed on our nature in the beginning, till the day of the exaltation and glorification of the entire Mystical Body of Christ, the day of the resurrection? It is true, we do receive in baptism sanctifying grace and with it the beginning of eternal life and the pledge of salvation, that is, all that is most vital in view of eternity. But for the time of our stay on earth, baptismal grace leaves us with the physical and moral miseries that are the consequences of the sin of the race. And we must ask: Why? Why does not the all-powerful grace of the Redeemer in baptism work the miracle of restoring the original state, as no doubt it could? Why the delay? There may be reasons of fittingness for it, for example: should not the members of Christ be in this world as Christ Himself was: full of grace yet subject to every human misery except sin? But, some will ask, would it not be better otherwise? And is there nothing more to be said for the present way of the repara-

tion of our fallen nature than that it is fitting, *convenit*? No more stringent doctrinal foundation, which could satisfy more exacting minds?

St. Thomas's theology of the fall and of its reparation by the Word Incarnate should be of such a nature as to establish a doctrinal and "rational" foundation of the manner of our reparation such as the faith proposes this to be. And it may be worth the trouble to examine this theology and to see why the reparation of our fallen nature takes this two or threefold stage which we know from the faith: Christ's passion, death and resurrection; our restoration to the life of grace in baptism; and the final restoration of our nature on the day of the resurrection.

Original Justice and Original Sin [1]

From the beginning our call to the supernatural end of the vision of God, our supernatural elevation, followed a social pattern. This was rather to be expected if grace perfects nature after the manner of nature. And the present situation of mankind in which the supernatural economy shows the same social structure—men are saved in the Church, as members of the Mystical Body of Christ—is in itself a presumption that the original elevation of men to the supernatural order was also social. St. Thomas expresses this social character of original justice by saying that it was given to the first parent of our race as an accident to the specific nature.[2] He means to say that this gratuitous or preternatural "proprium" of our nature —which did not result from the constituents of our nature but was superadded to it gratuitously—was to pass on together with nature through generation to all of Adam's posterity. The first man was to be fountainhead not only of nature but of grace as well.

If that was the case, then we can see why the personal gift

[1] For this section, cf. our two articles, "Original Justice and Adam's Sin," and "Our Sinful Inheritance," in *The Clergy Monthly*, 24 (1960).

[2] *Summa theol.* I, q. 100, a. 1: accidens naturae speciei, non quasi ex principiis naturae causatum, sed tantum sicut quoddam donum divinitus datum toti naturae.

of sanctifying grace in Adam was to be connected with a gift to nature which could be transmitted with nature and be in his posterity a call for grace. In fact, that is the way St. Thomas conceived the transmission of original justice.[3] Together with nature the first parent would have passed on the preternatural gift of integrity and other attendant gifts which were the disposition of nature for, and at the same time from another aspect the effect of, sanctifying grace; on the persons receiving a nature so disposed God would have bestowed the personal gift of sanctifying grace. Adam's posterity, by being born sons of men, would also have been born sons of God.

But it was never to be so. The faith tells us that Adam sinned gravely by transgressing God's command. Hence, St. Thomas explains, he not only lost sanctifying grace which cannot coexist with the state of sin—his sin was in the first place a sin of the person—but he also lost, *per accidens*,[4] that is, because of his unique position as fountainhead of nature and grace and because of the necessary connection between his sanctifying grace and the preternatural gifts of original justice, these very gifts which were the effect of grace: he threw off from his nature, and so from the nature of the entire species and of all his posterity, the preternatural accident of the specific nature which was to be the organic tool in the transmission of original justice. His sin was also a sin of nature,[5] because it was the sin of the fountainhead of nature and grace. Now he would pass on his sin to his posterity together with nature, not his personal sin or the privation of sanctifying grace as a personal loss and guilt, but the sin of nature or the guilty privation of the preternatural proprium of nature or of nature's disposition for the infusion of sanctifying grace in the persons who were to receive the nature.[6] All his posterity now enter the world deprived of the original justice. They are born sinners,

[3] Cf. *ibid.*, ad 2.

[4] Cf. *Comp. theol.* c. 198.

[5] Cf. *Summa theol.*, I II, q. 81, a. 2; *Comp. theol.*, c. 196.—Original sin is "peccatum naturae," cf. I II, q. 81, a. 1.

[6] *Summa theol.*, I-II, q. 82, a. 2.

not by any sin that originates in their own wills, but by the inherited sin of Adam. The sin of nature in them infects the persons; nature deprived of the preternatural disposition for sanctifying grace entails the privation of sanctifying grace in the persons. Original sin is the sin of nature in the persons. They inherit a fallen and sinful nature and in that sense, and in that sense only, they are born sinners.

Restoration of Original Justice

The fall of man, however disastrous for all of us, was not beyond remedy. It lies in the very nature of human sins, also of the first, that they can be undone or made good. They are sins of pilgrims on their way to heaven, and no decision of men in their pilgrim state is irreversible of its nature, though the actual reversion may not be possible without the help of grace. Adam's sin also, therefore, lay open to reparation.[8] Besides, St. Thomas says, God's mercy could hardly allow that His plan for the supernatural destiny of men, upset at the very start, should be frustrated for ever. His love for man and His own glory in a way demanded the reparation of the fall.[9]

The reparation of Adam's sin, however, was to be different from the undoing of the sin of any other man. His sin was unique in that it was both sin of the person and sin of the nature. As sin of the person it could be undone by Adam's repentance (with the help of grace); and a common belief has it that it actually was so undone.[10] But Adam's repentance was powerless to repair the sin of the nature. Why? Because, St. Thomas teaches, no act of an individual in any species, and Adam's repentance was such an act, can affect or modify the specific nature as such; [11] an individual in a species has no hold on the specific nature, he is rather held by the nature. By his

[7] *Comp. theol.*, c. 196: Primus parens suo peccato infecit naturam, et natura infecta infecit personas filiorum; cf. *Summa theol.*, III, q. 69, a. 3, ad 3.

[8] *Comp. theol.*, c. 199.

[9] *Loc. cit.*

[10] Cf. *Comp. theol.*, c. 198.

[11] *Comp. theol.*, c. 198.

repentance, therefore, Adam could recover for himself the personal gift of sanctifying grace, but not the lost preternatural gifts of nature. If by his sin he had been able to affect the specific nature by losing the preternatural accident of original justice, he did so only *per accidens* and without affecting nature in its constituents or its necessary properties. As said already, by throwing off sanctifying grace, he also threw off what was the effect of grace in his nature, namely, the preternatural proprium of integrity or harmony, and as he was the first man and fountainhead of nature, by thus affecting nature in himself, he did affect it also as specific nature: [12] the whole species was in him, and so the whole of nature sinned in him.

Accordingly, if the restoration of original justice in our human race was to happen not by way of pure mercy or pardon on the part of God but by way of immanent reparation, then the re-insertion in the specific nature of its lost preternatural accident could be done only by one of the human species who had a hold on the specific nature and was not held by it. No purely human person was so. Hence, St. Thomas teaches,[13] for such a reparation of our fallen nature the Incarnation of God was necessary. God alone can modify our specific nature; and only an individual of the race can make a human reparation of our nature. The Word Incarnate, Christ the Redeemer, therefore, is the only proper and fit agent of the immanent reparation of fallen nature. Only God made man could be the second fountainhead of grace in mankind. That is the reason why the Word was made flesh for our salvation.

Way of Christ's Redemption

Christ saved us and restored us to the supernatural life by His passion, death and resurrection; thus, we said, the faith teaches. Theology endeavours to see the reasons of this way of our redemption. St. Thomas's teaching throws indeed a wonderful light on the mystery.

[12] Cf. *Summa theol.*, I-II, q. 81, a. 2; *Comp. theol.*, cc. 192 and 195.
[13] *Comp. theol.*, c. 200.

The proper way of undoing the disorder of sin consists in the voluntary taking up of the connatural penalty of sin; that is what satisfaction means.[14] To undo the sin of nature by restoring to human nature the gifts lost by Adam's sin, Christ, sinless and unbound by the consequences of sin, freely took on a passible and mortal nature, like unto us in all except sin (and all that leads to sin, namely, in the case, the moral miseries consequent on sin and source of sin which are summed up in concupiscence). Thus He was able to take upon Himself the penalty of the sin of nature. He actually took our human sufferings and death, which are the penalty of the sin of nature, in order to undo that sin and its consequences. So it is that His passion and death of their nature led to the glory of the resurrection and ascension. By freely undergoing suffering and death, the penalty of the sin of the race, He overcame sin and death;[15] He, as it were, killed death. He was the God-man, sinless and unbound by the law of death; He could not touch suffering and death without transforming them; He took out of them the sting that is sin. He so to say could not suffer and die but in order to rise in glory—it could not have been otherwise. He also was, as the God-man, the second Adam, the second fountainhead of grace—to be this was the reason of His coming; and because He, being a divine Person, was not held by nature as is any purely human individual person, He had a hold on the nature of the entire species. He was able and had the power by His passion, death and resurrection to restore the lost gifts of nature, not only in His own individual humanity, but to the whole of nature.[16] The redemption restored in fact to His own humanity, and in potency or hope to the whole of mankind, the lost gifts of original justice.[17]

To us and to the whole of mankind He does not actually

[14] Cf. *Comp. theol.*, c. 226.

[15] Cf. *Comp. theol.*, cc. 227 and 236.

[16] *Comp. theol.* c. 239.

[17] *Comp. theol.* c. 241: Per Christi passionem et mortem, resurrectionis et ascensionis gloriam, a peccato et a morte liberati sumus, et iustitiam et immortalitatem gloriae, hanc in re, illam in spe adepti.

restore them all at once. There are stages, as we have said, in the work of our redemption or of the reparation of our fallen nature. The faith says so and experience of our present situation confirms the faith as far as it can. In His own humanity Christ's redemptive death and resurrection restored at once those gifts of original justice which He did not have in the passible and mortal nature which He took for our sake: and He restored these gifts of impassibility and immortality in a more wonderful way than they once existed: glorious and inamissible. To all those who are reborn in baptism and incorporated into Him, He restores at once the life of sanctifying grace and with it the hope of the final restoration of all the lost gifts, of immortality and integrity. But the actual restoration of these is being delayed till the last day. What are the reasons for this threefold stage in the reparation of our fallen nature?

Christ's Own Glorification

Christ rose from the dead on the third day and forty days after His resurrection ascended into heaven. Thus, our faith tells us, His own glorification was not delayed. In One at least of our race, in the second Adam, the privileges of the original state lost by sin have been restored even now. In Him at least our fallen nature has been restored completely and more gloriously than it was before the fall. Why is it that there was no delay for Christ's own glorification?

St. Thomas's theology points to the answer: because there was no objective reason for a delay. The reasons for a delay which exist in the case of fallen men, as we shall say presently, did not exist for Christ Himself.[18]

Christ, the God-man, was truly of our race, as truly man as He is truly God. Yet He was no son of sinful Adam. The Son of God did take on our fallen nature, but He could not take on what was sinful in it but only sin's penal consequences free from sinfulness—the infinitely Holy cannot be touched

[18] Cf. *Comp. theol.* c. 226 (Why He rose on the third day); *Summa theol.* III, q. 53, a. 2.

even by the shadow of sin.[19] His virginal conception and birth from the Immaculate Virgin Mother, which were kept free from any causal intervention of sinful Adam such as is active in the generative act of every human father, were the only fitting and possible way for the Word Incarnate to be born in our fallen human race.[20]

If He took on a passible and mortal human nature, He did so for the very purpose of His coming: our redemption by His passion and death.[21] But His very existence in a passible and mortal human nature was, so to speak, a permanent miracle. It would have been more normal for the One full of grace and of glory—for even during His mortal life He enjoyed the beatific vision of His divinity which is heavenly glory—[22] to be in a glorious, immortal and impassible humanity, such as He actually was to be in after His resurrection.[23] It was for our sake and for our salvation that He took such a nature as enabled Him to suffer and die.

Accordingly, once His redemptive task was accomplished, the normal state of His sacred humanity set in. In Him our human nature recovered in a glorious manner its pristine immortality and impassibility. It did so by virtue of His redemption.[24] For even in Christ, the fitting radiation of His sinlessness and His divine personality transfiguring His human nature actually was a restoration of gifts that once were lost for our nature.

And so, because Christ the Word Incarnate, who normally should have shared in His entire humanity, body and soul, the glory of the divine vision, took on a passible and mortal human nature for the sake of our salvation, once His redemptive task was accomplished, there was no reason fo ra delay in His own

[19] Cf. *Summa theol.* III, q. 15.

[20] Cf. *Comp. theol.* c. 218; *Summa theol.* III, q. 28, a. 1 (3°).

[21] Cf. *Comp. theol.* c. 226; *Summa theol.* III, q. 14, a. 1 and 2.

[22] Cf. *Summa theol.* III, q. 10; q. 15, a. 10: simul viator et comprehensor.

[23] Cf. *Summa theol.* III, q. 54, a. 3: Est autem dispensatione factum . . . ut ab anima gloria non redundaret in corpus . . .

[24] Cf. *Summa theol.* III, q. 54, a. 3.

glorification. The reason why for us and for all the children of Adam (except only the Blessed Virgin Mother) the restoration of the original gifts is being delayed and only sanctifying grace restored in baptism did not hold good for Christ. He was the new Adam who had command over our whole nature because He was not Himself held by it (for He is a divine Person) as all of us are; He in a way was above our nature and, as it were, "outside the series," *extra seriem*. He could therefore allow the glorification of His own humanity without of necessity affecting our specific nature in all sons of men. But for all of us, we shall show presently, there exists an obstacle to our actual sharing in Christ's glorification till the last day of human history.

Rebirth to Grace in Baptism

Our rebirth in baptism is for all members of Christ's Mystical Body a first step in the reparation of our fallen nature. In it we receive the personal gift of sanctifying grace but not yet the preternatural gifts to nature. The baptized are free from sin and they are in grace but they remain subject to concupiscence and to suffering and death.

The infusion of sanctifying grace in baptism is the restoration of the divine gift which, but for Adam's sin, we would have been given with our very birth from the first parent. The reason why grace can be restored and exist in the baptized without the gifts that attended it in the original state should not be too mysterious. In St. Thomas's theology it is almost self-evident. Then only is sanctifying grace attended by the preternatural harmony of nature when it is given because of the disposition of nature,[25] and not because of a personal act or a personal *passio*; then it is also the cause of this harmony in nature (according to St. Thomas's well-known idea of mutual causality between co-existing elements of one composite reality). Such would have been the case in the transmission of original justice, had Adam not sinned. But in baptism grace

[25] Cf. *Summa theol.* I, q. 95, a. 1; 100, a. 1, c and ad 2.

is given, not because of the disposition of nature, that is, the children of Adam do not receive grace merely by being born, but because of a personal act and *passio* (in the case of an adult) or of a personal *passio* (in the case of an infant), namely, they receive grace because they are reborn in Christ.[26] That is why sanctifying grace can and does exist in them without the preternatural gifts.

The state of the baptized entails, therefore, that the person be sanctified by grace while the nature remains unregenerate, that is, deprived of its own gifts of original justice.[27] Yet, it is well to say that fallen nature in the baptized is not in the same situation as it is in the unbaptized and unjustified, especially when the just grow in grace. Consider first the moral side of unregenerate nature, namely, what is called concupiscence, or the inordinate inclination of the senses and of the lower reason to pursue their own objects without heeding, or even forestalling, the directive of the higher reason and the command of the will. In the unbaptized concupiscence exists as the material element of original sin;[28] it exists in a person who is deprived of sanctifying grace and not oriented to God as to his end. In the baptized and justified, on the other hand, concupiscence is no longer the material element of original sin (for this sin no longer exists in them); it is just the penal consequence of it. Besides, and this is an important consideration in view of an incipient reparation of fallen nature, sanctifying grace is attended by the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity which anchor man's mind and heart in God, by the gifts of the Holy Spirit which make him docile to the inspirations of grace, and by the infused moral virtues or the supernaturalization of the whole moral life, especially the cardinal virtues, which establish a basic order in man's desires for creaturely or temporal goods.[29] This virtuous equipment of the

[26] Cf. *Summa theol.* III, q. 68, a. 1 and q. 69, a. 4.

[27] Cf. *Summa theol.* III, q. 69, a. 3 ad 3: isti defectus non tolluntur nisi in ultima reparatione naturae per resurrectionem gloriosam, cf. I-II, q. 81, a. 3 ad 2; q. 82, a. 1 ad 3.

[28] *Summa theol.* I-II, q. 82, a. 3.

[29] *Summa theol.* III, q. 69, a. 4.

person means a factual, if only inchoative, reparation of his unregenerate nature.

The Virtuous Life

The very nature of the theological virtues entails that as they grow and develop, man's resolve to adhere to God and to forego all else for His sake grows ever stronger.[30] This ever firmer anchoring in God of man's higher faculties constitutes a radical, if only initial, cure of the moral wound of his nature. It is a powerful counterweight to the congenital selfishness which is, on the moral side, the most apparent symptom of our fallen state.[31]

The supernatural (and also natural) moulding of man's potencies by the infused (and acquired) moral virtues is an initial healing of the fourfold wound of nature in which St. Thomas sees the consequence of original sin, a wound which affects the four potencies that can be seats of virtues and principles of virtuous action. This wound of ignorance in the mind is healed by the cardinal virtue of prudence; that of malice or selfishness in the will is remedied by the virtue of justice; that of concupiscence (in a narrower sense) in the concupiscible power is healed by the virtue of temperance; and the wound of weakness in the irascible power is healed by the virtue of fortitude.[32] The healing is only imperfect, no doubt, but a real beginning is thus made—which, of course, for its maintenance and development depends on our free cooperation with grace—at building up, as it were, a substitute for the lost gifts of integrity of the original justice.

From a biblical approach to the state of our unregenerate nature, we may consider concupiscence in the light of St. John's teaching in his First Epistle on the threefold disorderly concupiscence which he calls, concupiscence of the eyes and of the

[30] Cf. *Summa theol.* I-II, q. 61, a. 3 and 4; q. 85, a. 3; q. 65, aa. 1, 3 and 4.

[31] This basic selfishness is the reason why fallen man is unable, without the help of grace, to love God above all things; cf. *Summa theol.* I-II, q. 109, a. 3.

[32] Cf. *Summa theol.* I-II, q. 85, a. 3; q. 61, aa. 3 and 4.

flesh and pride of life. This reveals the radical distortion or vitiation in our fallen nature which infects and exposes to disorderliness the threefold natural, and legitimate, desire for external or temporal possessions, for the gratifications of the senses and the body, and for personal spiritual possessions. This threefold concupiscence is kept in check in the baptized and justified by the counterweight of the spirit of the evangelical counsels (and eventually also by their vowed practice) to the extent that the spirit of poverty, chastity, and obedience is a connatural postulate of progress in the virtuous life and the life of grace.[33] Here the gifts of the Holy Ghost also may play a decisive role.

Thus the life of grace given in baptism and developed with our cooperation is an actual beginning of the reparation of our fallen nature in its moral aspect. It is genuinely so in the physical aspect of our fallen nature, namely, with regard to suffering and death. These, to be sure, are not removed yet—and we shall presently give the reason for their remaining—but they are transformed for the baptized. Suffering and death are not the same thing for the unbaptized and the baptized.

For the unbaptized suffering and pain are hardly anything else but the penalty of sin; they do not generally, except remotely perhaps, help them to turn to God. For the baptized and justified suffering is no longer a mere penalty of sin; it is a remedy of sin, it conforms the just, the members of Christ, to their Head and makes them share in His redemptive passion.[34] Thus suffering becomes a remedy of concupiscence and a help to heal our fallen nature. But it does so, of course, only with our free acceptance and cooperation.

Death to the unbaptized and unjustified is the final penalty of sin, both original and personal; it is the entrance to a second death. To the baptized and justified death is not merely a penal sanction of nature's sin; it is a paschal mystery, a conformation with Christ's death and so, as His death was, the

[33] Compare *Summa theol.* II-II, q. 186, a. 7.
[34] Cf. *Summa theol.* III, q. 69, a. 3.

entrance to a glorious life.[35] It is the means of overcoming death and fully repairing nature in view of an immortal life —though we come to it now, not at once, but only in due time.

Nature's Final Restoration and its Delay

Why then is it that only a beginning of the reparation of our fallen nature is given with grace in this life and that the final restoration, that is, the complete return of all the gifts of the original state, is delayed till the day of the resurrection? That such is the basic significance of the resurrection and of the final glorification of the whole Christ is the unvarying teaching of St. Thomas.[36] All the gifts, which in the beginning of mankind belonged to men's supernatural state in the earthly paradise, will be restored in a more wonderful manner in the glory of the resurrection in view of the unending bliss of life everlasting. Meanwhile, and till that day, this restoration is delayed for all men (except the Blessed Virgin Mother). Why is it so?

It is not, St. Thomas says in so many words, because the baptism of Christ lacks the power to effect the miraculous transformation of our fallen nature. No, he says, baptism has power to take away all the penal effects of sin which remain in this life.[37] And the reason is not far to seek: it lies in the very nature of baptism. The first of the Christian sacraments applies to each of the baptized who become members of Christ the redeeming and sanctifying energies of His passion, death and resurrection. These, as was explained above, of their nature have the power to restore to human nature all the gifts lost by the sin of nature which Christ came to undo.[38] The first fruits, moreover, of Christ's redemption are there in His own glorification.

Yet, St. Thomas goes on to say, it is better for us and fitting that the penal effects of the fall should not be taken away from

[35] Compare a. cit.

[36] For example, *Summa theol.* III, q. 69, a. 3, ad 3.

[37] *Summa theol.* III, q. 69, a. 3: baptisma habet virtutem auferendi poenalitates praesentis vitae.

[38] Cf. *Comp. theol.* cc. 239 and 241.

us in this life; they should stay with us! He gives three reasons for it, practically the same throughout his works.[39] The first concerns directly, not to say exclusively, the physical miseries of this life; suffering and death. By baptism, he says, man is incorporated into Christ and becomes a member of Christ. But it is fitting that a member should go through the same experiences which the Head endured. Christ, on His part, in His life on earth was full of grace and truth, but had a body liable to suffering; and He went through His passion and death to rise again to a life of glory. And so it befits His members also, those who are reborn in Christ, to live the life of grace, yet to remain liable to suffering and death, and only by passing through these, after Christ, to attain the life of immortality and glory. That is why there is a delay in restoring to us the preternatural gifts of impassibility and immortality.

The reason indeed is persuasive, no less to the heart than to the head. It is so even more than may appear at first sight. The fittingness for the members of Christ to be likened to Him and share His passion death and resurrection is based on a deeper objective reason than mere external conformity to Christ. It may well entail the fact that it could not be otherwise.

Secondly, St. Thomas teaches, "it is fitting in view of our spiritual training: it is by fighting concupiscence and similar liabilities that man is to receive the crown of glory."[40] This teaching anticipates the reason which the Council of Trent was to give to explain the fact that concupiscence remains in the baptized justified by grace; concupiscence is an occasion for overcoming difficulties and for merit.[41] Perhaps some will say: Granted the fact that concupiscence remains in the just, they can and should make the best of a bad situation, and by courageously fighting and overcoming its allurements, with the help of grace, deserve a great crown in heaven. Yet, could

[39] *Summa theol.* III, q. 69, a. 3; cf. v.g. *2 Sent.* d. 32, q. 1, a. 2; *Summa cont. gent.* lib. IV, c. 55.

[40] *Summa theol.* III, q. 69, a. 3.

[41] Cf. Denzinger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, 792.

it not have been otherwise? And would virtue and grace necessarily have been less because the difficulty was less? Theologian agree that it is not the difficulty of a virtuous action, but the love that inspires it, which makes for its merit and for growth in grace. This seems to suggest that there ought to be a deeper reason why concupiscence remains in the baptized.

St. Thomas's third reason is the following: the penal effects of original sin should remain after baptism to preclude that men should come and receive baptism with a view to be pain-proof in this life and not to attain life eternal.[42] In fact, it would be a strange world were the baptized to be restored to impassibility and immortality and to immunity from the allurements of concupiscence, while the unbaptized remain liable to the physical and moral consequences of the fall! Who would not seek baptism? This very incongruity of the situation may be a sign that in fact it should and could not be so: baptism should not and could not have this effect! One senses that there ought to be some deeper objective ground from which springs this incongruity. And so the question arises: Can we go beyond these reasons of fittingness?

The Basic Reason of the Delay

It would seem that St. Thomas's theology of original justice and original sin implies the basic reason why the preternatural gifts of original justice are not to be restored to the redeemed in this life, or immediately after death, but only on the last day, the day of the general resurrection. He may not have explained in explicit detail the objective ground for this delay in the complete reparation of our fallen nature. Yet his explicit teaching logically entails the point of doctrine: the reason why the restoration of the gifts is being delayed till the end of time is that there is an objective ground against or an obstacle to this restoration, which vanishes only on the last day. This means to say that it lies in the very nature of our state of

[42] *Summa theol.* III, q. 69, a. 3.

fallen and redeemed men, fallen in Adam and redeemed in Christ, that the reparation of the fall is done by stages, and completed only on the day of resurrection.

The reparation of our fallen nature means the restoration to men reborn in Christ, not only of sanctifying grace and the attendant supernatural virtues and gifts, but also of the preternatural gifts of original justice. In St. Thomas's theology this comes to mean the restitution to human nature of the preternatural accident or proprium of the specific nature.[43] It is beyond doubt that Christ the Redeemer has the power to do this: He, because He is God and man, has a hold on human nature and He can, not merely *per accidens*, as Adam did in the loss of this preternatural accident of the specific nature, but of Himself, because He possesses a divine power, reconnect the lost preternatural proprium to the specific nature of our race.[44]

Yet, on the part of fallen mankind, there is an obstacle to this restitution which could not now be removed except by doing violence, as it were, to the course of human history and to the sweet and strong ways of divine Providence. It would not be possible to restore to the specific human nature the preternatural proprium or the lost gifts of original justice without modifying and affecting human nature in all the persons who share the human nature. It would be, as it were, a case of all, or none![45] But this restoration of the gifts to all men, while human history is allowed to go on and generation to

[43] Cf. above note 2.

[44] Cf. *Comp. theol.* c. 100.

[45] The same specific nature cannot at the same time include the preternatural gifts (in a number of individuals of the species) and exclude them (in another number of them): cf. *Summa theol., Suppl.* q. 75, a. 2: Ea quorum ratio sumitur ex natura speciei, oportet inveniri in omnibus quae sunt eiusdem speciei. Perhaps this principle expresses an absolute metaphysical necessity only in the case of the constituents and necessary properties of nature, and not in the case of a preternatural proprium of the specific nature—at any rate not as far as we can see. But St. Thomas's way of conceiving original justice as an accident of the specific nature implies precisely that in this case "preternature" follows nature, and because of this analogy—unless another reason were to exclude it—the same sort of necessity applies here as in the case of natural properties of nature.

follow upon generation, entails an impossibility. For it would mean that human children coming into this world would, because they are children of Adam, be born sinners deprived of grace and of original justice.[46] Yet at the same time, in the supposition that human nature had been restored by Christ to the original gifts and therefore disposed for grace by the preternatural accident of nature, they should have grace and be born children of God. The two, evidently, cannot go together. Either the first course of human nature and human history is to be abolished, or if it remains, then the second, namely, the restoration of our nature, is to be delayed.

But a reversal of the course of human generation from Adam, fountainhead of fallen mankind, is inconceivable. It would be tantamount to abolishing the past; and this even divine Omnipotence cannot do. Only what is possible is feasible, even for God. He Himself cannot effect that what once has been should not have been; only the effects of past events can be remedied. Adam, fountainhead of human nature, sinned and our nature sinned in him. And so even God cannot undo this fact. He can take away the effects of that sin wherever nature will exist in human individual persons; that is what in fact He does in the Redemption and its application to individual persons in baptism; but He cannot effect that our nature should not be sinful in the sense that it should not have sinned in Adam.

As long, therefore, as natural human generation goes on, Adam's causality as fountainhead of a sinful race takes its course.[47] And it is not possible that by virtue of their natural generation from Adam or by being born from him (and there is now no other way for human beings of coming into this world) children of men should not be born sinners deprived of original justice.

Accordingly, only when Adam's causality as fountainhead of a sinful race will come to an end, that is, human history will be completed and human generation come to a stop, will

[46] Cf. *Summa theol.* I-II, q. 81, a. 1 (the dogma of original sin).

[47] On this (universal) causality of Adam, cf. our article, "Hereditary Guilt," in *Irish Theological Quarterly*, 20 (1953), 350-65.

there no longer be an obstacle in human nature to the restoration of the gifts of original justice. Then Christ can exercise His power over our nature without forcing or doing violence to it and re-connect the preternatural proprium to our specific nature. That precisely is the day of the resurrection.[48]

We touch here on the basic objective reason for the delay in the complete restoration of our fallen nature. This restoration cannot be done without affecting all human persons, and this is made impossible by the continued causal influence of Adam, the fountainhead of nature and of sin, an influence which will be stopped only when human generation comes to an end.

Some Implications

This basic reason for the delay in our complete restoration shows that the fittingness of the reasons explained above is based on the objective reality of things and equivalent to such necessity as the human mind is able to detect by theological reasoning in supernatural realities. If the supernatural order is intelligible and follows the laws of being and of intelligence, as it undoubtedly does, then, in the social economy of grace such as is present in our supernatural elevation and fall in Adam and in our redemption in Christ the Word Incarnate, the complete restoration cannot happen except on the last day, at the second coming of Christ.

It also shows why the resurrection is to be universal but different for the just and the sinners.[49] It ought to be universal, because Christ cannot re-connect with our specific nature its preternatural proprium of original justice without changing nature in all individual men. All therefore must rise to immortality and indestructibility; this change does not depend in any way on their voluntary dispositions, because it affects their nature on the level of the *esse* and not on that of the *agere*. It is because on the level of the *agere* the willful dispositions differ in the just and the sinners that their resurrection to

[48] Cf. *Comp. theol.* c. 156; *Summa cont. Gent.* lib. IV, c. 83.

[49] Cf. *Summa theol., Suppl.* q. 75, a. 2; *Summa cont. Gent.*, lib. IV, c. 81.

immortality is also different. Sinners refuse grace and likewise glory; their now immortal nature cannot be transfigured by the radiation of the supernatural glory which they reject; they refuse and lose God and with Him all that is good; in them indestructibility by external agents cannot be impassibility and freedom from pain, because by their sin they chose suffering, which is the inseparable companion of their permanent state of guilt. The just, on the other hand, freely accept grace and glory; their union with God in the beatific vision cannot but transfigure their entire being and render their nature glorious; for their resurrection to immortality means resurrection to eternal life and eternal glory.

St. Thomas's theology of the reparation of our fallen nature also allows us to see the reason for the unique exception to this delay in the full restoration of our nature; the glorious assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mother, who at the completion of her earthly life, our faith teaches, was taken up into heaven body and soul. Her anticipated resurrection to glory is an exception and here, if ever, it may be said, "the exception confirms the rule." Just as Our Lady's exemption from all stain of original sin was a personal privilege granted by the Redeemer to His future Mother, despite her birth by way of natural generation in the sinful race of Adam, a privilege to the person which did not undo the universal law involved in the sin of nature (as far as this goes, she would have contracted the original stain had not God stayed the torrent of sin); so also, and in logical continuity with her first privilege, her anticipated resurrection to glory was a personal privilege owing in a way to the Immaculate who, though being fully of our stained race, was yet without sin. It was to be expected that for her the law of the delay in our final restoration should not prevail.

But it would be inconceivable that the exception should become the generality. For then, it would no longer be a personal privilege; it would actually and to all practical purposes follow with nature; and this, as shown above, is not possible. St. Thomas's theology of the reparation of our fallen nature, therefore, also excludes the opinion which has been proposed in

recent years. Some are inclined to think that the resurrection takes place for each individual person immediately after death. The transcendental relation to the body which the disembodied souls maintain would become effective at once. No, this cannot be, if the departed human persons continue to belong to our human race. Were they to rise immediately to immortality of body and soul and were our nature fully restored in them, then this change of our specific nature should also affect all living human beings. As shown above, this cannot be till the last day.

This also clarifies the ontological foundation of the fittingness for Christ's members reborn in baptism and incorporated into Him of being made like unto Him as He was in His mortal life, and not yet as He is in the glory.[50] No adult Christian can live in Christ or persevere in grace and so prepare for glory without his free cooperation with grace. On this cooperation will depend, not his resurrection to immortality, but his entry into the glory and his resurrection to glory. But if he is thus to be the artisan of his own salvation, not by himself, of course, but with the help of Christ's grace, that is, if he is to be the collaborator of Christ in working his own salvation, then it follows at once that the manner of his cooperation with Christ will follows the way of Christ. The particular causes of their nature share in the causality and in the manner of causality of the universal cause. If Christ saved us by His passion and death which led to His glorious resurrection, then our cooperation with Him in saving ourselves—and others too—will also involve our passion and death, which, for us as for Him, are the way to a glorious resurrection.

P. De Letter, S. J.

St. Mary's College
Kurseong, India

[50] Cf. *Summa theol.* III, q. 69, a. 3.

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Joseph P. Collins, O. P., S. T. M., S. T. D., a graduate of the Pontifical Athenaeum *Angelicum*, is Regent of Studies in the Irish Dominican Province and Professor of Moral Philosophy at St. Mary's, Tallaght, Co. Dublin, Ireland.

Carroll Stuhlmueller, C. P., S. T. L., S. S. L., a graduate Pontifical Biblical Institute, Rome, author of several commentaries on Sacred Scripture and contributor to the Catholic Biblical Quarterly, is Professor of Sacred Scripture at the Passionist Fathers Seminary, Louisville, Kentucky.

P. DeLetter, S. J., Ph. D., S. T. D., *Gregorianum*, Rome, is Professor of Dogmatic Theology at St. Mary's College, Kurseong, India, and a frequent contributor to scholarly journals including *Irish Theological Quarterly* and *Theological Studies*.

Dominic Rover, O. P., S. T. D., a Professor in the Pontifical Faculty of Theology, Dominican House of Studies, Washington, D. C., and assistant at the Summer Sessions in the Speech and Drama Department, Catholic University of America, is a playwright and author of a forthcoming book *The Poetics of M. Maritain: A Thomistic Critique*.

James M. Collins, Ph. D., a member of the Department of Philosophy, St. Louis University, St. Louis, Missouri, is author of *God in Modern Philosophy*, and a frequent contributor to scholarly journals.

Bonaventure M. Scheper, O. P., S. T. Lr., is a Professor of Moral Theology and History of Dogma in the Pontifical Faculty of Theology, Dominican House of Studies, Washington, D. C., whose article, "Catholic and Protestant Rules for Dialogue," appeared recently in *The Catholic World*.

BOOK REVIEWS

Christ and Apollo. The Dimensions of the Literary Imagination. By William F. Lynch, S. J. New York, Sheed and Ward, 1960. Pp. 267, with supplements. $5.00.

In a significant contribution to the contemporary effort to bring together the theologian and the literary critic to their mutual profit Father William F. Lynch, S. J., has fashioned this probing study of the literary imagination in its various dimensions. Called *Christ and Apollo* it composes, summarizes and refines many of the arguments and observations presented by Father Lynch in his articles in *Thought* some half dozen years ago. At times the terminology is different although the insights are largely the same, most of them touching on the impenetration of the creative imagination by metaphysics and theology. Gathered together and ordered in this book they represent one of the most persuasive and persistent efforts mounted in this country to open literature to a theological critique and to open the mind of the theologian to the dynamics of the creative effort and the uniqueness of creative goals.

A praiseworthy effort it is, yet a most difficult one, involving as it does the question of entangling alliances and peevish autonomies in both areas of thought. For a writer who sets out to be both critic and theologian risks the slings and arrows kept, cleaned and carefully sheathed for attack upon those professing just such a delicate and dual vocation. Nor will Father Lynch escape my own particular and partisan darts, as the reader of this review will discover. Nevertheless he deserves well of all of us for a consistent and strongly argued work. It simply happens to be a highly vulnerable work, a target facing two ways—towards literature and towards theology. Yet it is our good fortune that men of the calibre and courage of Father Lynch are willing to face both ways also; then willing to attempt —more perilously—to draw the two images into a single focus now centered upon what we might call total poetic reality, or the mind of man as it is imaged forth in the works of man.

The author initiates his critique in the form of an antagonism: Christ and Apollo—which might well suffer a more dramatic reading, Christ *or* Apollo. Apollo is the symbol of the dream, the vaguely infinite, the indefinite, the romantic; Christ is the symbol of the definite, the limited, the particular, the real. The book as a whole is a brief for the so-called Christic imagination as against the Apollonian imagination, the theme being set forth in the Introduction in a very sharp commitment with respect

to the finite and the definite in literature. "The literary process is a highly cognitive passage through the finite and the definite realities of man and the world" (p. xiii), literary insight coming from "the penetration of the finite and the definite concrete in all its interior dimensions and according to all real lines" (*Ibid.*). This thematic thrust rises above the work even in these early stages and remains to dominate the rest of the book, giving a striking unity to the far-ranging considerations contained therein. So, for example, the opening chapter *On the Definite* establishes once and for all the theme first articulated in the Introduction; this same theme is then explored and expanded in succeeding chapters on Time, on the notion of Tragedy and Comedy, and in the crucial discussion of Analogy which is aimed at confirming the author's position with regard to the centrality of the definite, of fact and event. Then in the two concluding chapters on the Theological Imagination and the Christian Imagination Father Lynch avails himself of the tools prepared in his treatment of the definite and the analogical. Beyond that he has included four interesting Supplements, one a series of texts on the Definite, a second series of texts on Time, a bibliography on Analogy, and a final supplement prepared by John P. McCall on Medieval Exegesis and the senses of Scripture. It should be pointed out that the supplements also tend to support Father Lynch's regent principle with regard to the primacy of the definite and the literal in the literary imagination in general as well as in the Christic imagination, so that the supplements should not be considered as scattered afterpieces but as supporting material directly in the line of his main argument.

Yet such a perfunctory resume does not do justice to the work as a whole, nor to the specific burden of the parts. To support a judgment that would both validate one's praise yet justify one's misgivings it is really necessary to take the long way round and go at the work piece by piece, part by part. It holds together, almost obsessively in fact, but it is important to see that too, to feel the binding force of the theme as it gathers in facts and conclusions and readings and critical judgments from literature and theology alike in order to formulate the magisterial plan. How is it formulated, first of all? Toward the end of the book Father Lynch states in retrospect that "this has been an attempt at an inductive analysis" (p. 162). Remotely this may be true but in view of the initial clarity and urgency of his judicative principles it is difficult to accept the inductive nature of the argument as it appears in the work. Rather one would say from the abundance of examples and from the sensitivity of Father Lynch's critical judgments that we are made aware of the inductive process that most assuredly preceded *Christ and Apollo*. But in the work itself the argument is clear and in command from the beginning; it operates by way of judgment from above rather than by way of invention or exploration from below. To be more exact, it proceeds through the statement and restate-

ment of a sort of critical and theological orthodoxy (a theory of the definite and the analogical) as it is known in itself in metaphysics and theology and as it is seen to impenetrate the literary imagination. Further, this same critical orthodoxy is evaluated, in breach and in observance, in the works of art that seem to embody it most perfectly as well as in the extreme modes of deviation that it suffers in other artifacts.

So, for example, in his opening chapter *On The Definite* Father Lynch examines and rebuts: 1) "the exploiters of the real," those writers and theologians who are content "to remain as uncommitted to the finite as possible" (p. 8); 2) the addicts of "psychologism" or narcissism—in literature Proust, in theology the Modernists—whose "aim is to create states of affectivity, areas of paradise, orders of feeling within the self" (p. 9); 3) the imagination of 'the double vacuum' as exemplified in Dreiser ("from nihilism to pietism"), Eugene O'Neill and Karl Barth; 4) the honest "facers of facts," i.e. existential writers like Camus who "accept the absurdity and limitation of reality with nerve, sincerity, courage and authenticity" (p. 11). Against the infinitizing tendencies of these four types he ranges two chosen correctives: Dostoevski's vision of finitude, especially in *The Brothers Karamazov*, and the Christian (and Ignatian) maxim, *Non coerci maximo, contineri tamen a minimo*, which implies total involvement in the finite. The third *locus judicativus*, as so often in Father Lynch's book, is the theology of the Incarnation. This is the way he expresses the relevance of the Incarnation to his "attempt to formulate an ideal attitude for the imagination in relation to the finite":

> God Himself has no need to go further than his eternal Christic, anointed Word to grasp Himself from all eternity; and certainly, being no better than God, we too need to go no further than the earthly, concrete, limited Christ and descend with Him for the grasping of everything (p. 15).

With respect to Time, "the horizontal dimension of the definite" (p. 31), he draws materials for judgment from the *Spiritual Exercises* of St. Ignatius. From below, from critical sensitivity, he finds support for his repudiation of the "angelic" imagination in the works of Picasso, Andre Breton, Baudelaire, Poe, Descartes, Malraux, and Proust. Such literary heresies-in-act or -in-artifact involve the flight from time (Proust), the rape of time (Picasso and the Cubists), the defiance of time through a putative "simultaneity" (Breton, Baudelaire), the sublimation of time through nocturnal time and the dream (Poe), the conquest of time through the timelessness of art (Malraux). Again, a superior judgment of these moods and modes of time-escape comes from the theology of the Incarnation, from our Christian "belief in a Man (sic) who, having 'created' time, could not possibly be hostile to it" (p. 50). Such a judgment derives

also from an examination of the *Spiritual Exercises* of St. Ignatius, with its strong taste for time and place and "the march of the self to God through event, through Christological and human event" (p. 58).

In a revealing chapter on Tragedy, Father Lynch uses the analytic tools of the definite and the temporal to adumbrate the various modes of the tragic experience. The truly tragic occurs "when the dramatic text has allowed itself to move through human time to the very last point of human finitude and helplessness" (p. 66). Such a movement, inevitable as time itself, anchored to the finite, is to be seen in *Oedipus*, in the *Medea*, in *Macbeth*, etc. whereas its modern parody and cheat is to be observed in the defiant tragedy of the indestructible will of man and the social or solitary tragedy of human worthlessness. Again the methodology is clear enough: the placing or, rather, the finding of an orthodox position plus a judgment on the heterodox extremes, in the case of tragedy extremes related to the old heresies of Manichaeanism and Pelagianism. The Manichaean attitude, says Father Lynch, operates in the social tragedy stemming from Ibsen, Zola and Strindberg and in the nihilistic tragedy of Sartre while the new Pelagianism is manifest, in its creative uses, in Maxwell Anderson, Clifford Odets, Paul Green, MacLeish, etc. as well as in the critical writings of Joseph Wood Krutch, Edith Hamilton and others. These extremist heresies face away from the median of tragic truth which consists in "a direct imaginative confrontation with an entrance into human finitude" (p. 66). In such a tragic movement the infinite rises out of the successive march through the finite, here "the limited finite of the thing called man" (p. 68). The chapter closes with a special study of Eugene O'Neill who is to be placed, at last, among the romantic or Pelagian tragedians in whom "the finite is a solitude, the fond place of the romantic hero, echoing in the darkness with nothing but calls for pain and courage" (p. 88).

As for Comedy, this is "the most inherently confident rung of the finite" (p. 91) for the comic structure demands a belief in facts, a belief in time and the finite movement of time, plus a belief that man is man, issue of human parentage, capable of human love. In fact, "its image (the comic image) of the finite is the most concrete, the most dense of all the images created by the art of man" (p. 96). Yet here too there are violations of the orthodox comic image, or, perhaps, the single summary heresy of the sublime, for "the one offense . . . which comedy cannot endure is that a man should forget that he is man" (p. 97). In breaking down the modes of the heterodox or the pseudo-comic Father Lynch rejects the comedy of the clown (who is basically sad), the comedy of the meticulous man (with his 'angelic' detestation for the specifically human) and, finally, those two grotesque contemporary modes—the comedy of disgust and the hateful laughter of hatred (evil angelisms both). In the structuring of the book it is the treatment of the modes of Comedy that

most clearly evokes the need for a consideration of the univocal and the analogical, for according to Father Lynch comedy cannot exist in the logical, supracausal, supra-connective world of Tragedy or the Serious. In comedy we are face to face with gaps, surprises, foreshortenings and odd multiplications, all of which stem from the glorious, mundane reality of things which are at once their limited selves yet related to all things and to God. It is analogy which explores and explains these gaps and surprises and hidden connections. It is analogy, therefore, which is the key to the manner in which ideas (" themes, structures, patterns, meanings, unities, etc.") enter into, penetrate, support and suffuse the literary image, *and* from within.

For the literary enterprise analogy is a matter of relevancy, of integration of sense and sensibility, of interpenetration of idea and image. The universal imagination tends to force its matter into a didactic or moralistic vision, a vision imposed from above and resisting the organic growth of image and metaphor. The univocal critic has the same disrespect for growth and texture, being drawn to " the pure idea of things." The equivocal imagination, on the other hand, forces nothing but is itself ordered by disorder, by " the love of darkness and pain," for there are no links or connectives in the world of the equivocal.

Father Lynch sees the vice of univocity in the torment of Greene's Scobie in *The Heart of the Matter*, Scobie with his compulsive and undifferentiated pity; he sees it also in the doctor-hero of Camus' *The Plague*. He discovers it as a radical taint in Mallarmé, Rimbaud and Poe who each in his own way undertakes a " purely Parmidean attempt to obliterate the whole action of the sensible world and to try, in its stead, to start all over again and get hold of a world of pure being in the shape of the poem " (p. 135). The spirit of the equivocal is found in the *acte gratuit* of André Gide, as also in all those artists or critics who hold fast to " separate autonomies," whether of thing and thing, or of idea and image, or of structure and detail. According to the equivocal spirit genuine poetry is marked by irrelevancy, by the adventitious, by the " free " detail. In Father Lynch's critique, therefore, the univocal means Parmenides and the dominion of the One; as a heterodox extreme it means didacticism, angelism, disrespect for matter and for the distinction of things; in the work of art it means a kind of supra-rational clarity but loss of reality and material plenitude. The equivocal, on the other hand, means Heraclitus and the Many, the chaos of flux, utter distinction of things, irrelevancy; in criticism it means separatism and the autonomy of the poetic act; in the work of art, fragmentation and obscurity.

The ensuing discussion of analogy is intended by Father Lynch to rectify these divergent and deviate tendencies toward the undifferentiated Many and toward the rigidly unifying One. Though one cannot commend

the accuracy of his definition of analogy (wherein "everything in the subject is *altogether the same*, and everything *altogether different*"—impossible!), yet his point and purpose are clear—to save the various levels of being and the levels of imaginative insight by a central pattern which will neither suppress detail nor yet be helpless and impotent in ordering detail. *Oedipus Rex* and *Riders to the Sea* serve as paradigms here. In the former ironical self-knowledge functions as a truly analogical idea lighting up the conscience of each character according to the mode of each. In Synge's lyric drama the central image and idea is not so much analogical as polysemous or many-sensed, i. e. the line of water in the floor operates as literal event, as symbol of the sea, as symbol of overpowering fate.

The chapters that follow, on *The Theological Imagination* and *The Christian Imagination*, are an attempt to bring the argumentation to a natural climax in the search for a theological dimension to the literary imagination. So, Father Lynch will speak of a 'Catholic' imagination and a 'Protestant' imagination. The former, he says, is content to course through the levels of being in the ascent to God, facing Him at last without the need to wrench free from human society, whereas "the Protestant seems . . . to wish to stand in nakedness before God outside of society" (p. 165). This means, in the terms of Father Lynch's rationale of the limited and the definite, that "the mysteries of Christianity are a penetration deep into the fact of man, all the way into his Christic center" (*Ibid.*). The implications of this central or orthodox position are then examined, *per contra*, in the opposite notion of dissociation, as we find it, for example, in Greene and Eliot, especially in the *Four Quartets*. Father Lynch is hard put to assimilate the latter poem as an example of the theological imagination because of the poet's taste for annunciations and sudden epiphanies, for the timeless points of time bespeaking illumination, rest, immobility. The critic searches diligently for instances of the flux of time and the horizontal movement of "time-ridden faces." What happens when the search is not successful? One must place Eliot beside O'Neill as an example of another 'dissociated' taste. More successful is the search for the spirit of time and the spirit of association in ritual and ritual drama, though not in forced rituals like Katzanzakis' *He Who Must Die* or MacLeish's *J. B.* which repeat the vice of dissociation in the religious sensibility itself.

In the concluding chapter on *The Christian Imagination* Father Lynch, while reaffirming the uses of Christology as "a model for the penetration of the finite," is concerned chiefly with an exploration of the Divine Imagination (sic) as it forms and then reforms created reality in accordance with the new analogical instrument Who is Christ. In this new and Christic "reorientation of the imagination" (p. 192), the fourfold senses

of Scripture serve as the key to what the Divine Imagination has done, for It has entered progressively into the shape of things, subverting "the whole order of the old imagination" (*Ibid.*) and extending the form of Christ "into history and society and Eucharistic things . . . (and) into the very marrow of the soul" (p. 197). The work of this chapter is then completed by the final supplement on the fourfold method of exegesis. And as we have pointed out, the various supplements that conclude the book are held together analytically by their relevance to Father Lynch's argumentation with respect to the definite, the literal, the temporal, the particular, the event. The first supplement *On the Definite* stands self-explained in its relevance to the main thesis of *Christ and Apollo*; the second one *On Time* stresses the Hebraic exploration of time rather than the Greek and gnostic attempt to transcend time; the texts on medieval exegesis together with their use in contemporary criticism all point to the primacy of the literal sense and to the grounding of all senses in the historical, the particular, the real.

This is a work, then, that is remarkably well structured and admirably one. Never, it seems, was a point argued so well, never was an argument on the definite made so clear and so definite. Everything points to, everything serves, everything sustains the projected burden of the book which is "the restoration of a confidence in the fundamental power of the finite and limited concretions of our human life" (Intro., p. xv). This primary purpose, moreover, is carefully—yet quite naturally—integrated with another purpose which we might look upon as a kind of sub-plot to *Christ and Apollo*. I am thinking of Father Lynch's forceful polemic against the esthetic formalists who are forever finding ways to render the poetic enterprise thoroughly and impossibly antiseptic, as they try to isolate the poetic act and the poetic response and to "protect" the poetic structure from metaphysics, theology and plain human sensibility. Quite properly, and with great eloquence, the weight of the argument in this book is made to bear also upon the spurious structures of formal criticism. For Father Lynch the literary imagination in all its possible dimensions necessarily looks both ways—toward the construct itself and toward the stimulus or cause, that is to say, toward the imaged reality. Imagination, after all, is an internal sense and sense is related to the sensed, to the object of sense. In its inventive function imagination is, of course, a making or, rather, a composing; in its more radical cognitive function it is a showing or a manifesting of things. The image is "open" in both ways: to the mind of the other, to the fellow imaginer, and to the *res*. It is a phantasma, a showing forth of things.

This consistent critical realism is, in fact, one of the features of *Christ and Apollo* and inclines one to support the argument for this reason only that it reaffirms the profound and fruitful relevance of poetry and reality.

Yet I have a doubt—which is really more than a doubt—not about the mode of critical reasoning employed here but about the excessive sharpness of the critical instrument, the theory of the definite. If one's first reaction to the argument is, "soundly and clearly argued," one's second and more thoughtful reaction is—"too close, too clear." For in the course of the book the realism of Father Lynch and his plea for the definite and the literal grows so insistent, so one-track, so nearly obsessive, that one is faced at last with a crucial option. Either his position, grounded in philosophy, theology and critical experience, is unalterably central to a mature realist criticism or else it is, more subtly, simply another fixed deviate in the line of critical theories, and one that veers—paradoxically—toward the univocal!

Allow me to examine the first option for a moment. Several times in the course of this review I have used the word "orthodox" to designate a given notion of Time or Tragedy or Analogy as urged by Father Lynch. I have spoken also of his judgment with respect to deviate notions and exemplars as a judgment of their heterodoxy, theological or literary. In all fairness it must be said that this terminology is mine and not his. Yet the rhythm of judgment is so firm and steady—the beat of an anathema without its resonant finality—that these familiar terms of doctrinal judgment seen not at all inappropriate. Thus we are shown how in the perennial philosophy analogy stands as a logical corrective to excessive univocity on the one hand and total equivocation on the other. In the material on tragedy an appeal is made, implicitly at least, to a true doctrine on man and on grace which will then stand as cure and corrective to the extremes of Manichaeanism and Pelagianism as they are manifest in certain putative tragedies. So also with Father Lynch's critical-theological principle of the definite. It is advanced as ineluctably sound and central both in theology and in literary criticism, proceeding as it does from an orthodox view of the Incarnation, from a sound physics and metaphysics, and from a logic that includes the notion of analogy.

Now no one will doubt the formidable character of such a critical-theological instrument, i. e. a theory of the definite supported by theology, the perennial philosophy and critical experience. We are, after all, dealing with poetry and the imagination and, therefore, working in the realm of the particular and the definite, for poetry is the *infima scientia* which treats of quasi-singulars below reason and imagination is that thing-anchored internal sense which assimilates the singular and the definite. No problem here. Nevertheless we are faced in *Christ and Apollo* with a stunning conclusion. In the name of a theory of the definite, and as that theory is enlarged by the uses of analogy, we are asked to reject characteristic imaginative structures of—note well—Greene, Faulkner, Eliot, Mallarmé, Baudelaire, Rimbaud, Breton, Proust, Racine, Gide, Camus, Wagner, Dreiser,

Odets, O'Neill, MacLeish, Katzanzakis, Mann, Shaw, Chaplin, Ibsen, Anderson, Sartre, O'Casey and others. It is not as though the adverse judgment is not well argued in many instances. In the matter of tragedy, in fact, Father Lynch's discussion on Manichaean and Pelagian pseudo-tragedy is so palpably accurate and revealing as to be very nearly definitive. Other judgments are equally sensitive and substantial, for example on dissociation in *The End of the Affair*, on the almost blasphemous freezing and looting of time in *Recherche du Temps Perdu*. Yet the critical principle of the analogical definite grinds on with crushing impartiality, rejecting, expunging, anathematizing. One gets the feeling that something is awry, that Father Lynch is demanding too much, imposing too much. One gets the feeling, further, that there is in him some fatal limitation of awareness or, rather, a kind of stiffness or constriction of the critical sensibility at certain crucial points. Father Lynch simply cannot respond to certain manifestations of the creative power and the creative passion. It may be presumptuous to designate, category by category, his more inhibited areas yet let me say for want of a more accurate terminology that he does not seem to respond at all to the prophetic, the romantic or the mystical modes of the literary imagination or to the obsessive in any form.

Suppose we take Racine's *Phedre* as an example. It is true that one cannot abide *Phedre* unless one is virtually hypnotized by the incantation of the verse, by the spareness of metaphor, by the relentless rhythm of suppressed passion. That is to say, one cannot abide *Phedre* unless one responds to the obsessive mode of the literary imagination. But this *is* the mode of the imagination and the mode of the poetic act in *Phedre*. It cannot be judged by the canons of the definite and the analogical as they are enunciated by Father Lynch. It simply will not yield, so that you must take the theory or take *Phedre*; you cannot have both. *Phedre* is powerfully, gloriously univocal. Or take *The Brothers Karamazov*, wherein Dostoevski with the wide embrace of genius employs both abstract and particular modes, both the definite and the dream, and is at home in each and in all. Father Lynch will not have it so. He will accept the particularized " exploration of hearts " in the multiple scene after Father Zossima's death but he will not accept the dialectic argument *ex alto* in the Grand Inquisitor scene, for it is achieved " by a dubious kind of transcendental thinking and by literary sleight-of-hand." So also with Eliot and *Four Quartets*, that metaphysical song set in the mode of epiphanies and quietly ecstatic moments, in time and out of time. It will not yield, as Father Lynch shows quite clearly, though he tries once or twice to make the poem testify, even if obliquely, to the movement of " time-ridden faces." Yet for all that the poem is haunted by Pentecost and the Baghavad Ghita and John of the Cross and a love which is " itself unmoving." But the theory of the definite will not move either—to embrace the poem just as

it is. Father Lynch grows suddenly uneasy and even querulous, as though Eliot to his own distress and our loss had not been adequately trained in the composition of time and place.

There is the matter of Surrealism, too. I would agree with Father Lynch and with M. Maritain that surrealist poetry is Parmenidean in its ambitions as it seeks to capture a knowledge-above-knowledge through the occult instrumentality of the poem. True enough; these are dangerous and dizzying heights. Yet does it follow that there is no place in poetry for the supra-real, for these loftier modes which we might call mystical, prophetic, apocalyptic, Dionysian and which Father Lynch would call Apollonian? Is there no place for Claudel, for Max Jacob, for St. John Perse, for Debussy, Chagall and Paul Klee, for German Expressionism and the Romantic movement in general? No place for the poetry of John of the Cross? No place for those more rational and more univocal obsessions of the literary imagination which bring forth, according to the Gallic genius, the *théâtre ideologique* and novels which are looked on as the public testaments of public moralists?

Let us suppose the truth of the Aristotelian maxim that poetry is more universal than history. Let us suppose the other truth implied in this maxim, that poetry at the other extreme falls short of the full universality of science, and that this is its unique power and genius—to bestride the world between, the world of the realized image between fact and essence. Then it follows that poetry commands a very wide world indeed; the inventive image-making power faces a broad spectrum of poetically conceived and poetically embodied objects ranging from the sharply definite object adjacent to the fact of history to the more perfectly universalized type or ratio operating, say, in *Everyman*, in a satirical novel, in an expressionistic play, in a mystical poem. Even at that this wide-ranging diversity touches only on the relative materiality or immateriality of the object—the universalized singular, the common concrete. There is in addition a distinct source of diversity deriving from the inventive power of the imagination which may conceive and fabricate in a realist form, or in phantasy, in a literal or symbolic mode or in both, or even—at the far, far end of the inventive spectrum—in the mode of illuminism, prophecy, apocalypse. In short, there is an " objective " spectrum reflecting the arc of virtual immateriality in the poetic object and there is an " inventive " or " subjective " spectrum reflecting the diverse and unpredictable modes of literary fantastication.

To move analogically through these diverse forms is work indeed for the practical critic and more work, infinitely more, for one who attempts to formulate a literary theory that will be more than a pleasant and equivocal catch-all for one's own literary favorites. This easy and less vulnerable extremity has no appeal for Father Lynch and we are his debtors for that. The woods are full of critical tea-tasters who take advantage of

a " formalist " theory of poetry to allow themselves a good deal of literary lounging in the sun. Father Lynch, at least, has made his choice, a very keen one in its critical dimension, very clear and firm in its theoretic commitment. But the choice, we feel, has left him in chains. He is definitively bound to the definite and his theory of the definite is simply not large enough to account for the " objective " and " inventive " variations that exist for all to see in the works of art we call good and great. One may prefer the realm of the definite, and the analogical exploration of the definite. But there is, I submit, a univocal mode to the literary imagination also, univocal to the point of obsession, and it has produced powerful and lasting works of art. Beyond that there is the scandal of all the romantic and illuminist and psychological and surrealist modes and the burden is clearly not upon the literary imagination that produced them but upon the anathematizer who would cast them out as heterodox. Rather should we be tempted to re-evaluate the critical-metaphysical theory that made it necessary to cast them out. Rather should we suspect its adequacy and examine it for the characteristic vices of the univocal spirit!

But there is an even more serious and more delicate critique to be levelled against Father Lynch's central argument in *Christ and Apollo.* It has to do with his Christology and with the ascetical doctrine consequent upon his Christology as both are used to substantiate his theory of the definite. It is difficult to communicate the precise tonality of Father Lynch's approach to Christology and the difficulty is increased by the slightly rhetorical quality of his Christological texts. Yet his approach does have a characteristic resonance to it and if I had to designate it I would say that it appears to look almost exclusively to the humanity of Christ and to the purely temporal finalities of His redemptive action. At least twice, for example, Father Lynch insists on speaking of Christ as " the Man " or " a Man," not only hypostasizing the humanity but doing so in contexts clearly related to a Divine Operation, whether of Creation or Assumption. So, in the Introduction he speaks of " the Man who, in taking on our human nature . . ." (p. xiv) and in the chapter on Time he speaks of " a Man who, having ' created ' time, could not possibly be hostile to it " (p. 50). Was this just carelessness or was it, perhaps, a rhetorical necessity in an argument focussing on Christ's involvement in the temporal? One is inclined to opt for the latter after a sampling of typical references to the life and work and purposes of the God-Man. So, " Christ moved down into all the realities of man to get to His Father " (p. 13); He stands for " the completely definite " (Intro. p. xiv), for a non-hostile entrance into time and an unromantic march or passage through time (p. 50), not redeeming time but exploring its inner resources fully (p. 51), being our model for " the penetration of the finite " (p. 187), " the model and source of that energy and courage we again need to enter

the finite as the only creative and generative source of beauty" (Intro., p. xiv); then standing as a model for the actual penetration of time, Christ is likewise a model for the cognitive grasping of time, being "the enemy only of the romantic imagination and the pure intelligence as ways of life" (p. 50).

One reference above all needs full quotation: "It is completely false to say that Christ redeemed time. For time has never needed redeeming; it only needed someone to explore its inner resources fully, as He did. And so powerful and new is the exploration, in His case, that it is crowned not only with insight but with the Resurrection" (p. 51). Might we not comment by saying that "so powerful and new" is Father Lynch's exploration of the Incarnation that we seem to be left at last only with the humanity of Christ, His acquired knowledge, His cognitive and non-sacrificial purpose, His fascinated regard for the finite. A matter of emphasis, yes, in a thesis inclined towards just such an emphasis. But more than this is required of a theory of the imagination in its theological and Christological dimensions. A certain fulness of doctrine is required, and certain specific clarities, too, such as the fact that Christ is not "the Man" but the God-Man; that He *did* come to redeem man and, therefore, to redeem time which had gone awry (not in itself but in man's despairing commitment to it); that He is the enemy of sin and error and Satan in whatever guise and not the enemy "only" of a romantic epistemology; that He does not need to march through man and through the finite to get to the Father; that the mysteries of Christianity are not "a penetration deep into the fact of man" but a penetration of the things of God and of all things as they are ordered to God; that the Christic reality and the Christic imagination are not narrow, thin and rigid but wider than all imagining, according to the width and depth and heighth of the hypostatic order, for "the plenitude of the Godhead dwells in Him corporeally."

In justice to Father Lynch I am willing to suppose that in twisting his lens to bring man into focus—man, the humanity of Christ, the definite, the temporal—he may have twisted too hard. This is a risk one takes. But one takes the risk also of theological distortion, which in the matter of Christology is avoided by keeping close to the Trinity and to the mission of the Word. St. Augustine gives us the tack here for clear theological sailing: "In the mystery of the Incarnation the whole ratio of the deed is the power of the doer" (*Epist. ad Volus.*, 137, 2), the doer Who is Divine. St. Thomas comments on this by saying "that we must judge of it (the Incarnation) in regard to the quality of the Divine Person assuming, and not according to the quality of the human nature assumed." That is to say, we must judge of the Incarnation in this way if we are judging formally, for this is what it is formally, not so much a going down as a taking up, an Assumption, human nature assumed into hypostatic

union with a Divine Person. The Christic mission, therefore, is not a narrow, rigid march through time but the transfiguring of man in time through an unheard-of union with the Divine.

Even on the part of the human nature assumed the effects are momentous: the plenitude of habitual grace, the perfection of beatific and infused knowledge, the power to work miracles, the power to prophecy; and beyond all that His grace as Head overflowing into His Mystical Body. That same Body receives these gifts from its Head in accordance with a human receptivity but in accordance also with the transfiguring mode of the gifts. For the Christian each rigorous moment of time is also a moment of miracle; the unforeseen gift is renewed from now to now in a dynamic interplay of the divine and the divinized that we call sanctifying grace. Over and beyond this there are the special moments: Tabor, Pentecost, the road to Damascus, the multiplication of loaves, Lazarus inexplicably walking out of the tomb. That is to say, in the Christian's daily, dogged movement through time there is the continuum of human and temporal succession yet discrete moments also, so to speak—metaphysical and metanatural breaks and gaps. Christ as the Lord of time is Lord both of the continuous and of the discrete or discontinuous; and both phases of Christic time bespeak transfiguration. Besides the moment of patience and the moment of rational action there is the moment of conversion, the moment of sudden faith, the moment of penance, the moment of ecstasy, the moment of miracle.

Father Lynch might be reminded that there is the moment of quiet also, the moment of meaningful immobility, a moment poetically structured by Eliot in *Four Quartets* and lovingly described by Teresa and John of the Cross and by the mystics generally. In the consistent rationale of *Christ and Apollo*, however, this ascetico-mystical consequence of a transforming Christology is made to appear alien and almost unnatural. What does it mean, for example, to say that "the most orthodox form of prayer for the Christian, no matter what spiritual state he might be in (including that of high contemplation) is not rest but motion: a coursing, with all the powers of mind and will and body, through the mysteries—that is, the stages—of the life of Christ" (p. 50)? It means this to me, that with a wave of the hand, so to speak, Father Lynch has disposed once and for all of the most profound tradition in Christian mysticism and has negated without proof, authority or honest discussion one of its most precious existential truths—that in the soul's growth in prayer rational discursus gradually gives way to the prayer of quiet. The reader should be warned against the author's tendency to make summary judgments out of such weak and even contradictory assumptions as this that even in a state of "high contemplation" the soul should persist in the prayer of beginners, with the added suspicion that anything else, anything more, would be somehow less orthodox.

As for the moments that leap and break even with the higher modes of normal or " continuous " transfiguration—the modes of ecstasy, prophecy, rapture, tongues—are they not phases of the Incarnation also and, consequently, possible phases in the working of the Christian imagination? That is to say, since the *gratiae gratis datae* are in every age part of the Christic march through time, shall they not be given their own appropriate and prophetic image? For if it be a question of the Christian imagination, is this not its true measure that Christ contains in Himself, and pre-eminently, all the modes of being and modes of knowledge to which man is open, by nature or by grace? Would it not be true to say that in its total dimension the Christian imagination includes both dream and reality, both event and promise, the clarity of the universal and the density of the singular, involvement in time and the transcendence of time, the joy of commitment and the joy of detachment, the humble quotidian fact and the ascents of the wonderful. In short, would it not be true to say that the Christian imagination bespeaks not Christ vs. Apollo but Christ *and* Apollo, or, more exactly, Apollo *in Christ*. For it is He Who is all things in all, the first-born and exemplar of all creatures, Who cannot fail to possess in a supereminent and purified mode the virtualities of every created reality, be it Dionysius or Apollo or Artemis or Pan. And we might add—paradoxically in the present context—that to separate any mode of reality from Him, to make Him alien to any mode and it to Him, is at least virtually Manichaean.

We may call it a paradox; it is also an unfitting and even hazardous thing—for criticism, for theology, for a really fruitful apologetics—to let great areas of human sensibility slip away from the sweet yoke of Christ, from the immense vision and embrace of the God-Man. Yet this is what has happened in *Christ and Apollo*. Father Lynch has made the Christian image and the Christian sensibility synonomous with a kind of dogged Christian existentialism which is not really existential at all because it does not account for all of the existents, all of the events, all of the facts and signs and wonders in the Christian thing. Remember, it was the prophet Joel whom the writer of Acts turned to in trying to describe the effect of Pentecost (event) upon the Apostles (these men in time): " And it shall come to pass in the last days these days, this day, now) . . . I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh: and your sons and your daughters shall prophecy, and your young men shall see visions, and your old men shall dream dreams " (*Acts* 2/17).

DOMINIC ROVER, O.P.

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A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. By HERMAN DOOYEWEERD. Translated by D. H. Freeman, W. Young, and H. de Jongste. 4 vols. Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1953-1958. Pp. 566, 598, 784, 257. $36 per set.

Because the approach and milieu of this work will seem very strange at first to the American reader, it may be best to begin by referring to some background material which may help to bring it within a more familiar context. One of the earliest and most perceptive responses to Etienne Gilson's renowned Gifford lectures on medieval philosophy came in the form of a series of articles contributed by Michael Foster to *Mind*, n. s., vols. 43-45 (1934-36). These articles were entitled: "The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of Modern Natural Science" and "Christian Theology and Modern Science of Nature," and they constituted an acute Protestant appraisal of the theme of Christian philosophy as related to the question of the origins of modern science. Foster's thesis was that the influence of revelation upon philosophy is deeper than we suspect and that it extends even to the modern scientific outlook. He viewed the relation of medieval Christian theology to Aristotelian philosophy as a substitutional critique rather than a transforming assimilation. The sharpest point of criticism of Aristotle and the Arabians was their philosophy of nature, precisely because the Christian theologians were trying to *replace* the conception of an eternal natural whole with the view of nature as created in freedom, as new with the newness of time, and as thoroughly contingent even in its most intelligible and conditionally necessary aspects.

Once this revolutionary reappraisal of nature was started, it could not be brought to a neat halt. Foster maintained that there is a closer continuity between the medieval Catholic and the Reformed theologian than is usually admitted from a standpoint centered around institutional conflicts, and that both groups were closely related to classical modern science. The theologians stressed the production of nature through God's knowledgable will, and the scientists were thereby assured not only of the intelligibility of nature but also of the need to consult sensory experience as the contingent counterpart of the free act with which God produced the natural world. Thus Foster expanded Whitehead's suggestion that modern science could only have grown out of the theological schooling of men to regard nature as an intelligible order whose laws can be known only through a conjunction of analysis, observation, and experiment. Richard Kroner is presently developing this same thesis about the role of faith in the constitution of modern philosophy and science.

Herman Dooyeweerd has been working for forty years in Holland to stimulate a specifically Protestant interest in the problem of the Christian contribution to the modern scientific attitude and the philosophies based

on that attitude. He is professor of philosophy of law at the Free University of Amsterdam and editor of *Philosophia Reformata*, a multilingual journal which approaches theoretical and historical issues in philosophy in terms of a highly sophisticated Calvinist philosophy of science and culture. Traditionally, the Calvinist mind has been less hampered than the Lutheran in making room within the life of faith for a reflective study of philosophical reasoning and scientific methods. For many decades after Hegel's death, the idealistic notion of science and cultural life was dominant in those Calvinist circles where philosophy counted. During the past generation, however, it has become increasingly clear to such groups that absolute idealism is not only capacious but also rapacious as far as the distinctive claims of revealed faith are concerned. Hence particularly among continental Calvinists, there has been a gradual shift of philosophical allegiance from Hegel to Kant and a corresponding growth of interest in the philosophy of modern science, especially the question of its ultimate foundations. Dooyeweerd is a leader in this movement, his journal gives voice to the particular discussions, and his present book is the major expression of the entire tendency.

From every angle, *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought* is a remarkable achievement, one of the significant multi-volumed philosophical works of our century. It reminds one of Ernst Cassirer's studies on epistemology and symbolic forms, for its sustained argument, scholarly detail, and wide range of problems. The two thousand pages of analysis are backed up by a conscientious use of scholarly instruments, forcing us to admire the author's responsible procedures even when we have to disagree with his positions. There is a real danger, however, that the reader will get lost in this vast forest of ideas. To guard against it, there are helpful internal divisions which are also listed in the table of contents. Moreover, volume four is entirely devoted to a 257-page analytic index complete with cross references and doctrinal summaries. Here, we find some six columns given to Aristotle, four to St. Thomas and Thomism, seven to Hume, twelve to Fichte, three to Husserl, and an overshadowing 26 columns to Kant. Technical subject-terms receive a similarly detailed indexing, so that all the mechanical aids are provided for introducing the reader to Dooyeweerd's intellectual world.

We get a first clue about how this world is orientated from considering the book's title. The aim is to supply a critique in the general spirit of Kant, that is, by searching out the conditions which make it possible for us to know and to develop the sciences. And like Kant, Dooyeweerd is not primarily interested in the psychological description and empirical genesis of our modes of thinking, but rather in the most general presuppositions and structures which pervade our thinking and organize our bodies of knowledge. In a word, the critique in question is a transcendental one, not in the sense of abandoning our world but of determining the

principles which govern our looking at our world. Yet Dooyeweerd does not regard his work as a repetition of Kant, since Kant did not press far enough along the path of critical reflection. Kant was satisfied when he came upon those epistemological principles which are proportioned to the methods and propositions functioning in Newtonian natural science, but he failed to inquire into the conditions making reasonable the whole enterprise of taking a scientific approach to the world.

Another point where the present work aims at becoming more radically critical than Kant is in respect to the forms of cultural and social-legal life. Here the impact of Hegel is still felt, since he carried out large-scale investigations into these forms of life. Perhaps even closer to Dooyeweerd's plan, however, is the work done by Dilthey and Husserl. Especially the latter furnishes a pattern by seeking out the genesis of both the scientific and the social structures together, as belonging within a common movement of mind and a common set of founding principles. Another piece of indebtedness to Husserl is for the technique of looking for the intentional meaning-acts which give structure to a science or to a social reality.

Yet Dooyeweerd does not think that these predecessors have exhausted the possibilities of critique, and hence he presents his reflections as a new critique. His confidence about being able to move beyond the critical tradition is based on a controlling consideration. When he examines the reductions of Kant and Hegel and Husserl, he finds them to be agreeing on one crucial matter: the critical principles to which they eventually come are immanent ones and do not go beyond the whole constituted by experience-and-the-world. This does not mean that they completely ignore transcendence, but it does mean that they recognize it only in order to fit it in somewhere within their explanatory scheme. They treat only of an immanentized sort of transcendence, and hence they do not even raise the proper question about the transcendent God in His own being. It may not belong to the office of philosophy to tell us anything about the transcendent God, but at least a critical reflection must distinguish between an immanentized idea of transcendence and the region where transcendence is properly met.

In a way, then, Dooyeweerd's whole effort is to broaden the meaning of critique to the point where we can see even a residual element of uncritical thinking in Kant and Hegel and Husserl, not to mention the empiricists. He characterizes all of Western philosophy, especially its relatively critical modern phase, as accepting the postulate of immanence in an unquestioning way and hence of failing to make any reductive reflections leading beyond the sphere of immanence. The implication is that when the human mind is left more or less to its own resources, it will not be able to break through the immanentizing web of philosophical thought. To do so in any effective way requires the aid of the Christian faith and

the encouragement of the Incarnation. Philosophy has always been a search for origins, but until the factor of revealed faith is explicitly acknowledged the origins are sought and found only within the totality of nature, including those human acts of intending and experiencing which are correlated with the natural whole. Some special ground must be discovered before we can even become aware of this controlling naturalistic assumption behind the classical achievements in philosophy. The new consideration comes with the Christian message, since in the person of Christ we see that nature is not autonomous but is rooted in the transcendent being of God. Faith in Christ helps the critical mind to spring the bonds of the sphere of immanence and at last reach a truly radical condition of critical reflection.

This is the sense in which Dooyeweerd views himself as continuing the work of Calvin, as extending the movement of reformation into the field of philosophy. Calvin proclaimed the word of God to people in the world, but he did not make any technical penetration into the determinate spheres of human experiencing and knowing. That is the work of the new critique, which reaches back beyond even Kant to Calvin for its decisive guidance. The re-forming of philosophy does not mean a reshuffling of theses in a closed system, but precisely the decisive opening up of all philosophical viewpoints, the relativizing of them to the word of God which does transcend our natural immanence. All philosophical explanations are affected, because they are now qualified as transpiring within the limits of immanence and hence as providing at the most a penultimate explanation. Dooyeweerd is careful not to fall into obscurantism: the relativizing of philosophical standpoints is not the same as abolishing them or declaring them worthless, but it is a re-forming of them within a further perspective which they could not reach by themselves.

He emphasizes that when philosophies are measured by the standard of faith, they do not wither away or cease to be significant for men. The types of order uncovered by philosophical analysis remain valid findings, but they cease to carry along with them any claim to be the ultimate conditions of thought and order in the world. To justify the claim of having made an unconditionally ultimate analysis of the internal structures and principles of order, a philosophy must be able to work out the interconnections and especially the manner of unifying the various spheres. Here, Dooyeweerd ventures the historical generalization that no Western philosophy has been able to resolve the question of the unity of the world and of the principles of thought. Philosophers have done a good job in working out various particular analyses of this or that region of meaning, this or that way of constituting an order of knowledge or social living. But they have been unable to find principles which are general enough to synthesize these particular accounts into a unified theory. The Aristotelian

matter and form failed to include the richness of human personal being; the medieval couple of nature and grace was too variously interpreted and too little adjusted to the actual penetration of the natural world to be effective; and the modern humanistic tension between nature and freedom has led to tiring oscillations rather than to a just balance.

Without excepting Kierkegaard from the modern predicament of dualistic antagonisms, Dooyeweerd nevertheless employs a typically Kierkegaardian theme in order to indicate the direction of his solution. What the critical inquirer seeks is a satisfactory synthesis, but he cannot find it within the postulate of immanence. He must forego the closure of thought upon itself and give up the claim to intranatural autonomy. This involves an admission that the philosophical search after origins must be reinterpreted to mean a search after a beginning which does not itself belong within the natural process but transcends it. Or to use the Kierkegaardian and even the Cartesian phrase, he has to discover an Archimedean point that is radically original in respect to our universe. Descartes thought that he had found the point, once he conceived of the laws of motion at work in the realm of extension, but surely the mind which had to be given the matter and the motion was not yet at the origin. Kierkegaard found the point well enough in Christian faith, but he lost his way back into the world, particularly into the world of the sciences and social institutions. Dooyeweerd locates the Archimedean point behind the Cartesian type of reflection and the Kierkegaardian type of faith. It is found in a certain act of critical reflection, which nourishes itself on the transcending word of God and nevertheless keeps its contact with the particular structures of order in the world. He is reluctant to call the resultant outlook a Christian philosophy, because it is more radically reflective than any philosophical immanence ever becomes and because it penetrates deeper into the mundane structures than most philosophies do, without making the claim to being completely autonomous in respect to an initiative beyond the mind-nature complex. It is a *sui generis* outlook issuing from the relation between a rigorously pursued critical effort and an acceptance of Christian faith, in the Calvinist tradition.

Dooyeweerd regards it as a major misunderstanding of his work to conclude from the fact that it is a critique of theoretical thought that it is therefore unconcerned with moral and practical issues. He tries to move farther than Husserl in clarifying the meaning of theoretical thought. His point is that precisely what comes under criticism is the assumption that the speculative sphere comes first, that it is fully constituted without any practical and motivational considerations, and that only thereafter may we treat of the human aims and influences on thought. Every sphere of thought is constituted by some operative intentional meaning, and in this respect the theoretical order has to surrender its autonomy and admit

the common feature of structuring intentionality which it shares with other ways of organizing our experience. Dooyeweerd presses this argument not only against a rigid division between theoretical and practical parts of philosophy but also against any separation of the scientific order from the results of his critique. There is no realm of human thought which can remain untouched by the criticism of immanence. A scientific method can be devised and put successfully to work without itself raising the question of its relation to other human concerns, but the critical mind cannot accept this value-free neutrality as the final report on that type of knowledge. Just as the explicit philosophies of immanence have to be sprung open, so the implicit claims of scientific method to be self-sufficient have to be criticized. The scientist cannot enter upon his task without having some assurance about the order, intelligibility, and ultimate unity of nature. But he cannot find these presuppositions justified in the humanist philosophies of modern immanentism, since these philosophies are dogged by internal conflicts that tell against a purely immanent view of nature. Eventually, the natural and social sciences themselves must acknowledge the reference to a transcendent God and hence the need for an act of faith in God as the principle of natural order.

Dooyeweerd is not satisfied with an epistemological presentation of his position, but engages in many detailed analyses of particular types of knowledge and types of social life. His attention is drawn specially to the nature of the state, the family, and the various levels of law. Throughout these regional analyses, he employs techniques drawn from Dilthey and Husserl. From the former he takes the conviction that we will find a typical structure present in all the literary, legal, and political expressions of social activity. And he employs Husserl to show that such structures are necessarily there, due to our intentional acts which found the meaning of institutions as well as methods and bodies of knowledge and value. Another major contribution of Husserl is his notion of an interlacing among the various particular spheres of human experience and thought. Dooyeweerd organizes his social and scientific analyses around three main principles: the modes of human experiencing are thoroughly and permanently plural; each way of intending issues in a sphere of meaning and living which has its own intrinsic and irreducible structural laws and qualities; these spheres do find a common grounding in man and hence they are interlaced rather than discrete. Because of his acceptance and extensive use of these principles, he refutes the charge that faith in the transcendent is incompatible with respecting the findings of the sciences and the value-structures of human life. For Dooyeweerd, the standpoint of critical reflection is a compound one because it involves accepting both the nonautonomy of the natural world and the natural sciences and also the actual presence of intentional structures and interrelations.

The influence of Heidegger is felt when the author seeks to show that structures are not incompatible with process. Not only is the intending act an intrinsically temporal one but all the resultant structures in knowledge and society are similarly temporal. The interlacings among spheres of meaning and value are not static but historical and developing in character. Where Dooyeweerd criticizes Husserl and Heidegger is on the issue of equating the historical dimension of human experience with only a relative transcendence, a transcendence reaching out to the next horizon but never moving beyond the immanence of human experience and its world of worlds. Dooyeweerd treats our temporal intending acts as modes of referring which point ultimately not only to the world as the interlacing of immanent meanings but also to God as the principle of cosmic order. For this reason, he calls his position a *critical cosmonomic* philosophy: it unifies all structures of order in the cosmos and then it reflects upon the founding of cosmic order itself in God the creator.

There are several lines of criticism which this book requires. One point concerns the kind of unity which Dooyeweerd provides for his cosmonomic idea and hence the kind of knowledge achieved by his critical reflection. The failure of Western philosophies to reach this standpoint is said to be not simply a historical accident but the result of not taking formal account of the Christian message. Yet since the medieval systems of nature and grace are criticized for failing to synthesize the two, we do not reach the cosmonomic viewpoint merely by acknowledging the word of God and the reality of faith. Only the particular way in which the Calvinist tradition conceives the relationship between nature and revelation is sufficient to bring us to the viewpoint in question. But in that case, the distinctive note seems to be a theological one and acceptance of cosmonomic knowledge would depend upon settlement of the theological issue. Yet despite the background predominance of this particular theological position, it does not come in for formal examination and defense. Thus the rest of us are left without the specific means for judging whether the supposed knowledge is indeed well grounded.

Although he criticizes Max Scheler severely in the social sphere and on individual being, Dooyeweerd is in a similar intellectual situation, since both men attempt to extend the theory of intentionality to include an acknowledgment of the transcendent being of God. Scheler eventually concludes that this cannot be done unless God is identified with the world order and with cosmic becoming. Dooyeweerd rejects pantheism of any variety. Still, his analysis of the varieties of epistemic and axiological experience leads directly only to the affirmation that there is an interlacing of structures to constitute the cosmos of meaning. The problem remains of how to show that the cosmonomic idea leads ultimately to the theonomic principle of nature. This connection is not established by means of the inten-

tional analysis itself. Once the mind is engaged by faith, it can grasp the need for making this further reference, but direct philosophical grounds for doing so continue to elude even the faith-illuminated mind as it is presented here. That is why the question of the type of unity found in cosmonomic knowledge is urgent. Dooyeweerd does not explain in sufficient detail how the act of faith affects the act of philosophical analysis, and whether the presence of the former introduces evidence which the latter can employ in working out the philosophical theory of an ultimate pointing back to a transcendent origin for nature.

Two indirect kinds of evidence are offered, however, for the recognition of God. One consists in Dooyeweerd's teaching on time and intentional meaning as leading not only to a cosmic nexus but also to that which transcends the things in nature. He makes an interesting blend of the notion of intentionality with that of being created, so that to intend in a temporal structure is proper to having a created sort of being. This goes one step beyond Heidegger's thoughts on our thrownness toward the world, but we are not shown that the step is taken on grounds about which the philosophical kind of reflection can consider and judge. Faith and critical reflection are said to be conjoined, but the createdness of nature remains only a counterpostulate to nature's total immanence as far as evidence presented for philosophical analysis is concerned.

The other indirect route is Dooyeweerd's pointing at the internal conflicts among all the philosophies. This is a move of high dialectical generality, and yet it cannot be any sounder than the examples furnished for it. Although he does not deliberately distort the historical sources, the author does simplify them excessively so that the individual thinker will not break out of the scheme. This is the constant danger of the method of reconstituting the so-called fundamental intentions of a philosophy and an era. For instance, it is essential to the completeness of Dooyeweerd's historical case to show that St. Thomas becomes involved in basic antinomies concerning nature and grace, and especially that he eliminates the radical Biblical motive of creation and the fall. To show that the doctrine of creation is emptied, Dooyeweerd pictures Thomas as conceiving the first origination of things according to the Aristotelian pattern of a bringing forth of matter and form. No notice is taken of the Thomistic teaching on the origination of being as existent and hence of the deep modifications which he did introduce into the meaning of causality as attributed to God in creation. In the case of the doctrine of the fall, Aquinas is said to treat grace as an extrinsic addition whose removal simply injures in an extrinsic way the order of nature. Dooyeweerd concludes that Christ's redemptive act therefore cannot effect the very root of the temporal cosmos for Thomas, but this conclusion follows only from the description given of the relation between nature and grace. None of the aids of recent scholarship

are used to insure a penetrating understanding of Thomistic thought, which is far more complex than this conventional interpretation supposes.

One final issue may be mentioned. Dooyeweerd is troubled by the possibility that philosophy and the sciences may seek a foundation not in the direction of faith but in that of ordinary experience. In the course of discussing this alternative, he performs a genuine service by criticizing the frequently advanced contention that the ordinary man supports a naive realism. The ordinary standpoint is not that of a lowgrade philosophical theory but of a nonphilosophical view of things. However, the author overstates his argument by linking philosophical realism too closely with an object-approach to beings. When the analysis is brought back to a position more fundamental than the subject-object distinction, this need not mean that realism is being left at the subject-object level. Dooyeweerd's handling of realism and ordinary attitudes is inadequate mainly because of a failure on the part of realists themselves to establish more clearly both the distinction between being and the phenomenal object and also the precise relationship of philosophical realism to ordinary experience.

These criticisms are not intended to obscure the fact that this is a highly important philosophical effort. Dooyeweerd takes a wide sweep and has a consistent position in respect to most of the major philosophical problems and schools. He reformulates the question of faith and philosophical reason in a provocative way. And he presents a strong challenge against the view that science is neutrally objective and that every philosophy of nature must accept a monistic immanence. Hence his work is worthy of a careful reading and later use in connection with many problems.

JAMES COLLINS

Saint Louis University
St. Louis, Mo.

Holy Writ or Holy Church. By G. TAVARD, A.A. New York: Harpers, 1959. x, 250 pp. $5.00.

One might suppose from the title of Father Tavard's scholarly study that an option is necessary: we must choose *between* the Bible or the Church. Actually nothing is further from the author's mind; moreover, nothing could be further from the truth. Nevertheless, the allusion to a fundamental controversy is evident. What is the final criterion for divine faith? The Sacred Scriptures, say our Protestant brethren, at least for the most part. *Sola scriptura* is even said to be the " formal principle " of the Protestant Reformation. The contrary position, namely, that the Church is

the sufficient, proximate rule of faith, *could* be called Catholic doctrine. The task that the author sets before himself in this book is to determine whether or not this position is the whole truth, and, even more, whether or not it is the most accurate expression of this fundamental point.

The importance of what Father Tavard has done here (or at least begun) could scarcely be overestimated. In the first place, the discussion concerning the place of Sacred Scripture in the divine economy, the role of the Church in proposing divine truth, and the nature of divine and apostolic tradition always remains central to the Catholic-Protestant question. It might be well, however, to call attention to the fact that without regard for heterodoxy, it is extremely important for a well balanced fundamental theology and ecclesiology that these relationships be well established and defined.

The author states at the outset that the method is historical; and the reader of this volume becomes quickly aware that the documented research provides sufficient material for determining, *historically*, certain trends. Since his primary intention is to investigate the attitude of Christian writers (and the Church at large) toward Holy Scripture and tradition, Father Tavard begins in the patristic period. It is here that we meet for the first time a phrase that is to re-appear many times in one or another form, so that it constitutes, in a way, the theme of the entire volume: "the inherence of the Church in Scripture . . ." (p. 15). The meaning of this phrase with respect to that early period in Christian history is that it is impossible to think of the Scriptures outside the Church; but it is equally impossible to conceive of the Church without the Scriptures. This latter statement is true notwithstanding the evident truth that, absolutely speaking, the Church need not have "inhered in Scripture." *De facto*, she does, and this on account of a divine ordination that divine revelation be transmitted *this* way.

The medieval period is presented as having remained substantially faithful to this idea. The author brings out some interesting points on the meaning of *sacra scriptura* in medieval theological literature. He shows that, although theologians such as St. Thomas were well aware of the distinction between canonical and non-canonical sacred literature, still in practice they often used the term *sacra scriptura* to designate more than those books divinely inspired in the strict sense. Thus, for example, it would seem rather arbitrary to understand Holy Scripture (i.e., the text of the Bible) in the following passage: *omnibus articulis fidei inhaeret fides propter unum medium, scilicet propter veritatem primam propositam nobis in Scripturis secundum doctrinam Ecclesiae intellectis sane.*[1] Aside from the problem of determining the precise sense of this particular text, or others similar to it, it is important to keep in mind what is implied in this

[1] *Summa theol.*, II II, 5, 3, ad 2^{um}.

inclusion of the writings of the Fathers in that which constitutes the "doctrine of the Church," namely, that there is a *tradition*, a handing on, a transmission of the Scriptures (understood as the Bible).

St. Thomas' attitude on this point is elucidated in another text not cited by Father Tavard. In the *de Veritate* we find the following objection laid against the necessity of man possessing faith: ". . . *ea quae sunt fidei, in nos per multa media devenerunt.* A Deo enim dicta sunt apostolis vel prophetis, a quibus in successores eorum, et deinceps in alios et sic usque ad nos pervenerunt *per media diversa.* Non autem in omnibus istis mediis certum est esse infallibilem veritatem: quia cum homines fuerint, decipi et decipere potuerunt. Ergo nullam certitudinem habere possumus de his quae sunt fidei; et ita stultum videtur his assentire." The emphasis here, and the force, therefore, of the argument is the multiplicity of the media through which divine revelation is transmitted. Not a word is said about the writing down of the revelation; but that the living word is passed on in the Christian community both by preaching and by writing is strongly implied by the use of the term *media diversa.* The Angelic Doctor's answer to this objection is equally enlightening without regard to his own mind. ". . . omnia media per quae fides ad nos venit, suspicione carent. Prophetis etiam et apostolis credimus ex hoc quod eis Dominus testimonium perhibuit miracula faciendo. . . . Successoribus autem eorum non credimus nisi in quantum nobis annuntiat ea quae illi in scriptis reliquerunt." [2] From this response we can gather that although St. Thomas was well aware that certain things had been passed on from age to age in the Christian community without their having been written down by the apostles,[3] still the great emphasis is upon the *written* tradition—*quae in scriptis reliquerunt.* Here again it is difficult to determine whether or not St. Thomas is referring exclusively to the Apostles and the Prophets which he mentions earlier in the text, or whether his view takes in the non-canonical transmission of divine revelation in the writings of those who are the successors of the Apostles.

Father Tavard's study becomes increasingly interesting when he begins to trace what he terms a "breakdown" in this synthesis, a process which began long before the Protestant Reformation, and which he considers to be one of the major contributing factors in the preparing of the ground for this movement away from Catholic unity. It is difficult to distinguish clearly the elements which make-up the "seeds of discord." Among them, however, may be included an exaggerated papalism and an uncertainty about just where revelation stops and the tradition of revelation begins.

One of the best sections of the entire volume includes the chapters which the author devotes to the doctrines of Luther and Calvin respectively on

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[2] *de Veritate*, qu. 14, art. 10, arg. 11^{um} et resp.

[3] Cf. *Summa theol.*, III, 25, 3, ad 4^{um} (quoted by Tavard, p. 21).

this question. One is able to see clearly that there are two quite distinct traditions within Protestantism on the question of the Bible and the Church; and if we add the Anglican position (treated in the last chapter of the volume) these traditions become three. It is, therefore, not quite correct to speak simply of the "Protestant doctrine" regarding the Scriptures.

Perhaps most discussion concerning this book will eventually be centered around the manner in which the author treats the Catholic solution of the problem raised in the 16th century by the Protestants' formulation of the idea of *sola Scriptura* (understood in the Lutheran, Calvinist, or Anglican sense). The problem was stated in this way: are there two distinct sources of divine revelation, sc., the Scriptures and unwritten traditions, so that we can speak of divine revelation being contained *partly* in the Bible, and *partly* in the aforementioned traditions. Before the Reformation, during the 16th century, at the Council of Trent, and subsequent to it, many Catholic theologians would answer this question in the affirmative. At all these times, however, other theologians would either deny it or, which is much more common, state that this is not the best way of putting the question, i. e., that the problem is not quite so simple as that.

The merit of Father Tavard's treatment of this question lies, first of all, in his having showed clearly that throughout the entire history of the Church (and even during the time of the polemic of the counter-Reformation) primacy is always given to the Sacred Scriptures as a source of coming to know the Word of God. He also rightly insists that at all times some Catholic authors have stated flatly that Scripture suffices as a source of revelation.[4]

For all this, the reviewer should like to suggest that Father Tavard seems so to interpret the doctrine of the Council of Trent that it appears almost illegitimate to hold that divine revelation has been transmitted *partim* in the Holy Scriptures and *partim* through unwritten traditions. It is an established fact that the Council did consider a text on the acceptance of the sources of revelation in which the terms *partim . . . partim* were employed, but that in the final draft of the decree these terms do not appear. Rather, we read ". . . hanc veritatem et disciplinam contineri in libris scriptis et sine scripto traditionibus, etc."[5] Still the *reason* for the deletion of these words is not revealed in any of the diaries of the conciliar Fathers, nor in the minutes of the meetings of the commission

[4] Fr. Congar points out that Cardinal Newman expressed this view in the *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine.* Cf. "Sainte Ecriture et Sainte Eglise," *Rev. des Sc. Phil. et Theol.*, XLIV (1960), p. 81.

[5] Decr. de Symbolo—de canonicis Scripturis (Sess. IV, 8 April, 1846), D. 783. This entire text should be read carefully.

which dealt with this matter. Another author has suggested, rather forcefully, that this silence is an indication that the deletion had no significance as regards the sentiments of the members of the commission and the conciliar Fathers.[6]

Father Tavard is certainly right in stating that the Council "focused attention on apostolicity, whether Scriptural or extra-Scriptural, as the hallmark of Revelation" (p. 197). It is for this reason that one might venture to suggest that, whatever the contingent reason for the deletion of the *partim . . . partim* may have been, the striking out *is* providential. The present text emphasizes much more the *apostolic unity* of divine revelation and its transmission. Here, however, it might be well to quote a rather lengthy passage to illustrate how the author seems to push this idea to its extreme limit:

> The conception of Scripture and the traditions which was formulated by the Council of Trent is authoritative for Catholic theology. The story of the debates that led to the decree points to the meaning of this formulation.
>
> The dynamic element which constitutes the source (*fons*) of all saving truth and all Christian behaviour, is the Gospel of Christ, the Word spoken by Christ and communicated to the Church through the Apostles. It is the living Word. It carries the power of the Holy Spirit. This dynamic element uses two sets of vessels: Holy Scripture and traditions. In as far as they convey the same Gospel of Christ, in as far as they channel the original impetus whereby the Spirit moved the Apostles, both Scriptures and traditions are entitled to the same adhesion of faith. For faith reaches Christ and the Spirit whatever the medium used to contact us.
>
> This would logically imply that the whole Gospel is contained in Scripture as it is also contained in the traditions. Yet this was not made explicit at Trent. In view of divergences on this among the Bishops, it could hardly have been made explicit. Nevertheless, *the weight of the debates favours this implication. For the opposite conception, that the Gospel is only partly in Scripture and partly in the traditions, was explicitly excluded* (p. 208; italics added).

The reason for quoting this text in full is that it shows at once the strength of Father Tavard's presentation of the role that the Bible plays in the life of the Church, and also the hardiness of his conclusion, a hardiness which might be questioned on the basis of the lack of evidence. Did the Conciliar Fathers *explicitly exclude* the *partim . . . partim* text as not faithfully expressing the Catholic tradition on the question? From one

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[6] Lenners, H., S. J., "*Scriptura Sola?*" *Gregorianum*, XL (1959), p. 50. "Wenn die Konzilsväter zuerst das Dekret mit *partim-partim* angenommen haben ohne eine Bemerkung dazu zu machen . . . und wenn sie nachher das Dekret ohne *partim-partim* wiederum in gleicher Weise angenommen haben, ohne eine Bemerkung dazu zu machen, so dürfte das doch wohl ein Zeichen dafür sein, dass es nach der Ansicht der Väter für den Sinn des Dekretes und seine Lehre ohne jede Bedeutung ist, ob das *partim-partim* im Dekret gesagt wird oder nicht. Der Sinn des Dekretes wird dadurch nicht berührt."

point of view this is merely an historical question, i. e., what was the mind of this body of men? From another angle, however, it is important theologically. Certainly the debate is not finished. Father Tavard may be thanked for having stated the one position with such force.

Now to leave this controversial point, attention ought to be called to the significance of this doctrine of " the mutual inherence of Church and of Scripture " (pp. 115 and 142) for Catholic ecclesiology. This notion rules out when Father Congar calls the " associationist " concept of the Church.[7] In other words, the Sacred Scriptures are not merely a handbook of information and rules composed for and by an ecclesiastical association for the use of its members. Of course, we do not need to know that the Church and the Scriptures " mutually inhere " one in the other to have rejected that sort of concept. The rejection is implicit in the doctrine of the Church as the Mystical Body. The *Church is a mystery*! The point here is that the Word of God in the Church is part of that mystery. The Bible might be called, in this context, the Word of God upon which the Mystical Body of the Church is nourished. Insofar as the Bible is a certain *documentum* it needs to be certified in the Church. The reason for this is that the Bible was written *for* the Church. This is becoming increasingly evident, for example, with regard to the Gospels. The early catechesis was written not merely so that the missionaries might have a *vade mecum* of sermon material. It was more for the Christian community, especially for the liturgical worship of the community. We need not necessarily conclude, however, as Father Tavard seems to, that the reading of a given piece of literature in the liturgical assembly was the criterion for the establishment of the biblical canon. (p. 6).

Still, there is another way of looking at the Bible, i. e., simply as the inspired Word of God, as a book which *contains* God's Word, which is pregnant with Divine Truth. In this sense the Bible *is* constitutive of the Church, just as the sacraments are " Church building elements." This is an opportune concluding point, namely, that Father Tavard's book calls attention to the truth that the Catholic Church is not merely the Church of the Seven Sacraments. She is also in a very real sense the Church of the Word. Perhaps the Protestant Reformation has made Catholic theologians shy away from such expressions. There is no need to be afraid of this truth, however. As a matter of fact, the stating of the whole truth about the Church (and this means especially making explicitly the principles of a sound ecclesiology in a theological and not merely apologetic context) is Catholic ecumenism.

Bonaventure M. Schepers, O. P.

Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

[7] *Art. cit.*, p. 86.

BRIEF NOTICES

The Responsibility of the Artist. By Jacques Maritain. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960. Pp. 120. $2.95.

In this little book Maritain contemplates the artist and his work in relation to the social community and to his own perfection as a man. Citing the traditional distinction between prudence and art, he shows that while each is formally distinct, art nevertheless because it resides in a man is indirectly regulated by prudence, so that in the long run the artist will suffer, as artist, if he ceases to live as a man. Art also must be considered in relation to the queen of all the virtues, charity, for it is only by growth in this that an artist may "purify his sources" and arrive, after great storm and struggle, at some integration between the demands of his work and his life.

Charity is the key to the responsibility of the artist, for if he loves truth and his fellowmen he will never seek to corrupt either. It is on the basis of a refinement of this thought that Maritain sees the role of the community in censorship. If what the artist does is an incitation to evil action and not just an attempt to impart ideas (admitting the difficulty in distinguishing the two), the civil community has a right to interfere. It is another matter with the supernatural society which is the Church since the common good here is divine truth communicated to men and the inner life of grace vivifying them. Ideas disseminated in such a society obviously cannot be opposed to the truth revealed by God.

The best wine in this book is kept until the end where Maritain discusses the problems facing the sincere artist who wants to be a saint. His extreme sensitivity to material beauty, his temptation to taste evil in order to know it, and to be too much in sympathy with the evil characters he depicts, all throw up what seem to some artists an insurmountable barrier to sanctity. "Il faudrait être un saint . . . Mais alors on n'écrirait pas de roman," is the way Mauriac said it. Maritain does not diminish the difficulty but still finds reasons for encouragement. His words should be read by all artists fighting the good fight and swimming, as best they can, against a very considerable stream.

Thomas R. Heath, O. P.

St. Mary's College,
Notre Dame, Indiana

The World as Will and Representation. By Arthur Schopenhauer. Tr. by E. F. J. Payne. Indian Hills, Colorado: The Falcon's Wing Press, 1958. Vol. I, pp. 534; Vol. II, pp. 687. $17.50.

Schopenhauer shares with Nietzsche the distinction, rare among German philosophers, of being a writer who is both clear and outspoken, who lightens his pages with many striking examples, and not infrequently delights the reader with passages of striking beauty. In fact, he was more of a poet than a philosopher. One who reads him for his philosophy may find many insights, acute observations, and an interesting criticism of Kant; but from the point of view of systematic thought, this voluntaristic and pessimistic view of reality has little to commend it beyond drawing attention to what is undoubtedly one aspect of reality, yet by no means the principal one. There is no need here to dwell on the many internal contradictions and defects that have been pointed out by others, such as Fr. Copleston in his work on Schopenhauer, and more briefly by J. Collins in his history of modern European philosophy.

It speaks well for the translation that the reader is hardly aware that what he is reading is not the original. An introduction explains the translator's aims, and indicates the principal German terms and the vocabulary adopted to express them, especially where previous translations have been thought insufficient, or likely to cause confusion. Only recently the full and original text of Schopenhauer has been made available, largely owing to the scholarly and constant researches of Dr. Arthur Hübscher, president of the Schopenhauer Gesellschaft; it is this text which has been used in the present edition, thus giving us what must be reckoned the standard critical edition in English. One is grateful also that the work appears in two volumes, with all the supplementary chapters later added by Schopenhauer collected in the second volume. When Schopenhauer refers to Kant, the translator helpfully gives also the reference to Müller's english translation of the Critique of Pure Reason; and many readers will be grateful for his rendering into english, in foot-notes, of the numerous greek and latin or french quotations which Shopenhauer loved to introduce into his text. A very complete index adds greatly to the usefulness of this scholarly work; and the publisher, with these two beautifully bound volumes, would, we feel sure, please even the fastidious Pessimist, gloomy Poet, and would-be Philosopher, who was so sure that he, and he alone, had uncovered the secret of the universe, and would therefore be read as long as men thirsted after the truth.

Ambrose J. McNicholl, O.P.

Angelicum, Rome

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